



# Social Norms and Sector-Level Engagement with the State: Evidence from East Jerusalem

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# **Social Norms and Sector-Level Engagement with the State: Evidence from East Jerusalem**

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## **Abstract**

In East Jerusalem, the vast majority of Palestinians contest the legitimacy of the Israeli state's claim to sovereignty. This necessarily affects how Palestinians engage with the state in pursuit of goods, services, rights, and resources. But how? Using data from 55 interviews and original observational and experimental survey data from a representative sample of East Jerusalemites, I show that collective social norms surrounding the acceptability of a particular state-provided good, service, or institution (GSI) determine the extent to which individuals engage with the state in that sector. Where social norms deem a GSI to be acceptable, there is widespread engagement. However, anti-normalization (Arabic: *tatbi'a*) norms lower levels of engagement with the state in select sectors. This article provides an alternative explanation to those in the citizen claim-making literature. Rather than material factors, social norms can drive individuals to engage with or avoid the state depending on the sector in question.

Keywords: claim-making, conflict, social services, state legitimacy, political behavior, mixed-methods



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## 1. Introduction

Midway through the morning on a scorching August day, I made my way down the slippery limestone streets into the heart of the Old City of Jerusalem for an interview with a Palestinian civil society organization representative. Once inside, I welcomed the rush of air conditioning and the near-instantaneous offer of *ahwey* (Arabic coffee) or *chai ma nana* (tea with mint). With drinks in hand, we sat down and turned to the purpose of our meeting: to discuss the willingness of Palestinians in East Jerusalem to engage with the Israeli state in pursuit of state-provided goods and services. The civil society organization employee began to tell a now familiar story of how willingness to engage with the state is dependent upon the sector; a story echoed again and again among my interviewees.

Going to court, for example. People are not satisfied with it, but sometimes they must do that. Calling the police is out of the question. The majority won't do that. Health services? No questions. These are fine. The National Insurance Institute? People will go there (Interview 28, 2022).

I was grateful to the organization's employee for succinctly highlighting the puzzle of Palestinian claim-making; Palestinians in East Jerusalem are willing to accept select state-provided goods and services but will opt out of engaging with other arms of the state. Because the majority of East Jerusalemites perceive the Israeli state to be illegitimately occupying the city, the decision to access state-provided goods and services is not neutral but is instead imbued with political meaning. As a result, Palestinians in East Jerusalem regularly distinguish between different types of goods and services provided by the Israeli state and choose to engage in select sectors while intentionally avoiding others. If Palestinians opt out of the state-provided option, they may instead seek a solution within the Palestinian community or simply go without. To unravel the puzzle of selective claim-making in East Jerusalem and beyond, in this paper I ask three related questions. First, which services are most commonly engaged with and which are most likely to be avoided? Second, how do Palestinians in East Jerusalem determine which services to engage with and which to avoid? And third, what is the role of social norms in affecting the state-related choices made by Palestinians?

Importantly, the puzzle of Palestinian engagement with the Israeli state diverges from expectations in the claim-making and quotidian political participation literature. The literature on everyday claim-making paints a picture of two types of individuals: those who regularly interact with the state in pursuit of state resources and those who do not. This literature identifies several factors

that increase the likelihood an individual makes claims on the state. Claim-making<sup>1</sup>—defined first by Kruks-Wisner (2018, p. 7) as “efforts to navigate the state’s social welfare apparatus: that is, engaging the actors, agencies, and institutions that directly and indirectly shape the provision of such goods,”—is thought to be made more likely by residing in socially homogeneous neighborhoods (e.g., Tsai, 2007a), a greater density of party brokers in one’s neighborhood (e.g., Auerbach, 2016), increased visibility of the state in one’s neighborhood (e.g., Kruks-Wisner, 2018), and positive policy feedbacks whereby individuals who gain from the state via distributive policies are more likely to become active citizen claimants in the future (e.g., Kumar, 2022). Notably, the sociological literature on documented and undocumented immigrant help-seeking in the U.S. cites factors such as fear, shame, and immigration status as key factors determining whether predominantly Latinx individuals seek help from government agencies (Chavez, 2012; Reina et al., 2014; Zadnik et al., 2016).

Furthermore, the literature on tax compliance and fiscal contracts provides several explanations for when and why individuals engage with the state by upholding tax commitments. These explanations range from previous experience receiving positive benefits from the state (e.g., Bodea and LeBas, 2014), to the availability of community-based substitutes for state services (also Bodea and LeBas, 2014), to the collection of taxes by local leaders instead of state agents (e.g., Balán et al., 2022), and rural local governments’ receipt of intergovernmental fund transfers, as they can then better enforce tax compliance (e.g., Masaki, 2018). As such, the tax compliance literature highlights explanations for a particular form of engagement with the state at multiple levels of analysis.

Importantly, while the claim-making literature has gone as far as to investigate the determinants of particular types of claim-making, such as filing legal claims in pursuit of social welfare goods (Taylor, 2020), attention has yet to be given to a comparative differentiation across service sectors. According to Kramon and Posner (2013)—who find that governments’ distributive targeting of ethnic groups varies depending on the good or service in question—focusing on a single government-provided good can result in vastly different conclusions, depending upon the good itself. Building upon this insight, I focus on civilian<sup>2</sup> action with respect to the state to illustrate how, in contrast to the prevailing assumptions in the claim-making literature, a single individual is unlikely to act uniformly across all sectors. As such, the Palestinian case adds nuance to existing explanations for civilian claim-making

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<sup>1</sup> I also use the term “engagement with the state” interchangeably to describe this seeking behavior.

<sup>2</sup> Here I used the term civilian in place of citizen, which is the literature’s more commonly used term. This is because in the East Jerusalem context and as is often the case in contexts of occupation and conflict, the individuals living in the territory may not hold citizenship status. As such, here I refer to individuals as civilians when making a distinction between civilians and government authorities.

by illustrating that a single individual may engage with a given service and simultaneously avoid engagement in another service sector. While it is well-documented that East Jerusalemites boycott municipal elections due to concerns over legitimizing the Israeli state's claim to sovereignty in Jerusalem (i.e., "normalization"), less attention has been given to the everyday choices Palestinians make outside the formal political sphere (Prince-Gibson, 2018). Recent work on the controversiality and politicization of Jerusalem municipal community centers has also begun to fill this gap (Avni et al., 2022); however, my article is the first to differentiate between numerous modes of engagement with the Israeli state.

In this article, I draw on data from 55 in-depth interviews conducted during 11 months of fieldwork in 2022, as well as original survey data from a representative survey of East Jerusalem's 19 neighborhoods, fielded in the summer of 2023 to (a) quantify patterns of variation in individuals' engagement with the state across sectors and (b) develop a theory concerning how individuals make choices between different types of goods, services, and institutions deeming some acceptable to engage with and others less so.

I argue that social norms surrounding the acceptability of a particular state-provided good, service, or institution (hereafter, GSIs) determine the extent to which individuals engage with the state in that sector. Where social norms deem a GSI acceptable, there is widespread engagement with the state in that sector. By contrast, anti-normalization norms surrounding the unacceptability of particular sectors have powerful deterrent effects and lead to lower levels of engagement in select sectors. Palestinians use the word *normalization*, or in Arabic *tatbi'a*, to describe the allowance or legitimation of the Israeli state's sovereign presence in East Jerusalem and across all territories of historic Palestine. As the logic goes, engaging with any of the Israeli state's GSIs legitimates the state's authority to govern. Importantly, while all manners of engagement may technically be classified as normalization, in practice, norms of acceptability and unacceptability dictate which forms of engagement are consequentially controversial.

Using regression analyses, I first establish that there is a relationship between individuals' perceptions regarding whether engaging with a given GSI constitutes normalization and the actions individuals take concerning that GSI. I find that, in many sectors, those who perceive engaging with a particular GSI to be an act of normalization are less likely to engage with that GSI. I then use an experiment embedded within the original survey to further illustrate the influence of anti-



normalization norms. This vignette-style experiment measures whether engaging with particular GSIs affects one's assessment of the likeability and respectability of potential neighbors<sup>3</sup>.

