***Abstracts***

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**Panel 1: *Legacies***

***Christian Missions, Traditional Authorities and Social Insurance Networks in Malawi***

Kate Baldwin (Yale University) and Ellen Lust (Gothenburg University)

This paper studies the long-term effects of Christian missionaries on social structures and social insurance networks. The activities of Western missionaries implicitly and explicitly challenged the position of traditional authorities, and therefore we hypothesize that they made them weaker sources of assistance in the long-run. We also examine whether the churches and organizations established by missionaries were able to provide alternative sources of assistance. We draw on evidence from Malawi, a country in which late 19th century missionary expansion -- inspired by David Livingstone -- occurred quickly and in advance of British colonial power. We pair information on the location of missions and missionaries prior to World War I with data from the Malawi GLB survey. In communities with early access to missionaries, we find that traditional leaders are weakened and citizens are unlikely to turn to them for assistance; however, we do not find that citizens can turn to church leaders or church organizations in their place. This suggests a weakening of social insurance networks in these communities.

***Legacy Institutions and Political Order in Weak States: Evidence from Chad***

Paul Thissen (University of California, Berkeley)

This paper investigates variation in the ability of non-state institutions to produce political order in weak states, presenting evidence from interviews and a survey experiment in Chad. In some places, chieftaincies, clans, sultanates, or kingdoms perform many of the functions of a state: enforcing legal codes, collecting taxes, guaranteeing property rights, and ensuring security. The leaders of some such institutions demonstrate an impressive command over their followers. Yet in other places, residents feel free to disobey their leaders with impunity. Why are leaders of some non-state institutions able to command compliance from their followers while others are not? To address this question, this paper presents data from in-depth interviews and a survey conducted in several peripheral regions of Chad between 2015 and 2017. These interviews reveal how centuries-old institutions can command greater compliance. People grow up believing in the institution's legitimacy, and they believe they will be punished if they disobey its leader. In contrast, people do not consider newer institutions -- such as those created during the colonial area or later -- to hold as much legitimacy. And they are not sure whether such newer institutions are capable of enforcing their decisions. Original data from a survey of 2,300 Chadian villagers supports the argument that people comply more with older institutions.

***The Legacy of Development Planning: Evidence from Tanzania***

Ruth Carlitz (Gothenburg University) and Ameet Morjaria (Northwestern University)

This paper examines the long-term impact of a major episode of development planning in post-independence Tanzania. Specifically, we focus on the legacy of *Ujamaa* villages introduced in mainland Tanzania over the period 1974-1982. Using historical maps, we generate finely-grained estimates of the extent of villagization, which we then combine with data from population censuses and recent national household surveys. This allows us to investigate the extent to which variation in the intensity of the government’s forced resettlement program explains subnational variation in social and economic outcomes today. We document that, in the short-run, villagization led to an increase in various educational outcomes, such as primary school completion rates, literacy rates, and total years of schooling. Today, districts which experienced a high share of developmental villages have greater availability of some public goods and citizens report higher rates of participation in community activities, but there is worse perception of corruption among government officials and greater rejection of one-party rule. Per capita household consumption is also significantly lower in districts with historically high levels of the treatment measure. To address potential endogeneity in village formation, we report instrumental variable results based on variation in ethnolinguistic fragmentation and the occurrence of droughts in the 1970s which facilitated the resettlement of peasants into villages. We conclude by providing some preliminary evidence on the lack of economic diversification as well as political alignment with the ruling party as possible channels which explain the legacy of the villagization experiment.

