

Transcript of Governance Uncovered Episode 49: Between Borders: Refugee Return Dynamics and Integration Realities

Hello and welcome to Governance Uncovered - a podcast brought to you by the Governance and Local Development Institute at the University of Gothenburg. This podcast is supported by the Swedish Research Council.

This episode focuses on migration and integration as we're approaching World Refugee Day, which falls each year on the 20th of June. World Refugee Day is an international day designated by the United Nations to acknowledge the strength and courage of people who have been forced to flee their home country to escape conflict or persecution.

Joining us today is Daniel Masterson, from the University of California, who will talk about his recently published paper *Dynamics of Refugee Return: Syrian Refugees and their Migrant Intention* - in which he and his co-authors look at what makes refugees decide to return home.

*So in any given year on, on average, about 1 to 2% of refugees worldwide will be resettled to a third country and less than 1% are given citizenship in a hosting country and what this means is that most refugees face a decision between protracted displacement continuing to live as refugees or returning to their homes. *

Then, we'll hear from Isabell Schierenbeck and Andrea Spehar from the University of Gothenburg. They have looked at street-level bureaucrats in and Syrian refugee interactions in Sweden, Jordan, and Turkey.

I think it's the time that there is a lack of time and the whole idea with street level bureaucracy and and their roles, street level bureaucrats and their role in this process is that they actually should have time for the individual person to sit down and and understand and try to really grasp what does this person want? What does the person wish for?

We hope you enjoy this episode, don't forget to like, share, and subscribe if you do!

In the following interview, Daniel Masterson, assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, discusses his recently published paper in the British Journal of Political Science: *Dynamics of Refugee Return: Syrian Refugees and their Migrant Intention*, which he wrote together with Ala Alrababah, Marine Casalis, Dominik Hangartner, and Jeremy Weinstein.

The book looks at refugee return dynamics, specifically at Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan and their intentions of returning home. Daniel highlights that conditions like safety, security, service

access, job opportunities and family networks in the home country, Syria, play a larger role in influencing refugees' return intentions than conditions in the host country. And we will now listen to what led up to these findings and why it's important for future policy making.

I'm Daniel Masterson. I'm an assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Thank you, Daniel, and thank you for joining us today. It's really exciting to have you with us and to talk about your paper you recently published in the British Journal of Political Science, and it's titled the *Dynamics of Refugee Return Syrian Refugees and their Migration Intention*. And in it, you're looking at this question of what makes migrants, or refugees rather, decide to return home. At least in terms of having the intention to return home. And you weigh the conditions in the host country and the conditions in the home country, in this case, Syria, and that the refugees in both Jordan and in Lebanon that it's really those conditions in the home country that are affecting their intentions. Can you tell us just a little bit more about the research and the findings in your view?

Thank you very much, Ellen. So as I'm sure you know, the scale of force displaced around the world is staggering. According to UNHCR today, there are 32.5 million refugees worldwide and beyond the devastating consequences of forced displacement. First and foremost for the people themselves, this also poses challenges for hosting countries and home countries. And what many people might not know, beyond just the scale of forced displacement, is that in any given year, a very small share of refugees will be resettled or be granted citizenship in a hosting country. So in any given year on, on average, about 1 to 2% of refugees worldwide will be resettled to a third country and less than 1% are given citizenship in a hosting country and what this means is that most refugees face a decision between protracted displacement continuing to live as refugees or returning to their homes. And so it was precisely this choice that most refugees face that we wanted to explore in this paper, we wanted to understand what drives refugees intentions to return home, intentions around when they would do so, and why. And so this is a hard question to study because there is little reliable data on refugee return. So even UN data on return is limited because the UN gets data on return either when there is an organized return or in people self-report to the UN that they return. And lots of people return without reporting that to the event. We can even think of incentives why people might not want to report because it gives them the freedom to possibly, if they realize that conditions in the home country aren't what they had hoped, returned to the hosting country without any disruption in their UN registration. People might fear being cut off from assistance, for instance, if they were to report that they had. So we wanted to collect data on refugees experiences and their return intentions to try and understand the drivers of refugee return and this sort of comparison of conditions of the host country and compare and conditions in the home country motivated our initial very simple theoretical framework and beyond just this sort of classic push pull model of migration. And we were also motivated to explore this because there's this implicit theory driving Lebanon's policy response towards Syrian refugees that has been explored in reports by like the World Bank and Oxfam, and scholars such as Myanmar that the Lebanese government is operating under a premise that, if it makes life difficult for Syrian refugees in Lebanon, they will return. And so there's this implicit theory underlying that policy, that refugees will respond to hardship in the host country by leaving, by returning home. And so to explore this, we conducted a representative survey of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. We surveyed 3000 refugee households from August to October 2019. And we also ran an additional survey with Syrian refugees in Jordan test the sort of the generality of the findings. And we looked really specifically at intentions, there's