Finally, having shown that social norms influence behavior with respect to engagement with the state, I then use qualitative evidence from interviews to identify the mechanisms and logic behind the classification of certain behaviors as normalization and other behaviors as acceptable. I argue that when making day-to-day choices regarding which services to accept from the Israeli state, Palestinians in East Jerusalem make a distinction between engaging with the state in sectors that are “political” and those that are instead considered “technical.” Furthermore, I formulate a typology of service sector types to conceptualize the relevant boundaries of the political vs. technical distinction. Generally speaking, sectors deemed “technical” are those that serve to uphold the positive rights of Palestinians in Jerusalem. Positive rights are those that individuals claim in pursuit of resources to promote their basic livelihood and well-being.

Sectors deemed “political” are typically those that in some way impinge on the negative rights of East Jerusalemites, such as the rights to privacy and expression of national identity.<sup>4</sup> While Palestinian interviewees regularly expressed that it was their right as taxpaying residents of Jerusalem to access “technical” services falling in the category of positive rights (healthcare, public infrastructure, sanitation services, etc.), concerns over normalization and a well-earned lack of trust in the state were cited as fueling resistance to any forms of interference from the state that impinged on personal security, privacy, identity, or livelihood. These sectors, such as policing, dispute resolution, and primary and secondary education using the Israeli Baghrut curriculum, were repeatedly described as “political.”

This article makes four main contributions to the literatures on quotidian political participation, civilian claim-making, civilian agency in conflict settings, and Palestinian politics. First, the Palestinian case challenges the implicit dichotomy present in the citizen claim-making literature that individuals either make claims on the state or simply “exit” (Hirschman, 1970; Hirschman, 1978). Instead, Palestinians in East Jerusalem make claims in select arenas while exiting others. Thus, in this article, I identify and quantify an additional dimension of variation—variation by sector— and present a theory to explain that variation. Second, the Palestinian case draws attention to how the setting of conflict

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<sup>3</sup> This experiment was modeled after Anoll (2018)'s and Gerber et al. (2014)'s survey experiments, which also test for the impact of political participation on peer perceptions.

<sup>4</sup> Negative rights are the class of rights that entitle individuals to non-interference from the state or other parties in select manners or domains. For example, in most democracies, individuals hold the right to privacy, which bars the state from undue interference or violation of that privacy absent due process. Positive rights, by contrast, are the rights that individuals hold to receive benefits and resources from the state (Fabre, 2000; Wibye, 2022).

and occupation influences individuals' interactions with the state. Importantly, the findings of this article suggest that the setting of a territorially contested city generates unique implications for how civilians interact with the state in pursuit of rights and resources. In line with recent work by C. Anderson et al. (2023), this article builds upon literature concerning citizen claim-making in the absence of conflict and the growing literature on civilian political behavior and agency in conflict. Additionally, the article illustrates how normative factors, such as beliefs about the legitimacy and proper role of the state, can influence civilian engagement with the state. Existing explanations point to primarily material or experiential factors that influence claim-making but have yet to address how ideological commitments or widespread norms can affect engagement with the state.

Finally, the majority of Political Science research on Palestinian political behavior has focused on the propensity of Palestinians to protest, both violently and nonviolently (Gade, 2020; Pearlman, 2011; Zeira, 2019). However, by considering the everyday actions of Palestinians rather than their protest involvement, this article aims to check the implicit biases inherent in Political Science scholarship on this topic. Namely, focusing exclusively on Palestinian violent and nonviolent protest activity paints Palestinians as belligerents and revolutionaries, obscuring their role as predominantly non-citizens deserving of civil liberties, equal citizenship rights, and access to state-provided goods and services. Thus, this article contributes to the Political Science scholarship on Palestinian political behavior by highlighting quotidian forms of Palestinian political participation in an attempt to correct for this implicit bias.

In addition to these contributions, the case of East Jerusalem has implications for cases of the claim-making decision nexus of citizens and non-citizens outside of the Israeli-Palestinian context. In conflict and non-conflict contexts, while the specifics of the social norms are likely to differ, contextually particular social norms will likely affect how individuals choose which goods, services, and institutions to seek out in pursuit of state-provided rights and resources. Namely, social norms theory can be applied to other conflict contexts where groups—those with and without separatist or revolutionary aims—are at odds with the state, something particularly relevant for cases of occupation, such as for the choices of Ukrainian civilians in Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine. In addition, a social norms theory of engagement with the state is relevant for non-conflict contexts, such as where minority groups, indigenous peoples, immigrants, or other sub-groups face barriers to engagement with the state compared to majority group members and/or citizens. For example, interviewees compared the Palestinian experience with the Israeli state to that of the Black American experience, and further research could examine how social norms within Black communities in America structure

choices made by group members regarding U.S. authorities and institutions. However, the theory does not apply to contexts or sectors where civilians are coercively obligated to accept state goods—such as some authoritarian regimes— whether by necessity or due to monitoring and sanctioning by state authorities. Even in East Jerusalem, where the surveillance and sanctioning capabilities of the Israeli state are incredibly robust, Palestinians regularly exercise choice in their quotidian decisions.

In the following section, I provide an overview of the history of East Jerusalem’s shifting geopolitical status (1948-present) and describe the implications of geopolitics for Palestinian claim-making in the contemporary context. This is followed by a discussion of how collective norms influence civilian engagement with the state; here, I outline five hypotheses related to the influence of norms on quotidian political behavior in East Jerusalem. I then use original survey data to identify variation in patterns of engagement with different state sectors. This analysis serves to establish that there is variation to be explained, to identify which sectors see widespread engagement, and which sectors do not. In the subsequent section, I use regression analyses to establish a relationship between perceiving engagement with a sector as an act of normalization and individuals’ behavior concerning that sector. This is followed by evidence from a vignette-style survey experiment to show how collective norms of acceptability are associated with particular service sectors, while norms of unacceptability are associated with others. Finally, I present evidence from semi-structured in-depth interviews to identify the underlying logic and mechanisms behind pervasive anti-normalization norms and develop a typology to distinguish between “political” and “technical” sectors. I conclude with a discussion of the implications for policy and directions for future research.

## **2. Geopolitics & Claim-making in East Jerusalem 1948-Present**


For the past 100 years, the experiences of Palestinians in Jerusalem regarding GSI access have been inextricably linked to the city’s geopolitical status. Following the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, or the *Nakba* (catastrophe) as termed by Palestinians, Jerusalem was divided, and East Jerusalem fell under the administrative control of the Jordanians until 1967. At the time of this division, Jordanian East Jerusalem retained only 11.5% of the pre-1948 Jerusalem Municipal territory. Meanwhile, 4.5% of the territory was swallowed by the ceasefire line itself, and 84% became the self-designated capital of the newly created Israeli state (PASSIA, 2023). One consequence of the division of the city was the loss of all administrative institutions and apparatuses to the Israeli side, as the majority of Jerusalem’s municipal institutions – such as post offices, hospitals, municipal council buildings, and sanitation facilities, amongst others – were located in West Jerusalem (Schleifer, 1972). In effect, all that was left

of the pre-war Arab municipality were several high-ranking administrators who did their best to respond to the ensuing post-war crises while displaced from their offices and stripped of the necessary resources (Naamneh, 2019).

As a result, the 1948-1967 period, sometimes referred to as the Jordanian Occupation of Jerusalem, did little to advance basic social welfare goods, services, and institutions for Palestinians in East Jerusalem. Importantly, after the division of Jerusalem in 1948, Palestinians living in East Jerusalem were granted Jordanian citizenship, which did not cohere with the burgeoning collective Palestinian national consciousness (Khalidi, 1997; Sa'di, 2002). Though the majority of Palestinians living in West Jerusalem were displaced from their homes during the 1948 war/the Nakba, those that remained were granted Israeli citizenship along with the other Palestinians scattered between the armistice “Green Line” and the Mediterranean Sea.

Following the Six Day War in 1967—or *ElNaksa*<sup>5</sup> as it is termed by Palestinians—in which the Jordanians were defeated, Israel extended the Jerusalem municipal boundaries to include East Jerusalem before formally annexing the area in 1980 with the passage of the *Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel* (The Knesset, 1980). Figure 1 depicts the municipal boundaries established after Israel’s unilateral and contested annexation of East Jerusalem.

