

*Abstracts*

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***Bureaucrats, Accountability, and Public Sector Program Success:***

***A Conjoint Experiment Among African Bureaucrats***

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Does social accountability make public sector programs more effective and less corruptible? Although this question figures prominently across theories of development, it has been difficult to meaningfully assess the effects of accountability on the success of public programs. This paper examines this relationship through a conjoint survey experiment administered to thousands of bureaucrats across three African countries: Ghana, Malawi and Uganda. By asking bureaucrats about two hypothetical programs with randomly assigned characteristics, we examine whether bureaucrats associate opportunities for monitoring or collaboration by social actors with the success of public sector programs. The findings suggest that, across diverse country and organizational contexts, bureaucrats consistently attribute high probabilities of success to programs that are visible to the public, transparent in their implementation, and open to collaboration with civil society. These findings suggest that social accountability is indeed an important ingredient for the potential success of public sector programs in the developing world.

### ***The Legacies of Wartime Institutions on Citizens' Preferences for the Rule of Law***

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What are the political legacies of civil war? This paper focuses on a political outcome that has so far been neglected, but is crucial to the advancement of post-conflict peace, democracy, and economic development: the rule of law. We investigate the legacies of wartime institutions on civilians' support for repressive, extralegal measures in order to combat crime. Living in a conflict zone can entail experiencing the erosion of institutions as well as seeing the emergence of new ones and enduring the highly authoritarian rule of an armed actor. We argue that both experiences can impact civilians' political attitudes. Relying on original data on individuals, households and communities in Colombia, we find that the collapse of institutions and the ensuing insecurity during wartime do not lead civilians to endorse extralegal measures in order to combat crime, as is often assumed. On the other hand, civilians who receive protection from armed groups during war are more likely to disregard the rule of law. Finally, enduring the authoritarian rule of armed groups has mixed effects on civilians' preferences for the rule of law.

### ***The Case for Community Gender-Accountability Coalition for Local Development in Northeast Nigeria.***

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Women's exclusion from accountability programming for social provisioning and service delivery at the local level in both aid-driven and state-funded developmental enterprise is widely known. As top-down developmental frameworks give way to more citizen-led modalities, collaborative strategies to local level development are increasingly broadly accepted as effective for achieving social change through community processes of participation and accountability. While the World Development Report's framework identifies 'coalitions' as the mechanism through which "citizens" make effective

accountability claims on service providers, it stops short of specifying the nature of these coalitions and how they build collaborative capacities to hold state and non-state providers accountable. This paper delineates a framework that centers community gender-accountability coalitions (CGAC) for citizen-led demands for women-inclusive accountability programming for access to resources and service delivery at the community level. This paper focuses on non-state funded education service delivery with an emphasis on Education in Emergency (EiE) contexts and uses original data from survey questionnaire and semi in-depth interviews conducted in January 2018, in the Northeastern Nigerian states of Bauchi and Yola among internally displaced persons (IDP) host-communities dealing with the Boko Haram crisis. The paper suggests that the structure and density of social network maintained by members of the community gender-accountability coalition determines its success in mediating the unique constraints women encounter with accessing public services and strengthening women's voice in demanding service delivery that works.

***Does Accountability Strengthen Local Financial Autonomy? Evidence from Local Revenues Mobilization in Accra and Nairobi***

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The mobilization of local revenues is an ongoing challenge in many Sub-Saharan urban municipalities. This paper seeks to understand how local actors attempt to strengthen their financial autonomy through the mobilization of local revenue. Drawing upon urban governance and political motivations and incentives literature, I argue that the ability of local actors to raise more revenues is conditioned by their capacity to build better systems of accountability aimed at informing taxpayers on the utilization of revenue collected. Such efforts can increase the trusts of citizens, therefore more tax compliance. This argument is supported by empirical data derived from semi-directed interviews with local actors and primary source documents, all gathered during a field research in Accra (Ghana) and Nairobi (Kenya) between September 2017 and May 2018. The findings confirm that the efforts of local actors to engage taxpayers will result in greater revenue collection. The findings also show that these efforts are undermined by political interference in the management of local government affairs. Given that local elected officials are endorsed by political parties or

political coalitions when running for office, they are inclined to be more accountable to political parties or party coalitions rather than the citizens once in office. More accountability to political parties rather than the citizens limits the willingness and motivations of local elected officials to engage and inform the citizens on the management of local revenues, which leads to weak tax compliance. Hence, this paper puts at the center of the weak local accountability to the citizens, caused by political parties interference in local affairs.