intentions matter for refugees. This isn't like studying vote intentions, where really what we care about is vote behavior for refugees. We actually have a normative reason why we care about intentions, cause we aren't refugees to be able to make voluntary, intentional choices about where to live. And so what did we find? First off, is just the descriptive findings are that in this representative sample of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Only about 5% of Syrians planned to return within 12 months, so that was at that point, meaning before roughly the end of 2020. But in contrast, almost 2/3 reported that they wanted to return home in the future. So we see this big split in very low short term return intentions, but fairly high long term return intentions. And it's also worth noting that I mean saying that 2/3 of the roughly 1,000,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon want to go back is saying that a sizable minority, roughly 300,000 people, plan to never go back. So, just descriptively some important findings there. And then what did we find about the drivers of variation in people's return intentions? One of the key findings here is that push factors conditions in the host country do not seem to play a large role in peoples's return intentions, and so this consistently merges across our findings. So we run regression analysis of our survey data from Lebanon, progression analysis of the data from Jordan. We run a survey experiment in Lebanon where people were presented with hypothetical vignettes describing future scenarios in Syria and Lebanon and asking if under those conditions they would return, and consistently across these analysis, we find that push factors do not play a large role in people's return attentions. It is conditions in Syria that are driving people's return attentions first and foremost, safety and security. But also other factors, service availability, jobs, family networks. But it is really conditions in Syria that are playing the large role in people's return attentions. You know in the paper we're transparent about what happened next and we were puzzled by these results and we had pre specified the analysis that we were going to run and our predictions. And so we stepped back and we asked what could explain these results? How could it be that a misery eating conditions don't change refugees return intentions? And we saw these huge effects of safety in Syria on people's return intentions and it led us to ask if what we were seeing might be some sort of threshold, where people simply will not return before safety is established in their home. And so we started thinking about this threshold model, or a model of lexicographic preferences, that really emphasizes the role of security and safety in driving people's return intentions. The idea here is that if safety in Syria is below some threshold, people are not making trade-offs between conditions in the host country and the - simply put, if, if, if Syria isn't safe enough for people to return, they're not going to return. That is what the the threshold theory proposes. And so to explore this, we looked to qualitative interviews that we had been conducting and really consistently we saw people talking about their vision for their future and the conditions under which they would return, has really fitting quite well within a lexicographic preference model. People were simply saying they can't return to Syria under the current conditions because it is too dangerous for them or their family. And then we also returned to the results from the conjoint experiment and subsetted the vignettes into those where Syria was described as safe. And those were Syria was described as unsafe. What we found was really consistent with this threshold model that when vignettes described serious unsafe conditions in Lebanon and Syria, other conditions just did not. But when Syria was described safe, we saw evidence that looked like people were in fact trading off. I mean, overall it looks like return is not going to occur without security in the home country and the results also suggest that pushing refugees to return very well can increase suffering, but it's not going to increase return intentions.

That's a very powerful finding, right. Because it really suggests that some of these, like you said, the policies in Lebanon, but I think it's a broader discourse that if you make life too easy for refugees, they'll never go home and that it then sort of justifies policies and and actions that are actually

aimed at being detrimental to refugees and not necessarily supporting of them, right. So that's, I think that's a really, really important policy implication of what you're, what you're showing. I have a question for you and that is: when I looked at your analysis, it actually looked like you have the kind of local conditions of safety and then you have safety in the country as a whole. Are the conditions going to be safe going back to your home area, or are they going to be safe, is the country safe and stable? And if I remember correctly, it looked like they both have an important effect in terms of your willingness to go back but it almost looked like the local conditions played a larger role than the national ones. Do I read that correctly or, or would you say that there's no real difference?