**Figure 1. Map of East and West Jerusalem Since 1967**



<sup>5</sup> *ElNaksa* can be translated into English from Arabic as “the setback,” in contrast to the 1948 *Nakba*, or “the catastrophe.”

Figure 1 also delineates between predominantly Palestinian East Jerusalem and predominantly Jewish Israeli West Jerusalem.<sup>6</sup> The Israeli Defense Forces also conquered the West Bank, the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Gaza Strip during the Six Day War/*El Naksa*. At that time, the West Bank was placed under martial law and international law relating to belligerent occupation; East Jerusalem was thereafter governed under Israeli domestic law. Importantly, international law stipulates that the jurisdictional distinction between the West Bank and East Jerusalem is void and that Israel's unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem does not change East Jerusalem's status under international law, which is that of an occupied territory (Sasson et al., 2012).

The events of 1967 were a significant turning point in establishing the contemporary terrain of claim-making for Palestinian East Jerusalemites. Most consequentially, at the time of annexation, Palestinian East Jerusalemites were granted permanent resident status but not full and equal citizenship in the State of Israel (Halabi, 1997). What began as an administrative question regarding the legality of imposing citizenship on an occupied population has since transformed into one of the most significant existential threats to Palestinian livelihood and well-being in East Jerusalem. As noncitizen permanent residents and holders of Jerusalem "blue IDs," East Jerusalemites must continually prove to the Ministry of the Interior that their "center of life" remains in Jerusalem to avoid deportation and/or residency status revocation.

Residency revocations increased in earnest in 1995 with the reinterpretation of the 1952 Law of Entry. This law has been reinterpreted to allow the revocation of residency status for Palestinians who leave Jerusalem for extended periods for work, schooling, or to live elsewhere, such as in the West Bank. Coupled with a housing crisis, the threat of home demolitions, and the extreme difficulty in obtaining building permits to expand existing homes, Palestinians in East Jerusalem face difficulties finding affordable and legal options to remain in the city once they marry, leave home, or outgrow their current dwellings. Furthermore, permanent residents have limited voting rights in Israeli elections; Palestinian East Jerusalemites are only eligible to vote in municipal, but not national, elections. Importantly, the most significant decisions concerning Jerusalem's status are administered nationally under the Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem Affairs rather than by the Jerusalem Municipality (Sasson et al., 2012).

In addition to concerns over the futility of voting, the majority of Palestinians abstain from voting in municipal elections because voting is thought to legitimate Israel's claim to sovereignty over the city

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<sup>6</sup> The statistical areas depicted in Figure 1 were redrawn in 2011 and thus reflect the statistical areas as they are today (rather than as they were 1967 at the time of annexation).

(Blake et al., 2018; Prince-Gibson, 2018). Further, only Israeli citizens are permitted to hold municipal office; thus, most East Jerusalemite would-be voters could not run in municipal elections, even if they desired to. Based on Israel Central Bureau of Statistics Census data, the Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research reports 375,600 Palestinians were living in Jerusalem in 2021 – 38.9% of the total population of the city and a significant block of non-voting eligible voters (Assaf-Shapira, 2023).

Beyond rights to limited formal political participation, Palestinian East Jerusalemites with permanent resident status can access municipal and national state-provided public goods and social services. This includes goods and services like membership in the state health insurance schema, social security and social welfare benefits, and an array of municipally funded services, such as education, infrastructure maintenance, trash collection, access to public parks, playgrounds, and municipal-run community centers. Anyone who has visited both East and West Jerusalem will report the stark disparity between the levels of development and public infrastructure in East Jerusalem compared to most neighborhoods in West Jerusalem.

The well-documented service provision disparities between East and West Jerusalem are beyond our scope; however, what is important to note are the twin problems of (a) inadequate municipal funding allocated for development in East Jerusalem and (b) the political sensitivity of municipal interventions in East Jerusalem. In 2018, the Jerusalem Municipality launched a half-billion-dollar plan to invest in East Jerusalem's schools and public infrastructure. However, the plan was controversial amongst both Palestinians and far-right ultra-nationalist Israeli lawmakers, and plans for its 2023 renewal and expansion have been halted (Hasson and Friedson, 2023). Longtime Jerusalem city councilperson Meir Margalit describes the conundrum of development in the context of occupation:

The inauguration of a new municipal school is a positive event, but taking a broader view, we understand that it implies the insertion of hundreds of students into the Israeli school system, whose personal and family data will be catalogued, coded, and computed to become part of an Israeli control device...to a certain extent, the trap of Occupation lies in the fact that any service provided by the state for the benefit of the population becomes another pillar of the oppressive system (Margalit, 2020, pp. 21–22)

Thus, it is in the context of scarcity, discrimination, and suspicion that Palestinians must choose which services they are willing to accept from the Israeli state. In the following section, I present hypotheses to explain patterns of claim-making in East Jerusalem.

### 3. How Social Norms Influence Claim-Making

The extant literature on the influence of social norms on political behavior has heavily focused on how social norms influence the propensity to vote; much of this literature has been generated by scholars in the field of American Politics (Gerber et al., 2014; Gerber and Rogers, 2009; Hassell and Wyler, 2019; Panagopoulos, Larimer, and Condon, 2014). Social norms are known to positively influence political participation (what other people do, I should do) (e.g., Gerber and Rogers, 2009), negatively (what other people do not do, I should not do) (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990), and inversely (what other people aren't doing, I should do) (e.g., Hassell and Wyler, 2019).

Furthermore, much of the extant literature in this area has focused on descriptive social norms, which should be distinguished from injunctive social norms (Cialdini, 2003). While descriptive social norms are the social rules people follow based on their assessment of what is considered typical behavior (what other people typically do), injunctive social norms are the social rules people follow based on what they think is socially required of them (what other people think I should do) (Lapinski and Rimal, 2005, p. 130). A simple heuristic to distinguish between descriptive and injunctive norms is whether there is a possibility of sanctioning behavior that does not cohere with the norm. If an individual may be sanctioned for violating a norm, that norm is injunctive (Lapinski and Rimal, 2005).

Here, I focus on the anti-normalization norm, an injunctive social norm within Palestinian East Jerusalem pertaining to acceptable and unacceptable interactions with the Israeli state. Following the logic of Lapinski and Rimal, anti-normalization norms are injunctive due to the possibility of social or material sanctions in the event of non-compliance (Lapinski and Rimal, 2005). While the anti-normalization norm is well documented to strongly affect propensity to vote (Blake et al., 2018; Prince-Gibson, 2018), it also affects all non-voting spheres of engagement with the state. Thus, in the following paragraphs, I outline my theoretical expectations for how collective norms influence civilian claim-making in East Jerusalem (H1-H5).

First, I expect variation in the frequency with which Palestinians engage with each discrete GSI. Namely, while some GSIs will be regularly engaged with by most Palestinians in East Jerusalem, others are likely to be avoided by most East Jerusalemites.

**H1:** Palestinians in East Jerusalem are more likely to engage with certain GSIs (healthcare, community centers, etc.) and avoid others (calling the police, pursuing cases in the justice system, Israeli curriculum education, etc.)

Hypothesis 1 establishes that there is variation in sector-level engagement. While this hypothesis may read as plain, it is significant as the implicit assumption of the extant literature is that claim-making

behavior can be assumed to be the same across service sectors. Instead, a major contribution of this article is that there is significant variation between sectors. But what drives this variation? This leads to Hypotheses 2a-b and 3.

**H2a:** Social norms surrounding the relative acceptability of a given GSI will influence the extent to which Palestinian East Jerusalemites engage with that GSI

**H2b:** If an individual perceives a GSI to legitimate or normalize the authority of the Israeli state, they are less likely to engage with the state concerning that GSI

**H3:** Social norms against the use of GSIs will be stronger in certain sectors and weaker in others

Hypotheses 2a-b and 3 highlight that social norms surrounding the acceptability of a particular GSI influence individuals' behavior around it. Perceptions regarding what constitutes normalization are ultimately unique to each individual. What one person considers to be normalization may be different from their neighbor. However, interview evidence suggests a general consensus, or norm, surrounding which GSIs are commonly perceived as acceptable or unacceptable. This leads to Hypotheses 4 and 5, which elucidate the logic behind designations of acceptable and unacceptable.

