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Poor People's Perceptions and Different Forms of Clientelism

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Gaps in the Literature

- **Inadequate Attention to Citizen Demands:**
 - Material-based view of client's demands – why and when do people turn to vote-buying
 - No client agency (offered = accept)
- **Failure to Differentiate between Traditional and Modern Clientelism**
- **Lack Insights into When Traditional or Modern Clientelism Prevails, or its Dynamics**
- **Tension with Redistribution Literature – which sees Poor as Demanding Redistribution**




Fundamental Innovations

- **Consider Perceptions of the Poor:**
 - Horizontal Efficacy
 - Legitimacy of Social Inequality
 - *consider these as related*
- **Incorporate the Role of Social Psychology – Parents’ interest in legitimizing inequality, protect self-esteem**
- **Incorporate the Role of Information and Isolation – the Access to other information**
- **See as Choice between Redistribution and Clientelistic Benefit**



Initial Empirical Evidence: Values and Support for Clientelistic/Redistributive Parties



Efficacy: how often voters are offered a genuine choice in elections.

Injustice perception: WVS respondents say incomes should be made more equal *and* success comes from luck and connections.

Poverty: WVS income question asking asses their income status on a 1-10 scale.



The Model: Citizens' Choices

- **Citizens Live for Two Periods**
- **Citizens' Choice of Clientelism**
 - Value of Clientelism (unless redistribution wins)
 - Value of Redistribution (only if it wins)
 - Costs of Inequality (young vs. old, and worse if old and delegitimized)
 - Costs of Clientelism
- **Citizens' Choice of Redistribution**
 - Loss of Transfer
 - Belief of Group Solidarity/Identification affect estimation of prob(succeed)
- **Candidate – offers T, minimize success at minimal cost**



Model Dynamics

- **Over time, Perceived Efficacy Updated** – so $p_{t+1} = p_t^*$ (capital stays the same)
- **Each generation** – begin with p_t , exposed to information $\rightarrow p_t^!$ (Individuals' expectations), patron picks T, and choice made.
- **Results depend on percentage choosing Redistribution**
- **Recall** – horizontal efficacy changes perception of success from p^i to $p^i + g$




Endogenizing Legitimacy Perceptions

- Legitimacy perceptions need not equal “true” level
- Impacted by: “true” level + Parent’s efforts to shield children
- Degree of impact depends on alternative sources of information -- Connectivity




Dynamics: Low Connectivity



p Efficacy Perception
 θ Inequality Delegation



Dynamics: High Connectivity





Results (Selected)

1. Patrons pay less to those who have low group identification, low injustice perceptions, or low ideological cost of clientelism
2. Shocks in populations with little diversity (homogenous re: inefficacy or legitimation of social inequality) can have little long-term impact.
3. Large shocks – even when parents have low efficacy – can lead to change: a) either clientelism/mix or redistributive (depends on perceptions of injustice and gains from redistribution)



Information matters...

4. In Low Connectivity areas, efficacy and legitimacy reinforcing
→ low clientelism or high clientelism (traditional clientelism)
5. Informationally connected areas result in intermediate states
of clientelism (modern clientelism)

In short: Traditional Clientelism is hard to change, and Citizens Gain Less