I agree with your interpretation of the results and what you're referring to, for people who want to look at the paper, is the results from the conjoint experiment and what we see there is that in vignettes where someone's hometown is described as safe, but not all of Syria, we see a large increase in people's return intentions. And in vignettes where all of Syria is described as safe, we also see a very large increase in return intentions and those two effects are distinguishable from each other, so the effect of having all of Syria be safe is larger than the effect of having just their hometown be safe. But it is striking that the effect of having so much hometown be safe is about a 35 percentage point increase, whereas all of Syria being safe is about a 42 percentage point increase in stated intentions. And so the effect of having someone's hometown be saved is almost as large as the effect of all of Syria being safe. What safety means to people, there's a question that we have received from plenty of helpful commentators in workshops and presentations. And you know, it isn't something that we explore in depth in this paper, but it is something that I think is a great Ave for future research because safety can mean different things to different people. It could be you know, the absence of fighting, it could be the assurance that they won't be kidnapped, it could be the risk of government persecution and arrest. Safety could be a more have implications for the autonomy and the provision of services, and I think that there's also another puzzling dimension of local safety versus National Safety that shows that and a lot of the people here are prioritizing local 50 and then, like local safety, has a big impact here even in the absence of National Safety.

Which is really striking, right. And then that's a that's an important finding, I was also struck by the fact that you, like I said, you do this in in Jordan and Lebanon, and you note that the baseline intention of returning if you're in Jordan is actually lower than the baseline intention of returning if you're in Lebanon. If I remember that correctly. And I'm just interested in your understanding of that, but also maybe extending beyond that because you know somebody who's listening, who's sitting in Sweden or or Germany may say, well, that's all really great because Lebanon and Jordan are over there, but we're very different in Western Europe or in the US and other places. To what extent do we think that that would carry out into these other countries?

So I think when we consider how these results might travel, we can think about what sort of variation would we see in other contexts. I mean, first off, we could imagine what if conditions in a hosting country were much worse than they were in Lebanon for Syrians when we ran this survey in 2019, and in fact, that is in Lebanon over the last couple of years. And so I mean, as you know, like Lebanon has been going through it, leading combination of crises over the last couple of years since late 2019 has been economic and financial crisis exacerbated by COVID-19 and the absolutely catastrophic explosion in the port of Beirut in August 2020. There's been a series of fiscal and

banking policies that have ended up being highly regressive, just really punishing the people who are poor or middle class in Lebanon, and so estimates that I've seen say that more than 80% of Lebanese now live below the poverty line, huge drops in income, huge inflation, severe shortages of fuel, other basic goods, rolling blackouts, and of course, these impact both Lebanese and Syrians in the country and other people in Lebanon. We might ask with these punishing declines in living conditions, have Syrians returned? And for this study beyond what we show in this paper, we are collecting panel data on Syrian refugees, return intentions overtime and their return behavior. So what we see is that return intentions started fairly low, and they have stayed low and even gone down overtime, and returned behavior has been very low overtime. So even as conditions in Lebanon have gotten much worse and conditions in Syria, which were bad, have to put it a bit simply stayed very bad, we have not seen an increase in return intentions, or a significant return of behavior really. And so, you know we we could see this as evidence that conditions in Lebanon are not driving return behavior. I would be cautious to make that claim from aggregate national level variation and we would need to and will pay more attention to individual level variation to test that question about the impacts of the crisis in Lebanon on return behavior. But you know, this does make sense with the threshold theory from the BJPS paper, people want Syria to be safe and Syria remains unsafe. You know, we've seen this from reports from Human Rights Watch from AMR. And under those conditions, people will not go back even with the decline in living conditions in the hosting country.