### ***The Politics of Complaining: Grievance Redressal and Citizen-Police Relations in India***

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The gap between programmatic policy design and the uneven local implementation of law and policy is a widely recognized obstacle to effective and accountable governance. Governments worldwide have attempted to bridge this gap through the design of grievance redressal programs, intended to give citizens direct channels through which to voice their complaints. Despite the proliferation of these programs, there is little scholarship that examines their political consequences. This paper examines these dynamics in the case of policing—a critical arena of citizen-state relations. Drawing on a study of the Jan Sunwai – a weekly public hearing carried out by the Madhya Pradesh state police in India – I examine when and why citizens engage in formal acts of complaining, and the consequences of their engagement for perceptions of public responsiveness and accountability. Through a combination of surveys and in-depth interviews with Jan Sunwai participants, I find a perverse effect of grievance redressal over time: participants’ assessment of police performance is enhanced in the short run—at the time of their hearings—but diminished in the weeks that follow in the face of both expectation and capacity gaps concerning what the police should and can do. And yet the Jan Sunwai remains an important channel of access to the police, in particular for women and for those who have been deterred or blocked from contacting their local police station. The paper concludes by reflecting on both the potential and limitations of formal grievance redressal as a mechanism for improving accountability, and on the dynamic role that expectations play in shaping citizenship practice.

### ***Parallel States, Public Services, and the Competition for Legitimacy in Kosovo***

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Public services are often provided by a plurality of state and non-state actors in fragile contexts. Recent work highlights the supply-side: how actors use public services as a way to cement their authority among a population. This study highlights the demand-side. Using education, healthcare, and justice, it asks why people chose one service provider over another and how they hold these providers—and each other—to account. Kosovo provides an ideal case study to explore these questions. During the last 25 years, different ‘parallel states’—one Albanian, the other Serb—have sought to gain legitimacy from the population by providing competing services. These ‘parallel’ services were broadly akin to club goods. However, I find significant variation between them. Education and criminal justice—exemplified by the Albanian blood-feud reconciliation—was defined by norms of appropriateness and significant co-production between providers and recipients, helping to hold the former accountable. Healthcare and civil justice revolved around trust and notions of what was ‘best’ over what was ‘right’ yet lacked the same accountability mechanisms. I conclude by arguing that disaggregating state-society relations in this way may help us better understand both individual agency in fragile contexts and the role of public services in (non-) state legitimation.

### ***How Political Competition Can Increase Corruption: Electoral cycles in police extortion in West Africa***

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Several studies have found a positive association between democratization and corruption. Few, however, posit a convincing mechanism. I explain why the relationship between political competition and corruption may be concave. In countries where bureaucracies are poorly insulated from political influence, the introduction of elections increases uncertainty about future leadership. By threatening future income, competitive elections raise the opportunity cost of remaining honest, incentivizing corruption. These dynamics do not exist

in autocratic countries, where elections provoke no uncertainty about future leadership, or in consolidated democracies, where civil service legislation protects bureaucrats from political vicissitudes. Examining electoral cycles in over 300,000 bribes paid over a seven-year period by truck-drivers in five West African countries, I show that the average bribe extorted by bureaucrats increases by twenty-three percent in the buildup to competitive elections. Consistent with the idea that political competition only increases extortion when it increases uncertainty, bribes in the post-election period return to the non-electoral average when incumbents win reelection, but remain high when challengers win. I find no evidence that such dynamics exist around elections in autocracies. The findings suggest that democratization can have adverse effects on corruption in the short-term, and highlight the importance of civil service insulation as an anti-corruption policy.

***The 'short' and 'long' routes of accountability in Tanzania's rural waterscape***

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In 2004 the World Bank (WB) produced an influential World Development Report (WDR 2004), titled *'Making Services Work for the Poor'*. Among other things the report suggested that the poor do not get better services (e.g. Water, health and education) because service delivery is framed as a *technical problem* rather than a *governance one*, resulting in failures in the chain of accountability that links service providers to citizens. The report went further to suggest the (in)famous "accountability triangle" as a remedy to improve service delivery. The triangle links citizens to service providers via two routes: the 'long-route' of accountability, which passes through public officials, and the 'short-route' which is direct. Since the unveiling of the report, millions of dollars have been committed by development partners and the government to improve the two routes of accountability for better service delivery. In this paper we examine accountability routes in a case of inferior rural water supply in one geographical locale in Tanzania anonymized as Mashujaa district. We employ concepts from organization and institutional theory to show that the focus either on the short or the long

route of accountability is not effective. Instead, informal accountability mechanisms to a large extent, determine which actions are taken to hold public officials to account and ultimately improve the rural water supply.