**Panel 2: *Integration into the State***

***Traditional Institutions of Governance: Friend or Foe of Development?***

Daniela Behr, Ph.D. Candidate, Dept. Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz

In many states around the world, besides a state-sanctioned, formal sphere of governance, there exists another, second dimension of governance: traditional governance. Traditional leaders are heads of ethnic groups typically holding a hereditary position which they obtain according to the customs of their ethnic communities. They take on key functions within the society at large and as such often exist alongside, on top of, or sometimes in conflict with the formal state apparatus. In this paper, I investigate how states deal with this situation of so-called dualism. Drawing on a novel dataset on the constitutional integration of traditional institutions around the world, I estimate whether countries that enshrine provisions on traditional governance in their current constitutions are better off in terms of socio-economic development. In a series of multivariate regressions, I explore the developmental consequences of the constitutional recognition of three main categories of rights: (1) ethnic group rights, including cultural, social, political, economic, and land rights; (2) the constitutional recognition of traditional leaders (e.g., chiefs, headmen) and traditional bodies (such as council of elders; national houses of chiefs); (3) the constitutional recognition of customary rules and norms. Overall, the results suggest that the constitutional recognition of group rights is positively associated with a country’s socio- economic development, while the constitutional recognition of traditional leaders/bodies as well as customary law is negatively associated with development.

***Rescaling the rules for multi-level governance: A constitutional economics approach to political decentralization***

Emmanuel Frimpong Boamah (State University of New York, Buffalo)

This paper concerns itself with the ‘rules’ often chosen to frame political decentralization. It seeks to challenge researchers and policymakers to have another look at the root causes of bad governance and poor developmental outcomes experienced especially in developing countries. Issues such as corruption, weak institutional capacity, and financial constraints that characterize multi-level governance in these countries are potentially the effects of “ill-conceived” constitutional rules. Specifically, I draw on key ideas from constitutional economics to problematize the constitutional rules that frame the prevailing decentralization paradigm in postcolonial African countries such as Ghana. I argue that the constitutional rules for Ghana’s decentralization evince state control of, and dominance over, local governing processes, and are evidence of a systemic transfer of the logics and instruments of an authoritarian military regime. Grounding the study within comparative historical analyses, I find that, first, the procedural mechanisms in choosing the constitutional rules were based on populist, rather than rational, discourse championed by special interest groups who were backed by military force. Second, the rules were not chosen in a manner that genuinely supported the preferences of citizens. Third, these constitutional rules were and are changed through a mix of explicit constitutional and explicit unconstitutional procedural mechanisms. In these discussions, I delineate key effects, or governance tensions, evidenced in these findings. One such effect is the state’s use of ‘territorial fixes’ to address ‘wicked’ local problems; this manifests prominently through the state’s (re)drawing of boundaries and creating new local governments without commensurate improvement in local democratic and pro-poor developmental outcomes. I propose two measures to initiate conversations into alternative visions for political decentralization in postcolonial African countries: decentralizing the constitutional rules through a nested, three-tier decentralization rule system, and de/re-territorializing the reified, territorial conception of state power to respond to the inherent dynamism of multi-level governance.

***Informal Institutions Under an Expanding State: A field experiment on community policing in Papua New Guinea***

Jasper Cooper (Columbia University)

This study takes advantage of a unique opportunity to examine how the expansion of the state's policing apparatus into areas primarily policed by chiefs and vigilantes affects the provision of order. In late 2015, remote villages in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, were assigned at random to have or not have a nominated community member become a uniformed officer of the state's community police force, permanently present in the village. In a household-level survey carried out in late 2016, 8 months after the community police have been working in the selected communities, I find no evidence to support the notion that the expansion of state services crowds out informal institutions, or that local elites ``capture'' decentralized agents of the state. Rather, community police appear to complement informal policing institutions by catering to women, who are typically disadvantaged by informal justice providers. There is some evidence that this complementarity improves order: respondents are less likely to report incidents of theft, alcoholism or domestic violence in their community. These findings, however, are not corroborated by individual victimization measures.

**Panel 3: *Shifting Modes of Non-State Rule***

***Tribes without Sheikhs? Technological Change, Media Liberalization, and Authority in Networked Jordan***

Geoffrey Hughes (London School of Economics)

This paper examines how Jordan’s rapidly evolving media sector is transforming the nature of authority in Jordan. An older generation of leaders, known as sheikhs, confronts technologies they often don’t understand and a new generation that has little respect for their elders’ genealogical claims. Amidst a proliferation of social media tools that allow young people to use the idiom of the tribe to act quickly and decisively—even violently—in the political field without regard for their elders, the Jordanian government seeks to reassert control over a media sector that is increasingly international, for-profit, and privately held. Yet a new generation of would-be tribal leaders is rushing into the breech. Drawing on case studies of various would-be tribal leaders, this paper argues that the future of authority in Jordan will depend on the continued ability of leaders to use media to move between various scales, representing themselves individually while also convincingly standing in for lineages of various sizes and, indeed, the nation itself.