That's really striking. I mean, especially because there's a lot of Lebanese who are trying to leave Lebanon. And so that's really suggesting the extent to which the home country effect is very, very strong. This is again, I think it's really fascinating work, but it's also even more importantly, it's very important work. It really is shedding light on how we should think about the conditions that refugees face in host countries and the importance of safety and stability in their home country if they are able to kind of escape what you were, I think very rightly pointed out, is this space in which they're not, they don't really integrate into the host country and they're not really able to to head back, which is a whole other topic we could talk about, but it is this question of of what does life look like for individuals in these spaces. Again, thank you very much. It is really, really great to talk to you.

Thank you, Ellen. I really appreciate the chance to share this work.

How does integration politics get implemented on an everyday basis? In the book "Migration in the Welfare State: To Implement Integration Politics," Isabelle Schierenbeck and Andrea Spehar dive into interactions between street-level bureaucrats and Syrian refugees in Sweden to understand the challenges faced by both parties. Isabelle and Andrea highlight the frustrations expressed by refugees, particularly regarding long waiting periods, lack of follow-up, language barriers, and feeling undervalued.

Isabell and Andrea have done similar work in Turkey and Jordan. When comparing the situations between the three countries, they note that while language issues and biased treatment based on accents remain prevalent in all three countries, there is evidence that the historical and cultural connections between Jordan and Syria play an important role in the gratitude towards the government expressed by refugees.

Isabelle Schierenbeck and I'm a professor in political science at the School of Global Studies here at Gothenburg University.

And I'm Andrea Spehar, associate professor in political science at University of Gothenburg and also director for the Central global immigration at the same university.

Thank you for joining me today. It's really great to be able to talk to you both about your findings from the book that you've published in Swedish as well as the broader findings from the the project that you've been working on. Were you looking at street level bureaucrats and Syrian refugees or refugees generally in Sweden, but also in Jordan. So maybe we can start just by asking you to think about and describe for us the challenges that refugees and street level bureaucrats face in Sweden.

Yeah, from our findings, we can say that refugees or Syrian refugees in Sweden, they are facing several different challenges. Foremost, the challenges are about how they perceive encounters with street level bureaucrats. Usually they view these encounters as very stressful and frustrating, and it was actually very surprising that there is so much frustration in these perceptions that they put forward and the frustration is mostly about the long waiting periods. So I mean the institutions here in Sweden at the local level, they're responsible for the integration in the society and the street level bureaucrats, they are playing a great role in this. They were dissatisfied with Swedish Employment Office that they were offered different internships and advice. They didn't match their expectations or what they desired in relations to their working life careers and also experiences. They were also very dissatisfied with a very bad actually system for following up the different requests. So very often they were not contacted after the meetings, so that creates a lot of frustration and this long waiting periods. And then also some of them, they felt that their competencies from the country of origin were evaluated and they were not listened to. That's the most, I mean, this frustration that everything takes a long, long time, that I will not listen to. And also the frustration with language that's also something that is very it is very common in there arguing or criticism towards the Swedish institutions. The interpreters are not very appreciated actually because there was some kind of mistrust on the side of the refugees that everything what they say, it's not translated in a way that they expect to be translated. So it was all these meetings were done in a hurry so so they could say that more or less they were afraid that their thoughts and the things that were putting put forward were not.

Which is sort of part of the broader sense of not feeling valued, right? I mean that their experience isn't that they're not, their voice isn't coming through from the street level bureaucrats perspective What did they experience those challenges?

As we know from lots of other studies on street level bureaucrats working in in similar offices or in similar policy areas as we are standing, we know that they, they almost always think there is a lack of resources and this was also the case in, in our study. And it has to do with both money or funding. And that is like the the the different programs and opportunities that they actually can offer, a lack