***Leveraging Localism: Local Origins, Ethnicity, and Electoral Choice in Malawi***

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In much of the world, politicians view social ties with their home region as important catalysts for votes. Candidates return home, sometimes after decades away, anticipating support from their ‘home constituency.’ Studies of elections in the West find that candidates garner votes from their local areas, but literature on elections in the developing world has focused on the role of ethnicity on voter choice, largely overlooking other social ties that may influence voters.

Yet, what explains when and why voters may support candidates who hail from their village? And, to what extent is ‘hometown support’ significant in contexts where ethnicity is salient? This paper employs a rating-based, conjoint analysis implemented in Malawi to examine how candidates’ local ties affect vote choice. We find that voters prefer a ‘lifetime local’ -- someone who was born in the village and spent her whole life in the village -- over a better-endowed individual who was born in the village but lived away for many years. Moreover, the evidence suggests that candidates’ local ties are more important than co-ethnicity. We explore the mechanisms underlying this preference, finding strong evidence that a sense of shared preferences and potential for perverse sanctioning, rather than expected accountability, shared accomplishment, or strong community ties, explains support for lifetime locals. The findings shed light on voters’ calculations, highlight the importance of shared ties that go beyond ethnicity, and draw our attention to the role of social institutions.

***Exposure to Rebel Governance and Preferences for Justice: Experimental Evidence from Iraq***

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Rebel groups that govern territory require the support or cooperation of large numbers of civilians who are often perceived as “collaborators” after conflict ends. Given the difficulty of conducting research in war zones, we know very little about public opinion toward collaborators. This knowledge gap is an impediment to transitional justice and sustainable peace-building. Through experiments embedded in an original door-to-door survey of Mosul, an Iraqi city that experienced three years of governance by the Islamic State, we identify the effects of hypothetical collaborators’ identity traits and type of collaboration on preferences for punishment, forgiveness, and reintegration. Contrary to the government’s harsh and indiscriminate approach to prosecuting collaborators, participants prefer lenient punishments—or no punishment—for some. We find that the nature of collaboration matters more than the identity of the collaborator and that perceptions of what should be done with collaborators depends on whether the respondent stayed and endured rebel rule or fled. Our design helps identify the conditions under which former rebel collaborators may be successfully reintegrated into post-conflict societies.

***Gauging the Value of Community Participation: A Conjoint Experiment in Democratic Republic of Congo***

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As advocates from afar champion community participation in development, we examine how much citizens actually value community-led development initiatives. As part of a panel study on health and health-seeking behavior (N=4,320), we conducted a conjoint experiment in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo to study the value that individuals attach to

community participation in improving health care services in a post-conflict setting. More specifically, we gauge whether assessments of health care providers are influenced by individuals' ability to elect the members of an oversight committee (as compared to elite appointment) and to extensive community consultation to improve service delivery (as compared to minimal community consultation). We find individuals value community engagement when making choices about where to seek health care, but they value service characteristics (e.g., cost, quality) more. Our findings suggest cost of care and service characteristics condition the extent to which community engagement is valued. As major funders prioritize implementing development interventions focused on governance, our results suggest actual service provision -- both cost and quality -- matter far more for individuals seeking public services.

***Accountability in Intergroup Relations: Hindu-Muslim Cooperation in Public Goods Provision in Indian Slum Communities***