**H4:** Palestinians in East Jerusalem are more likely to engage with a GSI if the GSI supports the positive rights of individuals with respect to the state.

**H5:** Palestinians in East Jerusalem are less likely to engage with a GSI if the GSI makes claims on individuals' negative rights.

In the remaining sections of the article, each of these hypotheses will be addressed in turn.

#### **4. Research Design and Data**

To evaluate the influence of collective norms on engagement with GSIs, I use both qualitative and quantitative data collected between January 2022 and August 2023 in East Jerusalem. The quantitative evidence relies upon original survey data from a randomly selected representative sample of 1255 Palestinian East Jerusalemites conducted between June 2023 and August 2023.<sup>7</sup> The survey was administered using tablets and conducted in person in Palestinian colloquial Arabic using a representative sample from East Jerusalem's 19 neighborhoods. Jewish Israelis living in these neighborhoods were excluded from the sample. The response rate for the survey was 77%. Informed

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<sup>7</sup> The survey was implemented by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO), a survey firm with its headquarters in Bethlehem, West Bank, Palestine. Three hundred additional respondents were surveyed from the Beit Safafa neighborhood to conduct a natural experiment, which is the topic of another article.



consent was collected from all respondents before the start of the survey. Respondents were not paid for their participation.

I analyze the survey data in three ways; first, I use descriptive statistics to show basic patterns of engagement and abstention from a list of 21 distinct municipal and national GSIs. I then use logit regression analyses to measure whether perceiving engagement with a particular GSI as an act of normalization makes individuals more or less likely to engage with that GSI. In these regressions, the principle independent variables are binary “yes/no” answers to whether engaging with a particular GSI should be considered normalization. The primary dependent variable used in the logit regressions is a composite binary “1/0” record of whether an individual has reported using or seeking help from the Israeli authorities concerning that GSI. These composites were tallied from the “Services Census” portion of the survey. The Services Census captures whether individuals use, or would consider using, Israeli state GSIs across 21 different service sectors when in need of help.<sup>8</sup> Two example questions from the services census are listed in Appendix B, each typifying one of the two main question types included in the services census. The models also include control variables for respondent sex, age, neighborhood, education level, marital status, income, refugee status, political party affiliation, frequency of religious service attendance, and experience of time spent in an Israeli jail or prison. A comprehensive list of all variables used in the logit regressions, including explanations for how they were computed, is included in Appendix D.

The final form of quantitative evidence comes from a survey experiment embedded within the original survey. This vignette-style experiment measures whether engaging with particular GSIs affects one’s assessment of the likeability and respectability of potential neighbors. The dependent variable for the experimental analysis is a composite score of four likability/respectability/responsibility/neighborliness measures, which were asked after the respondents viewed each vignette. An example vignette is included in Table 5 of Appendix A.

Following the quantitative evidence, I use interview data from 55 interviews conducted between January 2022 and November 2022 to illustrate the logic and mechanisms behind the determination that certain GSIs are acceptable and others are not. Interviewees were not paid and informed consent information was presented to all. Interviewees comprised Palestinian civilian society employees, academics, journalists, activists, Israeli human rights organization employees, current and former Jerusalem municipality employees, Mukhtars, and other relevant community leaders.

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<sup>8</sup> This component of the survey is modeled after a services census within Jung and Cohen’s original survey, which captures where and from whom individuals seek social services in Haiti (Jung and Cohen, 2020).

The first round of interviewees was selected using the PASSIA Diary, published annually by the Jerusalem-based Palestinian think tank PASSIA. The diary lists contact information for all Palestinian and international institutions (governmental, religious, civil society, intergovernmental, etc.) that operate across Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. I scanned the Jerusalem section for all potentially relevant institutions and used the listed contact information to conduct the first wave of interviews. In the first round of interviews, I also contacted and conducted interviews with Jerusalem municipality employees in relevant institutions, such as municipal Community Centers, using publicly available contact information. After each interview, I asked interviewees the same question— “Who else do you think I should talk to?”— and relied upon snowball sampling to contact a second round of individuals and institutions.

The interviews were conducted in English (31), Palestinian colloquial Arabic (21), and Hebrew (3), as chosen by the interviewee.<sup>9</sup> English interviews were done with a mixture of Jewish Israelis, Palestinians (including Arab Israelis), and foreign nationals who were sufficiently proficient to conduct the interview in English. Only the general category of organization or professional affiliation was recorded (e.g., Palestinian civil society organization employee, Israeli human rights organization employee) to protect interviewee privacy in a highly politically sensitive environment.<sup>10</sup>

Furthermore, given the sensitivity of the questions and differences in the positionality of the interviewees, one might expect that Jewish Israelis, Palestinians, and foreign nationals would provide systematically different answers in interviews. Apart from some Jewish Israeli interviewees who, being aware of their own positionality, admitted to not knowing enough to feel comfortable answering, there was no significant divergence between the answers provided across groups. This is likely because all Jewish Israelis interviewed interfaced with Palestinian East Jerusalemites in different professional capacities and thus were more informed respondents than average. However, given the experiences and decisions in question are those of Palestinian East Jerusalemites, I interviewed fewer Jewish Israelis (10) and foreign nationals (5) than Palestinians (40).

It should be noted that the interviews were conducted before fielding the survey. Thus, information collected from interviews was used to iteratively adjust my developing theory and generate

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<sup>9</sup> I brought a research assistant to interviews conducted in Arabic and Hebrew for translation purposes. Though I understood much of what was being said in the Arabic interviews, I am not fluent and thus I brought a research assistant to ensure accuracy in my translations. I relied more heavily on translators for the few Hebrew interviews, as I have no formal training in Modern Hebrew.

<sup>10</sup> It should be noted that the designated “Palestinian” and “Israeli” in the examples here reflect the designation of the organization, and not necessarily the individual being interviewed.

some of the survey instruments, as suggested by recent work regarding the iterative interplay between field research, theory, and quantitative analyses (Kapizewski et al. 2022; Pérez Bentancur and Tiscornia, 2022). In the qualitative section, I distinguish between three types of services: those deemed “political,” which are sparsely engaged with; those deemed “technical,” which are widely engaged with; and those that straddle both categories. Together, these three forms of evidence—observational, experimental, and qualitative—test the claim that collective norms surrounding the acceptability of a select GSI influence the willingness of Palestinian East Jerusalemites to engage with that GSI.


## 5. Quantitative Evidence

### *5.1 Variation in Patterns of Engagement Across Sectors*

To arrive at a theory explaining divergent engagement patterns across service sectors, it is first necessary to identify which sectors are commonly engaged with and most commonly abstained from. As one interviewee put it, services can be put into three categories; “those that people have and won’t take, those that people don’t have and want, and those that people have and want” (Interview 16, 2022). Thus, the first task for this article is to identify which services fall into categories 1 and 3.

Figure 2 lists the proportions of individuals who reported engaging with, or being willing to engage with, the Israeli state when needing help concerning a particular GSI. As indicated in the example question in Appendix B, it should be noted that respondents were also asked about whether they would contact an array of alternative options (such as Palestinian civil society organizations, family members, etc.) if seeking help. One benefit of this question design is that it could lower a respondent’s propensity to answer in a “socially desirable” way, as respondents can select more than one option. The purpose of these tallies is to capture broad patterns of engagement across sectors. These tallies also test Hypothesis 1 and support the supposition that Palestinians in East Jerusalem will engage with some GSIs more than others.

**Figure 2. Levels of Engagement with Each Good or Service**



Beyond this, several features of the results are worth noting. First, several questions were aimed at capturing within-sector variance. Typically, these were included when interview evidence indicated potentially significant within-sector differences. For example, while primary care healthcare clinics are near-ubiquitously engaged with, interviewees suggested, and the survey data later confirmed, that many East Jerusalemite women prefer Palestinian providers when seeking prenatal care and when choosing where to give birth.<sup>11</sup> The primary healthcare vs. prenatal care differential was the largest of all in-sector tests.