of those and especially also with regard to the fact that lots of the Syrians are quite highly educated. And as Andrea pointed out, they come to Sweden with their trajectory already of have been working in specific professions and so on and there is a lack of those opportunities to offer those kind of opportunities and trainings, for instance. But then more importantly, I think it's the time that there is a lack of time and the whole idea with street level bureaucracy and their roles, street level bureaucrats and their role in this process is that they actually should have time for the individual person to sit down and understand and try to really grasp what does this person want? What does the person wish for? But also more importantly, what is the background or this person? What is actually the best possible fit for this person? If we think about, for instance, the labor market, and at this time, has been shrinking extremely not only due to the so-called migration crisis and the number of people who came to Sweden after 2015, but also over time actually. And one of the things they are pointing to is also the digitalization and this has gone very far, especially when it comes to the employment offices in Sweden and they specifically point to this as a problem because they don't meet the persons, they don't see them and also oftentimes there is problems for people to access counseling and or different opportunities that they have through different digital equipments and so on. So that's something that they're pointing at. They also actually to go back to this role of interpreters because they also raised the challenges with language. They also raise specifically when it comes to midwives, but also some of the other professions that they also see this mistrust, and they also experience, and they also experience that that they can't not always trust that things are translated and communicated the way they would wish for. Another thing, I think it's important to raise with regard to this, is that they find it problematic that there is very little communication between the systems. So between different between the social welfare Office, for instance, the Swedish language programs and the employment offices. That there is this lack of or or very challenging communication that is not really functioning and working the way they think would be benefiting both them in their work, but also the individual. So I think that's that's probably the most important part on their side.

It's interesting that they're both sort of coming to this question too, of language and communication, right, which I think is going to be something we can focus on when we turn to Turkey and and to Jordan as well. But before we get there, I want to ask you, obviously these are people, right, so they also have agency and they can find ways to overcome these challenges or they can find solutions to them. What did you see in terms of how they've addressed this?

Yeah, we have also analyzed different strategies to challenge this difficulties and frustration related to encounter. And sometimes when when we think about or relate to the street level bureaucrats and how they think about the whole situation and migration crisis and so on, my impression was also that to some extent the central bureaucrats, they feel that migrants, they should be satisfied and show gratefulness with whatever they get. And that's something that we see from the Swedish case, that refugees, they don't really accept that. So in many interviewees they told us that they raised their voice by writing written complaints or to contacting different, I mean supervisors to the street level bureaucrats, or to change the the office or just to yeah change the provider sometimes as well to find civil society organizations, for example, that provide the Swedish education or to rely more on the ads in newspapers or online to find jobs than to get help from the employment office. So yeah, they're not passive at all. I mean, some of them are, but especially I think from our material, we can see that people with higher education, they are, they have this social competence to really

argue against the the the treatment that they perceive as not positive for for their development in Sweden.

And there it's also important, I think to really think about the expectations specifically with regard to Sweden, because what they say in, in the interviews is pretty much well, this is Sweden, we we heard so much about it. We know that there is a great welfare programs there. So we expected more than this. Now, so I think that's one of the things also that is playing in here that they come to Sweden with very high expectations. They also and that I think it's important to understand from a street level bureaucracy point of view that they are also very much connected with other people who have immigrated to Sweden previously. They compare with them or at the same time they compare with them and talk with them but also, they have family members or friends that go to Germany, for instance, and they compare like, but also I mean they have still contact with, for instance, they're going back to the midwives again, you know, they have still contacts with their doctors. So when things are not like done in a proper way at all, according to them, or when they are like, don't recognize the advices they get from the Swedish with midwives, for instance, or how things are handled in Sweden, then they call their Syrian doctor, who might not even be in Syria any longer, but somewhere else. And they compare and they ask questions back to the midwives, in this case, you know. So I think it's in that respect, I think it's important to both think about expectations. But although that this is very well connected person, so oftentimes really also have agency and use it in different ways.

And also because the Syrian migration went so many places, right. There's many different experiences they're able to to compare to. What did you see in terms of how the street level bureaucrats though, are able to either adjust or to overcome the kinds of challenges you were about in terms of time to worry about digitization?