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In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which people living in slum communities cooperate across communal lines in public goods provision. In particular, we aim to test whether and how informal mechanisms of accountability at the very local level affect cooperation across Hindu-Muslim lines in improving drainage and sewage in urban slum areas in Delhi, India. The research is largely based on a survey experiment that was implemented in Delhi in June - July 2018. (The EGAP pre-analysis plan - #20180613AA – is gated until Dec. 31, 2018.) Respondents were asked to consider whether they will participate in a joint initiative to hire a private firm to clean and maintain drains in their community. The experiment randomly varied exposure to a text that describes (1) a nearby resident's hypothetical experience with this private firm's initiative and (2) the extent to which participants in the initiative would be accountable for their contribution (or lack of it). The description of the resident's experience varied by treatment to assess the effect of perceived in-group underperformance, i.e. information that coreligionists failed to contribute in the

initiative. The accountability description assessed the effectiveness of attempts to induce cooperation through one of two types of social accountability: Horizontal accountability, wherein participants were told that others in the community would know the extent to which residents contributed, or through vertical accountability, where they were told that local informal leaders would follow up with those who do not contribute. To preview our preliminary results, we show that willingness to contribute and to encourage others to participate in the program varies by religious identity, with Muslims rather than Hindu more likely to respond to both the in-group underperformance and the accountability treatments. We interpret this finding as an indication that members of minority groups living in the midst of a dominant majority group are more susceptible to social accountability pressures because they are more compelled to maintain a positive image of the in-group. While existing studies have explored how minority groups are more distrustful of public institutions like the police and courts and may be less likely to contribute towards public goods provision, the relative role of social norms and in-group policing mechanisms in minority communities has received less attention in the literature. By joining insights from social psychology with research on development at the very local level, and showing how effects may vary across groups with differential minority and majority status, this research potentially advances existing research on diversity and public goods provision and on social accountability.

### ***Local Politics, Governance, and Public Goods in Southeast Asia***

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Politics in Southeast Asia are being transformed by the intersection of three phenomena. First, over the past 25 years, in line with global trends, dramatic processes of decentralization across much of the region have devolved greater fiscal and political authority to local governments. Second, for the last decade or more, Southeast Asian countries have witnessed the rise of a new social welfare policies, with governments offering increasingly expansive programs of

education, healthcare, cash transfers and other benefits. Third, these new developments have been layered on top of pre-existing patterns of national and local politics, many of these centered on patronage and political machines. These developments call attention to the pivotal role of local authorities as initiators, innovators, implementers, and obstacles in the provision of public goods. This concern is not merely theoretical, but also deeply practical, given obvious differences in political accountability and policy outcomes, even in neighboring districts. This multiyear, collaborative study—still in its early stages—led by Meredith Weiss, Allen Hicken, Edward Aspinall, and Paul Hutchcroft, explores how variations in local government across four Southeast Asian states affect the delivery of critical public goods: transport/roads, sanitation, and healthcare. We will do so by comparing “local governance regimes” across sixteen municipalities in Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand. We aim to advance understanding of how varying political dynamics, from structures for participation to modes of leadership selection, can shape state–citizen interactions at the local level and affect how and whether citizens gain access to critical services. That said, at this point in the project, not only would our study benefit from ideas drawn from other projects—and especially, studies of other world regions—as we refine our research questions and methods, but we are keen to develop cross-regional ties among researchers focused on cognate issues. Hence, rather than present concrete findings, the paper aims to kick off a discussion of methods and core issues in the study of local governance.

***Title TBD***

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***Claiming or blaming? Social accountability, entrepreneurship, and regime- versus state-orientation in Egypt and Jordan after the 2011 uprisings***

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Entrepreneurship has been ‘booming’ in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since the Arab uprisings. Business elites, social actors and international actors in particular have taken

an interest in this phenomenon as a new approach to address socio-economic issues. As a consequence, a plethora of actors, initiatives and support mechanisms have emerged.

While one may simply consider entrepreneurship as another case of the outsourcing of social responsibility from the state to social and business actors, a closer look suggests a more nuanced reading. This paper argues that business and social actors exploit entrepreneurship to demonstrate that they exercise and promote (social) accountability – as opposed to the state which, they blame, impedes their work and does not let them take real initiative. The regime, however, appears detached from the state. Whereas in the case of Egypt, entrepreneurship initiatives have been used to claim distance to the Mubarak regime and to reconcile with the Egyptian people, in the case of Jordan entrepreneurship functions as the platform that enables citizens and the regime to jointly act.

This paper draws on data (inter alia interviews and reports) collected during field research in Egypt and Jordan between 2011 and 2013.