***Criminal Topographies: Rethinking Criminal Politics as State-Building***

Eduardo Moncada (Barnard College)

Why do criminal organizations build strikingly different types of governing arrangements across territory? Emerging research on the politics of crime finds that criminal organizations often function like “quasi-states” that provide a variety of goods and services in the territories under their control. But less clear is what explains variation in the nature and scope of criminal governance across space. Different “criminal topographies” have equally distinct effects on dimensions of daily life for the social groups that operate within these territories, including order, subsistence, and political voice. To explain this variation, I build a new analytic framework that focuses on the strategic calculations of criminal rulers. Criminal rulers weigh the economic and political costs and benefits associated with incorporating territorial enclaves into their criminal empires. The particular configuration of these costs and benefits shape whether and what form of criminal governance rulers pursue. I illustrate the analytic utility of the framework through an analysis of territorial variation in criminal rule in Latin America. The paper draws from and contributes to broader lines of research on institution-building and state formation.

***\*Paper TBD***

Lily Tsai (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

**Panel 4: *Conflict***

***Configurations of Wartime Governance and their Legacies on Political Behavior***

Ana Arjona (Northwestern University)

Non-state armed groups such as insurgencies, militias, and criminal organizations often take on governance functions in the localities they seek to control. Even though these groups often monopolize the use of violence, they seldom monopolize political power and authority: other actors—including religious, ethnic, and civic leaders as well as state agents—continue to play important roles. There is great variation in the roles that these different influential actors play in local governance in conflict zones and the ways in which they interact with each other. This paper investigates the legacies of different configurations of local governance during wartime on citizens’ political behavior in the post-war period. I rely on original data on Colombia, where different types of armed groups transformed local governance in radical ways for decades within the context of a civil war. Using detailed data on governance by guerrillas, paramilitaries, ethnic leaders, civic authorities, and state agencies during the war, I trace the effects on political behavior by relying on an individual-level survey conducted in the same communities after both guerrillas and paramilitaries demobilized.

***Traditional Governance, Political Dualism and Intra-State Conflict***

Katharina Holzinger (University of Konstanz)

Across the world, many ethnic groups still practice their own, traditional forms of political organization. These traditional forms of governance co-exist with state institutions at the local or regional level in about two-thirds of the UN member states. This co-existence implies a legal and political pluralism that has the potential to cause severe conflicts over authority between the groups and the state. This poses the question to which degree and under which conditions the political pluralism of indigenous and state governance leads to violent intra-state conflict.

Thus far, the role of the groups’ traditional governance and its role within state polities has largely been ignored. Previous research has shown that politically relevant ethnic groups that are excluded from government have a higher risk of engaging in violent action. In respect to traditional governance, research has shown that more centralized traditional institutions are better at bargaining with the state, which leads to a decrease of the risk of intra-state conflict. However, these institutions also have a stronger basis to mobilize against the state, which is likely to increase conflicts with the state. Finally, it has been claimed that power-sharing institutions may serve as a remedy to peacefully negotiate conflicts.

We argue that the way traditional governance of indigenous groups affects violent outcomes depends on their political relevance and mobilization potential, but that it is moderated by the way indigenous groups and their forms of governance are legally acknowledged and integrated with the state. In order to explore how the mobilization potential and the legal integration of indigenous groups relates to the risk of internal conflict, this paper draws (1) on a new dataset which codes the political integration of indigenous groups and traditional governance in the constitutions of all 193 UN member states and (2) on survey data on more than 1,000 indigenous groups worldwide. Employing logistic regression, we find support for our argument.