I mean some of them, especially the persons who had been working for a long time, were extremely frustrated and most of them, I would say also was very critical to the changes that have been made and don't think that they can do the work they're supposed to do or carry out the work the way they actually, from experience, think it's the most appropriate way to do it. So I think with a few exceptions, there were also a lot of frustration on behalf of the Street level bureaucrats and also with regard to complaints, some of them of course, had examples of refugees like Andrea said, who they don't think it's grateful enough and so on, but some of them also understood the frustration really and made, I mean, you know, they have with discretion as part of their work task and the way they're going to carry the work some of them really went far beyond what you're supposed to do as the street life burgers to actually assist and help out refugees that came with papers to them that they didn't understand or would papers that are like saying things and crunch contradict their ways. They made phone calls after the work hours. There were even examples of people who were, like, collecting clothes and other stuff for refugees that they had contact with, who had kids, you know. And so I think it's also important to to recognize that the frustrations exist on both sides.

And that actually, you know, makes you wonder about the turnover, right? And that you're talking to the street level bureaucrats who are still there. But then there's probably also some who have just

decided to exit the entire the entire thing. Let's think for a second about comparing it with what you see in Turkey and Jordan, cause one of the things I like about this project is how you're doing this comparison across. What do you see as the differences in terms of how the refugees are responding in Turkey, Jordan compared to to Sweden?

At first it's just important to point out that that we are not really done with that analysis yet, so we're working with that. Still, I think one really interesting finding here is that you would sort of expect that if you compare Sweden, Turkey and Jordan, Jordan has less resources, much less than both Turkey and Sweden, and you would sort of expect that the the refugees are more satisfied in Sweden and and Turkey or express satisfaction more, you know and less in in Jordan. But we don't see that that clearly in the Jordan case, there is actually the refugees expressed a lot of gratitude towards the Jordanian states, to the Jordanian local governments and so on. And they are, I would say more critical than towards the NGOs working there, but they have this, they they refer a lot to the fact that they have been like connections and relationships with Jordan and Syria, and especially in this area across the borders for long time historically, they understand us, they understand our culture, they understand where we are coming from. I think that's interesting because I think it says again something about how important this, this understanding or this experience of that somebody really see who you are and understand who you are, how important that is and that maybe there is too much of a focus on material things like what you actually get. In the other end, you know in this literature so, so I think that's one interesting finding. Of course also in your gaining case of course also if we think about response strategies to if they're not satisfied and on it's, it's there, we have this whole system of wasta. You know, so there's also this whole idea that there are ways to get around things to, to do it a bit different. There are opportunities that the system allows for more permeabilities like you know that for good and for bad. But it's definitely something we see in our.

Also, in a sense, it's sort of it's more legible because in that way I mean Wasta has also been a way that you get things done in Syria, right? So it's it's much easier to be able to apply what you know as a strategy to be able to deal with, you know, sluggish bureaucracy and other problems when it's the same way of dealing with it versus in Sweden, where that's not really as much of an option for them, even though they actually compare Syria and Jordan and says it's in Syria, it's much more bribes, but here it's worse. But they make some kind of distinction in the....

....don't want and also the language. It's also very one important issue here because differently from the Swedish and Turkish case, they can also understand each other....

....So on the other hand, they also really discussed this issues of that they are treated badly that they hear what accent. They have, they know where I'm coming for. It depends where I'm coming. This kind of like, of course the dialects place in here and that's very clear. Also in the Turkish. Is that the language is an issue that is constantly raised in the Turkish case, yeah.

Right.

Because even if they hear the accent and they and they bias against me because I'm Syrian, at least I'm speaking directly to them, right? And that's a very big difference, but it's also interesting. So Daniel Masterson is also has a paper that's looking at Lebanon versus Jordan and one of the things that he and his colleagues find is that interest in leaving Jordan is actually lower than leaving

Lebanon. So there's something else that might be going on that helps to explain that as well, right, that the the language and communication is a very big part of this and have you had a chance to look at the street level bureaucrats side of this yet or where does that stand?

Not that much yet. We have the material and we have done the interviews and of course we have been looking looking at them so, but we haven't done analyzed them that clear. Yeah, yes.

We'll have you back to talk! When you're thinking about putting this together, and and the nice thing about the book was it was really aimed at kind of the broader public, it's not in as much in an academic intervention as it is, I mean it has academic purposes, it's it's really aimed at saying here's how things can be improved, and here's what needs to be taken into account. What do you think are the main policy implications of the work that you've done so far?