Additionally, significantly more people have called the police to solve a problem (65%) than have visited a police station to solve a problem (34%). The percentages of respondents who participated in the Israeli Baghrut curriculum are similar to those who send their children to Baghrut curriculum schools. However, enrolling in the Hebrew University (39%) is more comfortable than enrolling in primary and secondary schools (17-21%). Slightly more people use the light rail than buses, but negligibly. Finally, the percentages of those who would seek out Israeli authorities (police or courts) if the victim of a crime or if accused of a crime are within a few percentage points. With these patterns in mind, we can now ask why certain sectors are nearly ubiquitously engaged with while others only see a fraction of the engagement. What drives this variation across sectors?

<sup>11</sup> Interviewees described prenatal care and birth, not as political, but instead as “social and religious” (Interview 37, 2022). Thus, large percentages of individuals prefer in-group care, but purportedly not due to concerns over normalization.

## 5.2 Observational Data

Having established there is a variation to be explained, Table 1 provides the results of a Logit regression, used to test the effect of perceiving engagement with a GSI as an act of normalization on individual engagement with that GSI. As such, the models presented in Table 1 are tests of Hypotheses 2a and 2b.

Table 1 displays the Logit regression results for 5 of the 10 services under consideration, all negative and significant at the 0.001 level. These results indicate that a one-unit change in normalization perception (corresponding from a change from 0 to 1, or “no” to “yes—engaging with the GSI in question is an act of normalization”) leads to a statistically significant decrease in the likelihood that a respondent will engage with the state in that sector (also on a 0 to 1 scale). These results hold for policing (-0.341\*\*\*), education (-0.478\*\*\*), voting (-0.667\*\*\*), sanitation (-1.163\*\*\*), and welfare/economic assistance (-1.726\*\*\*).

**Table 1. Effect of Normalization Perception on GSI Engagement, Logit (M1-M5)**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Police	Education	Voting	Sanitation	Welfare Assistance
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Normalization Perception	0.341** (0.127)	0.478*** (0.139)	0.667*** (0.145)	1.163*** (0.244)	1.726*** (0.173)
Sex	0.009 (0.130)	0.147 (0.123)	0.288* (0.134)	0.338 (0.240)	0.151 (0.134)
Age	0.035 (0.044)	0.169*** (0.041)	0.060 (0.046)	0.198* (0.085)	0.213*** (0.046)
Neighborhood	0.024* (0.012)	0.034** (0.011)	0.016 (0.012)	0.047* (0.021)	0.012 (0.012)
Education Level	0.423*** (0.055)	0.188*** (0.054)	0.238*** (0.060)	0.369*** (0.105)	0.419*** (0.060)


Political Apathy	0.025 (0.091)	0.204* (0.087)	0.023 (0.093)	0.138 (0.167)	0.222* (0.091)
Marital Status	0.255 (0.146)	0.038 (0.137)	0.008 (0.151)	0.089 (0.254)	0.272 (0.148)
Religious Attendance	0.137* (0.057)	0.030 (0.055)	0.041 (0.060)	0.024 (0.108)	0.179** (0.059)
Income	0.309*** (0.061)	0.027 (0.056)	0.056 (0.061)	0.148 (0.106)	0.064 (0.061)
Refugee Status	0.401* (0.163)	0.291* (0.147)	0.143 (0.160)	0.269 (0.270)	0.388* (0.164)
Prison	0.055 (0.143)	0.261 (0.136)	0.216 (0.149)	0.264 (0.241)	0.102 (0.147)
Party Affil.	0.193 (0.128)	0.179 (0.120)	0.216 (0.132)	0.337 (0.226)	0.249 (0.131)
Constant	1.057* (0.471)	1.592*** (0.461)	2.346*** (0.526)	1.338 (0.888)	2.308*** (0.494)
Observations	1,251	1,251	1,251	1,251	1,251
Log Likelihood	746.799	815.416	712.921	299.848	718.969
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,519.598	1,656.832	1,451.842	625.696	1,463.939

*Note:* \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

Figure 3 includes the associated predicted probabilities of engagement with respect to normalization perception. These predicted probabilities should be interpreted as percentage likelihoods that an individual would engage with the GSI in question, given their perception of whether engaging with that GSI is an act of normalization. For example, someone who perceives voting as an act of normalization has a 23% probability of voting, while someone who does not has a 38% probability of voting.

Notably, the predicted probability scores range from relatively small (an 8% decrease in the probability of visiting a police station) to quite large (a 40% decrease in the probability of seeking state social welfare or economic assistance). This indicates that anti-normalization norms may have stronger deterrent effects in some sectors than others (Hypothesis 3).

**Figure 3. Predicted Probabilities of Engaging with GSI Given Normalization Perception**



Second, as noted above, only 5 of the 10 services are included in Table 1; models for the remainder of GSIs with corresponding normalization perception measures (dispute resolution, parks, community centers, healthcare, transportation) are listed in Table 2. The results for these models (6-

10) were either null (dispute resolution, parks, medical) or the direction of the effect did not support Hypothesis 2b (Community Center, transport).

**Table 2. Effect of Normalization Perception on GSI Engagement, Logit (M6-M10)**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Dispute Res.	Parks	Community Center	Healthcare (Primary care)	Transport
	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Normalization Perception	0.310 (0.162)	1.387 (0.914)	1.080*** (0.287)	1.071 (0.620)	2.364*** (0.286)
Sex	0.523** (0.162)	0.018 (0.812)	0.004 (0.175)	0.152 (0.311)	0.387** (0.146)
Age	0.038 (0.053)	0.042 (0.257)	0.092 (0.062)	0.048 (0.103)	0.044 (0.049)
Neighborhood	0.047** (0.014)	0.114 (0.089)	0.051** (0.016)	0.002 (0.028)	0.037** (0.013)
Education Level	0.363*** (0.066)	0.171 (0.374)	0.222** (0.078)	0.184 (0.139)	0.012 (0.066)
Political Apathy	0.110 (0.115)	0.060 (0.580)	0.001 (0.119)	0.128 (0.213)	0.336*** (0.097)
Marital Status	0.185 (0.173)	1.218 (0.840)	0.282 (0.190)	0.307 (0.337)	0.395* (0.167)
Religious Attendance	0.114 (0.069)	0.547 (0.464)	0.003 (0.074)	0.101 (0.130)	0.034 (0.066)
Income	0.314***	0.298	0.031	0.318*	0.126



	(0.072)	(0.368)	(0.079)	(0.140)	(0.068)
Refugee Status	0.022 (0.196)	0.751 (1.138)	0.874*** (0.255)	0.040 (0.362)	0.308 (0.178)
Prison	0.085 (0.176)	0.151 (0.909)	0.270 (0.210)	0.167 (0.339)	0.223 (0.165)
Party Affil.	0.302 (0.156)	0.823 (0.868)	0.061 (0.173)	0.022 (0.306)	0.105 (0.143)
Constant	0.254 (0.568)	4.721 (3.274)	1.352* (0.630)	2.178 (1.117)	1.672** (0.549)
Observations	1,251	1,251	1,251	1,251	1,251
Log Likelihood	548.718	37.631	469.847	194.689	611.854
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,123.437	101.262	965.693	415.378	1,249.709
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001				

Null results should not be over-interpreted, and thus, these results indicate that there is insufficient evidence of the anticipated effect to conclude the effect of X on Y. Positive and significant results could indicate that those who attend municipal community centers and frequently use Israeli public transportation could hold pro-integration attitudes, whereby the term “tatbi’a” or normalization is not perceived as negative. In this instance, those who consider these GSIs normalization would also be more likely to engage with them. However, further tests are necessary to definitively draw this conclusion.

It should be noted that three of the five negative and significant GSIs –policing, education, and voting– fall in the “political” category and, amongst interviewees, were commonly perceived as the most controversial. Of the sectors that are not significant (Table 4.3), three of five are considered “technical” (Parks, transportation, Healthcare), one purely “political” (Dispute resolution), and the other mixed (Community Centers). This indicates that anti-normalization norms affect behavior, especially in sectors perceived as “political” but less so in sectors perceived as “technical” and thus more acceptable to engage with. Lastly, variation between model results could also be due to the difficulty in measuring norms, which are often unspoken yet palpable for those to whom they apply.

One interviewee used the analogy of a membrane to describe the difficulty in pinpointing anti-normalization norms;

It's like a membrane—there is no hard and fast rule of this is what you can do and this is what you can't do. But there is an understanding of where you have crossed the line. There are no signs or written rules, but you feel it. Applying for a permit is okay, but calling the police is not okay. Other things—like using the services from a community center—are okay at a distance.