***When and Why Do Citizens Make Claims on the State? Exploring Variation in the Nature of Demand for Public Goods***

Ruth Carlitz, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, , Program on Governance and Local Development, University of Gothenburg

In recent years, the international development community has seized upon the promotion of “social accountability” as an alternative means of holding elected representatives and service providers to account in settings where elections fail to fill that role. To date, such initiatives have largely failed to live up to their promise. This paper suggests that one reason for this failure is the tendency to homogenize both citizens and services. However, most contexts exhibit considerable variation among citizens in terms of their resources, motivations, and feelings of efficacy and as such we should not expect all citizens to be willing or able to engage in the same way. Moreover, different services present different challenges and opportunities for engagement. This paper represents an effort to probe these differences in a

systematic fashion. I attempt to account for variation in the degree and nature of citizen engagement across both citizens and services (specifically, education, health, and water provision), drawing on nationally representative surveys and geo-located data on service provision from Malawi and Tanzania. My empirical exploration intends to offer both theoretical and practical insights into the drivers of (and barriers to) effective citizen engagement for improved service delivery.

***Enhancing social accountability through community score cards? Evidence from the education sector in Morocco***

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In the wake of the Arab Spring, governments in the Middle East and North Africa region have responded to calls for greater accountability by creating new “participatory” institutions, often with the support of international donors. The focus in this paper is on Morocco and local experiences with Community Score Cards (CSCs), mainly in the education sector, based on two empirical qualitative case studies and interviews with activists, experts and officials in the education sector. CSC initiatives could be considered examples of potentially innovative, even if foreign-inspired, mechanisms to renew the “social contract” between citizens and the state after a period of upheaval and social contestations of state power.

The projects are funded by The World Bank and implemented by the international NGO CARE in partnership with Moroccan NGOs. The paper will first present the positive outcomes of the projects in terms of tangible improvements in service delivery as well as an increased sense of empowerment on the part of the population. It will then explain the findings by focusing on the “demand” side of social accountability, i.e. the role of citizens and civil-society participation in achieving accountable outcomes, and how they perceive the state. Who are these citizens, what are their organizational resources, and under which conditions do they engage in demanding accountability from the (still largely authoritarian) state? Another set of findings will address the role of new intermediaries (also called ‘brokers’ or ‘interlocutors’) in the form of local officials, consultants, or volunteers in

translating global discourses and tools for social accountability into local language and context. A third set of findings will focus on the “supply” side and the organizational incentives for civil servants to deliver better social services in a context marked by resource scarcity, corruption, and high social inequalities.

Overall, the paper argues that so far, the projects have not furthered an understanding of social accountability as a means for local actors to hold the state administration to account based on legal entitlements. Rather, the projects have focused on improving the parents’ associations’ internal accountability and fund-raising skills to pay for physical improvements of the school. This illustrates the local actors’ appropriation of foreign-inspired social accountability tools in ways that contribute to the shift of public service provision from government to civil society.

### ***The challenge of targeting extreme poverty: Evidence from Bangladesh***

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State capacity and accountability are notoriously weak in many developing countries. Public services and social policies are therefore often mistargeted and inefficient. We empirically analyze the underlying causes for mistargeting of cash transfers to elderly poor using a recent survey of elderly and local government representatives. Our data allows us to identify the relevant factors on the demand and supply side. We show that the actual selection of beneficiaries is virtually orthogonal to the national government’s eligibility criteria. Eligibility criteria are either ignored or compensated for by other opposing considerations. Illegitimate factors also play a role for access to social transfers. To mitigate mistargeting in the future, we discuss potentially effective interventions.

### ***All politics are Local: Municipal service provision for Syrian Refugees in Turkey***

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Turkey is currently world's largest host of refugees hosting around three and a half million Syrians (UNHCR). Despite the burden sharing efforts of international community, Turkish government is struggling to find methods and policies to effectively integrate this enormous population with its host community. More than ninety per cent of Turkey's almost four million refugees live in non-camp settings. Although universal access to health care and education have been granted for refugees under temporary protection by the central government, the municipalities hold a vital responsibility in management of day-to-day life for the refugees. However, the patterns of social assistance for refugees highly vary from one municipality to another. Legally, municipalities must provide services only for the citizens. Providing or denying aid for refugees is at the initiative of the mayor. While some communities build community centers and perform administrative duties for refugees, other municipalities provide nothing. This paper asks what explains the variation in municipal services provided to refugees. It looks at Istanbul, largest refugee hosting province in Turkey in order to illuminate the impact of conditions influencing municipal distributive behavior towards Syrian refugees in Istanbul, Turkey.