I would also like before we go to that just to say a few words about the Turkey as well, because I think one factor that was really very prominent in our material was this perception of discrimination that we didn't find in in Jordanian Swedish. Uh, so it was a great mistrust towards the the Turkish state and also street. The opinions were raised that they were marginalized in in these processes and counters and they didn't trust and also the exit strategies were pretty different. It was, it was about pretty much about the loyalty. You know, I just, I don't dare to say anything don't dare to quest. Just have to stay calm and avoid troubles. So that was really striking for the Turkish case.

And they also have a very different sort of legal status in Turkey than they do in Jordan and Sweden, which makes you think that that might be part of what's playing into that.

Yes, yes, yes.

Yeah, very interesting.

And also many problems with the language. In Sweden, every refugee is entitled to to get help with translations, but that was not the case in in the Turkish case, so.

But going back to your question, I think, yeah, I was thinking about this when I went here actually. And I actually think it's interesting because I mean, we obviously have a pretty good overview of our, the research out there and now I talk about Sweden and how the research has been looking at this for quite a long time in different ways, not exactly the way we do and what we are actually doing is also to really focus on bringing the refugee voices and sort of like contrasting them also with the street level bureaucrats. But I mean the the frustrating things for us as researcher I think is that it's almost going in the opposite direction. And I think this digitalization issue is, is one really good example and I think also for people who are not so aware about the Swedish attitude towards digitalization, it's it's it has this as some kind of like strategy of like, really being in the front with this in the school system, it's highly debated right now, you know, it's actually like that's pretty much all professions now said. This is not, It shouldn't be an aim in itself to be the most digital life school in

the world. You know which the Swedish state actually has set up as a goal, you know, and I think and there is a real backlash in the in the education system. Now, I don't know, actually the the leading newspapers in Sweden debate about this, in in policy circles, but I and I think it's something similar here, you know. So the the question is if that part seems to still continue, hopefully I think one of the things that we can see is that there is really a discussion of this kind of communication between different areas like between social welfare. Between and employment offices and and things so that there is like an idea of really working with having them more connected. Unfortunately I don't think it's always from the point of view that this is important for the refugees and to actually be more relevant for their introduction into the Swedish society. But this is has been raised for for other purposes that has to do with criminality. And the other issues I don't know if you agree with me, Andrea.

Yeah, I agree completely. And I also think from the refugee perspective that it's important to to take them seriously and also to Swedish, Jordanian and Turkish integration programs that were different. Here in Sweden, invest a lot of money in resources, especially to the first two years of this integration. Programs and processes the refugees. They are meeting many different kind of street level bureaucrats during these two years, but actually they are not informed enough at the beginning of this program how everything works, I think really that Swedish street level bureaucrats and also politicians should to some extent lower the expectations because I mean these high expectations to really present the Swedish state to them as a perfect example of how the things functioning and you know, with regard to the rule of law and effective bureaucracy and all that, that's really not the truth. So I mean, they should really lower the expectations and and tell them that this will take time. How much time it takes to validate your diplomas and how much time it takes to do the internship and to learn the language and, and of course, I mean, I think that refugees, they were not accepted because they want to normalize their lives as soon as possible. Actually, many of them, they don't want to go through all these programs, but that's how the the the Swedish system is designed.

Or they want to do in parallel, that's something that they why can't why can't they both work someplace and do their language?

Yeah, only parallel. Yeah, but faster...

...learn like, yeah, yeah.

...and you know, and that's something that that's repeated throughout the material that, you know, I have much more resources and capability than this...

Yeah, yeah, which also gets back to the feeling of of being undervalued...

...you know why why I'm not allowed to to use....

...in that and seeing as being as capable as you as you are but. It's very interesting. Because what seems to be coming to the forefront is the importance of communication, right? Yes, setting expectation, digitalization, all of that is about the communication aspects and it goes beyond just the language, right? But also, how do we engage and how do we interface.

Right.

It's fascinating work and again, thank you so much for coming and sharing it and for the work that you're doing, it's really great.

You for having us.

Thank you too.