It's like a balance or a dance (Interview 16, 2022).

With this in mind, the results of Models 1-5 provide strong but qualified support for the claim of Hypothesis 2b: collective norms surrounding the relative acceptability of a given GSI will influence the extent to which Palestinian East Jerusalemites engage with that GSI. Variation between Models 1-5 and 6-10 could also support Hypothesis 3 – collective norms against the use of GSIs will be stronger in some sectors and weaker in others. This variation further demonstrates the necessity of assessing engagement patterns at the sector level, as results vary by sector. The experimental results in the following section provide further support for Hypothesis 3.

### *5.3 Experimental Data*

Due to the difficulty in measuring the notoriously elusive concept of norms, I supplement the observational data with a survey experiment drawn from the original representative survey. The experiment is a vignette-style experiment whereby each respondent was shown six randomly generated profiles using combinations of the five attributes (Name, Age, Occupation, Neighborhood, Additional Information), each containing four levels. The full list of attributes and levels is included in Table 5 of Appendix A. Because each respondent was shown six profiles, the sample size for the experiment was 7531. The “additional information” attribute contains four levels, each representing a different form of engagement with the Israeli state in which the hypothetical person participates. To retain sufficient statistical power for analysis, only four of the many possible forms of engagement are included. The loss of breadth for statistical power is a trade-off of this experimental design. These four forms of engagement include voting in municipal elections, contacting the police to help solve problems in the neighborhood, attending a municipal community center weekly for Hebrew lessons, and attending a local state-run health clinic for routine medical care. These four types of engagement were chosen as they are expected to span the spectrum of controversiality and the “political”/“technical” designation.


The experiment is modeled after an experimental design used by Anoll (2018) and Gerber et al. (2014). Anoll (2018) used the experiment to measure race-based social norms surrounding different forms of political participation in the US. Here, the experiment is adapted to assess how East

Jerusalemites evaluate their peers based on their involvement with different Israeli GSIs. After viewing each profile, the respondent was asked four questions assessing the likability, respectability, responsibility, and neighborliness of the person in the profile. Respondents ranked these measures (likability, respectability, responsibility, neighborliness) on a scale of 1 to 10. The key dependent variable in this analysis is a composite likability score that sums the answers to all four questions.

Three of the four “additional information” levels were designated as treatment (vote, police, health) and the remaining as the baseline or control (community center). Importantly, because each respondent viewed 6 profiles, most were exposed to both treatment and control conditions. I expect evaluations of profiles with the “police” and “vote” primes to be evaluated more negatively than those containing the “health prime” and for all other attributes and corresponding levels to be statistically insignificant. Namely, I expect the social norms against the use of police and voting and in favor of the use of state-provided medical care to be manifest in how individuals evaluate their peers. As such, this experiment tests Hypothesis 3, which states that collective norms against the use of GSIs will be stronger in certain sectors.

The results of the experiment are visualized in Figure 4. As anticipated, the average treatment effects (ATEs) vary significantly between sectors, and each ATE matches the hypothesized directionality (negative vs. positive). The police prime decreases the composite peer evaluation by 5 points, the vote prime decreases composite peer evaluation by 1.4 points, and the health prime increases peer evaluation by 1 point over the control. All were statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors were clustered by respondent using respondent ID. The regression that generates the effect includes all attributes and their corresponding levels. These results are reported in Table 10 in Appendix C. No other attribute or level produced statistically significant results at the 0.05 level or above.

**Figure 4. Effect of GSI Usage on Evaluation of Peers**



Substantively, this experiment provides support for the theory that collective norms about engagement with the Israeli state exist in East Jerusalem and that these norms function differently across sectors. The observational data in the above section further suggests that these norms affect not only how individuals evaluate their peers but also how individuals choose to engage with the state in pursuit of rights and resources.

## 6. Qualitative Evidence

The quantitative analysis above reveals that norms surrounding certain GSIs influence how individuals evaluate their peers and that there is a statistically significant relationship between the acceptance of a norm and adherence to it. However, these quantitative tests are unable to specify the content or logic of these norms. Namely, what determines which GSIs are deemed acceptable or unacceptable? Here, I turn to interview data collected in person between January and November 2022 to argue why select GSIs are earmarked as acceptable while others should be avoided where possible. The interview data is thus used to test Hypotheses 4 and 5.

I argue that Palestinians in East Jerusalem distinguish between GSIs that are considered “political” and those that are instead considered merely “technical” and present a typology outlining the attributes that designate a given GSI as “technical” or “political”. The terms “political” and “technical” were generated by interviewees in their efforts to articulate the boundaries of acceptability. The attributes included in the typology are as follows: the relation of the GSI to the security apparatus, whether the GSI is transactional in nature, whether the GSI is material in nature, the cultural dissemination capacity of the GSI, and the relation of the GSI to the state’s political apparatus. Table 3 outlines the parameters of this typology in detail. Broadly speaking, GSIs in the “technical” category usually serve to uphold the positive rights of Palestinians in Jerusalem through the provision of resources from the state. “Political” GSIs are instead those seen as impinging on the negative rights of East Jerusalemites, such as their rights to privacy, national identification, or personal security. Services considered “technical” are widely engaged with, while those perceived as “political” are avoided by many due to anti-normalization norms.

**Table 3. A Typology of Service Varieties**

<b>Political</b>	<b>Attribute</b>	<b>Technical</b>
<b>High</b>  <i>Example: Policing</i>	<b>Relation to the security apparatus</b>  <i>Is the institution providing the good or service connected to the state security apparatus?</i>	<b>Low</b>  <i>Example: Parks</i>
<b>Low</b>  <i>Example: Justice (seeking remediation in the justice system if the victim of a crime)</i>	<b>Transactional in nature</b>  <i>Is the good or service a benefit received in exchange for taxes?</i>	<b>High</b>  <i>Example: Infrastructure</i>
<b>Low</b>  <i>Example: Dispute resolution</i>	<b>Bricks-and-mortar</b>  <i>Is the good or service provided material in nature?</i>	<b>High</b>  <i>Example: Social welfare/ economic assistance</i>

<b>High</b>  <i>Example: Education, Community Centers</i>	<b>Cultural dissemination capacity</b>  <i>Does engaging with the good or service expose civilians to the civil religion or civic culture of the state?</i>	<b>Low</b>  <i>Example: Sanitation services</i>
<b>High</b>  <i>Example: Voting</i>	<b>Relation to the political apparatus</b>  <i>Is the good or service connected to the overtly political institutions of the state?</i>	<b>Low</b>  <i>Example: Healthcare</i>

While all services provided by the Israeli state in East Jerusalem are in some way inherently political, Table 4 classifies services based on whether the political nature of the GSI is central and significant enough to deter engagement. Notably, though all services cohere with the typologized attributes on a spectrum, not all services fit neatly into a dichotomous typology so as to be classified as predominantly “political” or “technical”. Thus, these are marked as Political/Technical. In the following sections, we will consider each category of GSI in turn, with additional attention to factors cited by interviewees that make it more or less likely for East Jerusalemites to engage when there is ambiguity.