***Laws in Conflict: Legacies of War and Legal Pluralism in Chechnya***

Egor Lazarev (Columbia University)

How does exposure to conflict affect choices between state and non-state legal orders? This paper studies this question in post-war Chechnya, where Russian state law coexists with Sharia and customary law. I focus on the effect of conflict-induced disruption of gender hierarchies, because of the highly gendered nature of the conflict and because state law assumes gender equality, while non-state legal orders are explicitly discriminatory against women. The study leverages variation within Chechnya and compares Chechnya with its neighbor, Ingushetia, which has similar constellations of legal orders but was not affected by war. The analysis relies on semi-structured interviews, original population surveys, and data on court cases. I find that women in Chechnya are more likely to rely on state law than men and that this gender gap in legal preferences and behavior is especially large in more victimized communities. In Ingushetia this gap is absent. I infer from this that the conflict empowered women in Chechnya to pursue their interests through state law – albeit not without resistance. My qualitative research suggests that this conflict-induced change has generated a strong backlash from the post-conflict Chechen government, which has attempted to reinstate a patriarchal order by promoting rigid interpretations of customary law and Sharia. I conclude that that conflict may induce legal mobilization among marginalized individuals and groups, and that gender might become a central ordering cleavage during state-building processes in post-conflict environments.

***Legal Pluralism and State Legitimacy After Conflict: A Survey Experiment in Mosul***

Mara Revkin (Yale University) and Kristen Kao (Gothenburg University)

In post-conflict settings where state and non-state legal orders coexist within the same territory, what factors determine individual preferences among alternative providers of justice and order? Are some people more prone to favor legal pluralism versus believing in the legitimacy of a single legal system for all cases? Or does it depend on the type of crime committed? Through a survey experiment conducted in the Iraqi city of Mosul, where the population has been exposed to three alternative justice systems– state, tribal, and Islamic–we explore the relationship between state legitimacy and support for non-state legal authorities. The experiment will help use to parse out who is most likely to prefer legal pluralism–the application of different types of laws to different types of situations–in contrast to others who believe in the legitimacy of a single legal system to decide all cases that come before the law. We also expect, among other hypotheses, that Iraqis who stayed in Mosul after the Islamic State (IS) arrived in June 2014 (“stayers) are more likely to prefer non-state legal authorities, whether tribal or Islamic, over state legal authorities in comparison with those who fled to government–controlled areas (“leavers). Whether the data support or disconfirm these hypotheses, the results will have important implications for efforts by governments to establish legitimacy in areas where their sovereignty has been challenged by non-state actors.

**Panel 5: *Service Provision***

***Introducing the Tribal Leaders Survey – Governance in American Indian and Alaska Native Nations***

Florian G. Kern (University of Essex), Kristian Skrede (University of Essex), and Rebecca Cordell (Arizona State University).

We introduce the Tribal Leaders Survey - the first installment of a web-based survey, gathering opinions of tribal leaders in the over 500 federally recognized American Indian and Alaska Native (AI/AN) Nations in the United States. The survey includes questions on attitudes to various governance issues and policies, including security, employment, health, relationships with the federal government, inter-tribal relations, government openness, and constituent participation. The survey offers a comparative perspective on contemporary governance in AI/AN communities, an area that has been widely absent from main stream political science, and provides a basis for comparative studies on indigenous governance institutions. We provide an overview of the methodology used as well as some initial descriptive findings from the survey.

***“You must only drink one cup” Revisiting the Tension Between “Kikombe cha Babu” and biomedicine in Tanzania***

Alexander Makulilo (University of Dar es Salaam)

In 2011 tens of thousands of people from all over East Africa flocked to Loliondo in Tanzania seeking a cure for several diseases, including diabetes, tuberculosis and HIV. Ambilikile Mwasapile, a former Lutheran pastor, administered a miracle dose popularly known as “kikombe” charging about $0.33 for his concoction per patient. The Tanzania’s National Institute for Medical Research concluded that while the dose in Babu’s “cup” was safe, it did not endorse such drink as a "cure." In this paper, I revisit the Traditional and Alternative Medicine Act of 2002 in order to understand the tension that exists between traditional health practice and biomedicine in providing health services in Tanzania. I argue that although there is a tendency by the government to regulate and set standards for traditional health remedies and practices, that trend is a contradiction since it compels traditional health practice to work like biomedicine. Yet, despite the existence of the law, several traditional health practitioners are not registered thereby posing a serious challenge for the government to exert effective control over them.