**Table 4. Political vs. Technical Goods and Services in East Jerusalem**

<b>Political</b>	<b>Technical</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Primary and Secondary Education-Baghrut curriculum (self) (17.92% engage)</li> <li>- Dispute resolution (18.08%)</li> <li>- Primary and Secondary Education-Baghrut curriculum (respondent’s children) (21.40%)</li> <li>- Voting (28.68%)</li> <li>- Justice (accused of a crime) (32.74%)</li> <li>- Police (visiting a station) (34.26%)</li> <li>- Justice (victim of a crime) (35.93%)</li> <li>- Higher education (Hebrew University) (39.28%)</li> <li>- Police (calling) (67.49%)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Health (prenatal care) (41.51%)</li> <li>- Social welfare/economic assistance (52.66%)</li> <li>- Transportation (Israeli buses) (57.13%)</li> <li>- Transportation (light rail) (63.34%)</li> <li>- Electricity (67.49%)</li> <li>- Water (86.85%)</li> <li>- Sanitation (92.35%)</li> <li>- Infrastructure (94.90%)</li> <li>- Health (primary care clinic) (96.09%)</li> <li>- Parks (parks, playgrounds, community gardens, soccer fields) (99.44%)</li> </ul>

<b>Political/Technical</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Housing (79.20%)</li> <li>- Community Center (85.89%)</li> </ul>

*6.1 Claiming Positive Rights, Seeking Technical Services*

In speaking with interviewees, it quickly became apparent that, despite generalized concerns about normalization across all sectors, whole categories of GSIs are collectively earmarked as acceptable, if not outright desired and demanded. As Table 4 illustrates, the permeable category of technical services, or positive rights, includes social welfare/economic assistance, transportation services, electricity, water, sanitation services, infrastructure services, healthcare services, and recreational facilities such as parks, playgrounds, community gardens, and soccer fields. What these GSIs have in common is that they all provide a tangible good, service, or resource to East Jerusalemites. Furthermore, these GSIs are all transactional; in exchange for taxes, East Jerusalemites receive certain goods and services from the state, albeit to a lesser degree than their West Jerusalem neighbors. Interviewees repeatedly distinguished between services the Israeli authorities were obligated to provide, and those considered overreach. One interviewee noted,

If the authorities try to do festivals or bring cultural events to East Jerusalem, like the cinema, this is very sensitive. We want your infrastructure because you have to give it to us, but we don't want more than that (Interview 39, 2022).

Interviewees often used rights language, citing that it is their right as taxpaying permanent residents or citizens to receive certain goods and services from the state. Several interviewees appealed to international law, noting that Israel is obligated to provide certain goods and services to Palestinians under the Geneva Conventions (Interview 16, 2022; Interview 40, 2022). One interviewee noted, “Demanding basic rights is outside of normalization” (Interview 40, 2022). In a similar vein, when asked how to distinguish services that were okay and those that were not, several interviewees explained that because East Jerusalemites pay taxes, they should receive goods and services from the state in exchange for the taxes; “For the services you pay [taxes] for, ask for it and take it—this is not wrong” (Interview 23, 2022). Another noted, “In the post-Oslo era, it is acceptable to get help for social services—you are paying taxes to the authorities, and it is your right to get what you want” (Interview 6, 2022).

Interviewees repeatedly used healthcare as the prototypical example of an acceptable service; “Kupat Holim [socialized state medical insurance]—no one is going to criticize you for being non-nationalist if you use the Kupat Holim. This is the acceptable face of Israeli services” (Interview 33, 2022). Another interviewee noted, “Legal residents find [healthcare] as a good opportunity to benefit from the polity...Health is not controversial” (Interview 15, 2022). Lastly, a Palestinian employee at a Kupat Holim clinic in East Jerusalem described how healthcare is an exception to concerns over normalization,

There are services that are not affected by concerns of normalization. One of these services is healthcare. Most residents in East Jerusalem receive health services from Israeli clinics. What’s more, it is even considered to be very respectable and honorable to work in the healthcare system (Interview 43, 2022).

Several respondents grouped GSIs such as infrastructure, sanitation, sewage, and electricity, noting that in the face of widespread dissatisfaction with the level and condition of the services provided, there is widespread willingness to engage with the state to pursue improvements in these areas. One respondent described how,

There is a high level of willingness to work with these entities. They are not seen as political, but more as technical entities...these services don’t hold nearly as much of an emotional, ideological, or political weight. People feel like if they can do something to make a difference now, they will do it (Interview 19, 2022).

In sum, despite a consensus on the sliding scale of all normalization classifications, interviewees clearly elucidated and identified a cut point whereby state-provided GSIs crossed over into the realm of acceptable. Acceptable goods and services are those that enhance Palestinian Jerusalemites’ positive rights through the provision of tangible or material assistance in pursuit of the rights and resources due to them by the Israeli state. These GSIs were often distinguished from “political” GSIs, which are the focus of the following section.

### *6.2 Resisting the Impingement of Negative Rights and the Realm of the Political*

In contrast to the “technical” services described above, there is much more hesitancy to engage with the state in service sectors deemed overtly “political”. One interviewee went so far as to say, “There are certain levels of acceptable normalization, but there is no flexibility on anything that is political” (Interview 16, 2022). As outlined in Table 4, the GSIs most often categorized as political are policing, enrolling in the Baghrut educational curriculum, seeking dispute resolution or justice institutions, and voting. One interviewee described how to distinguish between “political” GSIs and others,



Anything affiliated with the security apparatus (military/prisons/police/intelligence) is more controversial...the controversiality of a service increases with respect to its proximity to overtly security/political criteria. If that's upfront and out there, it is difficult to engage with (Interview 21, 2022).

When asked which services were the most controversial, interviewees most commonly answered that calling the police reaches the top of the list, with one interviewee noting, "This is definitely considered normalization" (Interview 40, 2022). Several interviewees characterized the police as "the enemy" (Interview 23, 2022; Interview 6, 2022). One respondent succinctly described the consequences of evading anti-normalization norms and calling the police,

The police are the enemy who are coming with orders to kill. People go to their families [for help]. If they don't have families, they will go to the police, but they will be considered collaborators and traitors (Interview 6, 2022).

A common refrain amongst interviewees was that the police not only symbolize state violence but enact further violence when called upon to help remedy a situation. Some respondents described the contentious and violent relationship that East Jerusalemites have with police as akin to Black Americans' experience with the police, making both groups less likely to call, even if in need of law enforcement assistance (Interview 40, 2022). Interestingly, the survey data indicates that East Jerusalemites call the police more frequently than purported by interviewees, while East Jerusalemites visit the police much more infrequently, which aligns more with trends described by interviewees.

In total, roughly 65% of individuals have contacted the police at least once in the past five years to report an issue or solve a problem. However, only roughly 34% have visited a police station to report an issue or solve a problem. Within that 65%, roughly 17% have contacted the police just once, 3% have contacted the police two or three times, and a sizable 46% of the sample have contacted the police four or more times in the past five years. The difference in willingness to call the police over visiting a police station could indicate underlying concerns regarding monitoring and social sanctioning should one be seen engaging with the state. Namely, an East Jerusalem resident can call the police from inside their home without others noticing, but if they are to arrive at the police station and proceed to report an issue, it would be more likely observed by others in the community. Thus, the discrepancy between the interview and survey data could indicate that, while the injunctive social norms against calling the police are strong, East Jerusalemites will evade this norm—most likely out of necessity—if they can also avoid being seen by their peers.

When discussing willingness to seek dispute resolution assistance or pursue cases in the justice system, respondents repeatedly described how people prefer to keep these matters within the family or community and are reluctant to pursue intervention from the Israeli state. Several respondents used the difficult example of domestic violence, one citing that few women would be likely to approach Israeli authorities to intervene and that instead, “it is considered an inner-Palestinian issue;” as such, it would be better for the family or Mukhtar<sup>12</sup> to solve it. Another interviewee noted that many women see calling the police or pursuing a case in the justice system as an absolute last resort, only if her life is in danger (Interview 23, 2022). The interviewee further noted that this was in large part due to the community stigma against using state channels to address matters of justice, but that if her life were truly in danger, she would contact the authorities and “no one can fault her for that” (Interview 23, 2022).

Education, particularly enrolling children in municipal schools that use the Israeli Baghrut curriculum, ranks high on the list of controversial actions. The primary point of contention with the Baghrut curriculum is the absence of any mention of Palestinian history, culture, or national identity, and the unwillingness to tailor the curriculum to include these themes for Palestinian students. This is considered by many to be a deliberate act of erasure and an impingement on the right to national identity expression and self-determination (Interview 18, 2022). One interviewee described how the amount of time spent in the Baghrut system is relevant, namely, “If you want to go at the end to Baghrut okay—but if you go from beginning it changes your mentality. They want you to be out from your identity as a Palestinian” (Interview 23, 2022). Another respondent described the Baghrut curriculum as “another attempt to force the Israeli narrative onto people” and cited distrust in the ways Israeli intelligence uses the education system as a means of surveillance,

Shin Beit also has a hands-on approach to the education system. There is a lot of mistrust in how much the state wants to intervene. It is perceived as a route to mold the most obedient Palestinians (Interview 19, 2022).