***Precolonial Legacies and Institutional Congruence in Decentralized West Africa: Assessing the Roles of Elected and Traditional Actors on Local Public Goods Delivery***

Martha Wilfahrt (Northwestern University)

Scholars have long identified political bias in how African politicians distribute state resources. Much of this literature has focused on the motivations of the central state or on the role of group identities, such as ethnicity, to explain varying distributional outcomes. In this paper, I shift focus to local governments, increasingly important players in basic social service provision, to argue that public goods allocation under democratic decentralization is shaped by the presence or absence of informal social institutions, which embed local state and non-state elites in dense social networks and shared behavioral norms. I suggest that this is explained by varying degrees of congruence between formal and informal institutions within local governments. It is the relative overlap of formal institutional space of the local state, created and reformed from above, and local social institutions, inherited from the past, I argue, that determines the nature of local redistribution under decentralization: broad and equalizing in cases of high congruence or contentious and targeted in areas where it is low.

Looking to the West African state of Senegal, I find that informal social institutions are uniquely robust across villages in areas that were home to precolonial states. These areas are home to persistent, grassroots group identities and denser cross-village social ties, particularly among elites such as local elected officials, notables or village chiefs. Drawing on interviews with rural Senegalese elected and traditional authorities between 2013-2017, I demonstrate how the precolonial past shapes local politics today via the social identities and dense social ties it left behind. A unique, geocoded dataset of village-level public goods investments allows me to assess the degree to which areas that were home to precolonial states distribute goods more broadly across space. The findings underscore how state and non-state actors interact at the grassroots and, in turn, how the structure of their relationships to each other drive emerging sub-national variation in local government performance following decentralization.

**Panel 6: *Layered Authority: Complementing or Contradicting?***

***Institutional Layering and Political Stability***

Jennifer Murtazashvili (University of Pittsburgh)

Institutional layering refers to shared authority between informal and formal authorities. This paper uses the literature on self-governance and self-enforcing constitutions to clarity when institutional layering is stable and socially beneficial. To be stable, institutional layers must reflect the interests of all relevant participants in the system of shared governance. Specifically, there must be transparent and public limitations on the authority of government officials, the power-sharing arrangement must be in the interest of both government officials and informal powerholders, and powerful groups must have an interest in power-sharing. To be socially beneficial, informal powerholders must be constrained and accountable. I illustrate the framework by first considering the structure of customary governance in Afghanistan. I then compare the stability and effectiveness of layering in Afghanistan and extends the framework to two additional contexts: Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

***Whose Authority? State Versus Non-State Actors Influence Over Community Projects***

Kristen Kao, (Gothenburg University) and Ellen Lust (Gothenburg University)

Using an original tablet-based survey conducted in Malawi, this paper tests the differential effects of authority in motivating citizens to engage in activities for the communal good. A community leader with authority from either the state, popular elections, or tradition, was shown at random to the respondent. This leader was said to support an activity, also randomly shown. These activities included participation in a national plant a tree day, vote for a parliamentary candidate, contributing to a village bank, and participating in a community watch program. After being presented with a randomly selected description of the program as well as a randomly selected leader endorsing it, the respondent was asked how likely he or she would be to participate in an activity for the collective good. We find interesting variation in the ability of leaders endowed with varying authority to motivate citizens to engage in community-building efforts.

***Social Norm Conflict and Layered Authority***

Lina Erikkson (University of Gothenburg)

Social norms govern many aspects of human life, and we routinely and often unconsciously adjust our behaviour to fit in with the social norms around us. But sometimes social norms conflict: we are both expected to do and held accountable for doing one thing, and expected to not do that very thing, indeed, we might be sanctioned if we do. These types of situations can arise in many circumstances, but one of them is when the social norms of traditional society and non-state arenas conflict with the social norms that characterize state institutions. This paper explores the kind of decision situations that agents find themselves in when acting in contexts where the social norms of different layers of authority conflict, and outlines factors that can be expected to influence how agents deal with such norm conflicts.