Respondents reported mixed opinions regarding which curriculum was more rigorous and thus provided students with better prospects for the future. It is no secret that municipal budgets give

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<sup>12</sup> Mukhtars are community mediators with varying degrees of influence and formality in their ties to the state as state-designated brokers. They were appointed in Jerusalem during the British Mandate era as official mediators and brokers between the people and the Mandate authorities. Today, there are conflicting views on (a) the continued existence of Mukhtars and (b) the formality of their connection to the Jerusalem Municipality. While several Israeli interviewees insisted that state-appointed Mukhtars no longer exist, the consensus amongst Palestinian interviewees was that Mukhtars still exist in many neighborhoods and work closely with the municipality as mediators. See Baer (1978) and Baer (1980) for additional information on the functions and history of Mukhtars in Palestine.

preference to Baghrut curriculum schools and that these schools have lower student-to-teacher ratios and better infrastructure. Many cited the added Hebrew language instruction of the Baghrut curriculum as a draw for parents, as those who speak fluent Hebrew will likely have an easier time entering the Israeli workforce. However, others expressed skepticism at whether the presumed benefits of the Baghrut have provided Palestinians with inroads to employment beyond the retail and food service industries. Some expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the Baghrut curriculum, citing the alternative Palestinian Tawjihi curriculum as more rigorous (Interview 23, 2022). The municipality also runs informal educational programs and schools that use a modified Tawjihi curriculum. These non-Baghrut municipality schools are considered more akin to technical services, and interviewees cited a similar logic that it is the state's responsibility to educate East Jerusalem residents (Interview 25, 2022). Those who have the means will often opt to send their children to private and international schools. In general, in recent years, there has been a greater willingness to attend Israeli educational institutions, which is seen in the sharp increase in East Jerusalemite enrollment at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Hasson, 2019).

### *6.3 The Grey Area of Political/Technical Entities*

While there is an unspoken consensus regarding the acceptability of most services, several key GSIs fall into a third, grey area category where the degree of acceptability is more fluid and dependent upon other factors. A prime example is the 10+ Municipal Community Centers (hereafter MCCs), which are meant to be the primary neighborhood-based interface between the municipal government and residents of East (and West) Jerusalem.<sup>13</sup> The vast majority of survey respondents reported having visited an MCC at least once. However, interviewees described the decision to visit and acceptance of MCCs as much more contentious than the survey results portray at face value.

The contentious nature of MCCs is attributable to several factors. First, these are often brick-and-mortar institutions deep within East Jerusalem neighborhoods. The very presence of a brick-and-mortar institution, and especially the construction or opening of centers in new locations, is seen as a physical representation of the incursion of the Israeli state into the lives and lands of Palestinians (Interview 16, 2022). Because of this, in particularly sensitive neighborhoods—like Issawiya, Jabal Mukaber, and Ras Al 'Amoud—MCC employees do not work from an independent brick-and-mortar building but instead may work from within a municipal school or independently and itinerantly (Interview 7, 2022; Interview 8, 2022; Interview 9, 2022). As an illustration of the controversiality of

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<sup>13</sup> These centers operate in East and West Jerusalem and are also called Community Councils, Community Administrations, “Markez Al-Jamaheere” in transliterated Arabic, or “Minhalim Kaylatim” in transliterated Hebrew.

these institutions, both the Issawiya and the Sur Baher community centers have been burned down on multiple occasions due to resistance to their presence in the neighborhood.

Second, many MCCs bear Israeli municipal and state symbols on their building fronts. Several community center employees described the display of the municipal logo as a barrier for individuals, as many East Jerusalemites are not comfortable being seen entering a municipal building (Interview 22, 2022; Interview 8, 2022). This has led some centers to remove all municipal logos, with some success (Interview 2, 2022).

Lastly, these centers are often seen as promoting what many respondents deemed the “Israelization” of the city through their programming. While one interviewee characterized the MCCs as “a cancer within our neighborhoods” (Interview 23, 2022), another noted,

There is a nationalist motive behind the MCCs. It is not beneficial for children to invest their time in [MCCs] because it could cause a clash in national identities. It could impact the rates of normalization and legitimization of the state (Interview 17, 2022).

Despite the overall concern surrounding the impact of the MCCs in neighborhoods and on the nationalist cause, interviewees acknowledged the importance of MCCs as the primary and easiest way to interface with the municipality to take care of necessary tasks like resolving parking tickets, applying for housing construction permits and, in some, cases completing simple daily tasks such as receiving mail. In light of this tension, interviewees described several factors that influence when it is acceptable to go, and what makes some centers more acceptable than others.

First, one interviewee distinguished between different types of activities at the MCCs, noting that “there is sensitivity from people to anything related to education, ‘Israelization,’ culture. But events for the elderly? Why not. Let them go have fun. Cooking lessons are not sensitive” (Interview 31, 2022). Thus, there are different levels of scrutiny depending on what brings an individual to the MCC. Second, the most frequently cited factor was the neighborhood in question. While community centers are widely accepted in certain neighborhoods, such as Beit Safafa and Beit Hanina, as noted above, there has been so much resistance to MCCs in other neighborhoods that they have been burned down or plans for their opening have been blocked by neighborhood residents.

Next, interviewees commonly cited the community’s acceptance of the staff as a major determining factor for the center’s success. Ideally, staff would come from within the neighborhood and be trusted, if not prominent, community figures. In Sur Baher, the first MCC leadership faced significant resistance from the community upon the center’s opening. This resistance culminated in

an arson attack on the center in 2013. Only when the leadership changed hands, and the center hired from within the community did the center gain traction (Interview 4, 2022).

Interestingly, interviewees frequently noted that, if they were unable to work with other East Jerusalemite Palestinians (ideally from within their own neighborhood), they would prefer to deal directly with Jewish Israeli employees than work with Palestinian Arab Israelis or “48 Palestinians” who gained Israeli citizenship following the war of ‘48/Nakba. The main reason cited was feeling misunderstood by ‘48 Palestinians “from the North” (Interview 19, 2022; Interview 29, 2022). In discussing the dynamic after an interview, my East Jerusalemite research assistant contributed that there is an Arabic proverb that says something to the effect of “the dog is worse than the owner” because the dog worships the owner. Here, she likened ‘48 Palestinians to “the dog,” doing the bidding of “the owner” – the Israeli state.

The MCC is a prototypical example of a grey area GSI, where engagement is accepted under certain conditions but not others. Another GSI that falls into this category is the housing authority, which is highly politicized due to the housing crisis in East Jerusalem, settlement expansion, and frequent home demolitions by the state. Due to these factors, there is a deep distrust of the housing authority and all branches of the municipality involved in housing and home demolitions (Interview 18, 2022). Residents recognize that contact with the housing authority is necessary if they are ever to be approved for a legal building permit, and at the same time, it is highly fraught due to the high likelihood of rejection and the fear of attracting unwanted attention should they make changes to their homes pre-approval.

## **7 Conclusion**

This article develops and tests a theory concerning how social norms influence how individuals engage with the state to acquire resources, seek assistance, and carry out the tasks of daily life. Where social norms dictate that a good or service unacceptably legitimates the Israeli state’s claim to sovereignty in East Jerusalem, individuals are less likely to engage. However, when social norms deem a particular good or service to be acceptable, despite overarching normalization concerns, East Jerusalemites are more willing and likely to make claims on the Israeli state in pursuit of that good or service. A social norms theory is distinct from the prevailing explanations in the literature, which instead focus on material factors, such as the relative visibility of the state in the neighborhood or village, the presence or absence of intermediaries or brokers, and whether individuals have a history of benefiting from the state’s distributive policies. Further, while the literature has thus far focused on determining which

individuals are most likely to make claims, I illustrate how the same individual may make different choices depending on the good, service, or institution in question. Additionally, I argue that, in the Palestinian case, a distinction is made between goods, services, and institutions deemed inherently “political” and those that provide “technical” services.

This study’s limitations should be acknowledged. First, the findings are generated from a single case, and thus, the theory should be tested elsewhere, acknowledging certain scope conditions. The theory could most easily be applied to other cases of occupation or contested governance, whereby civilian populations are opposed to the presence of the governing body but beholden to it. However, a social norms theory of everyday political behavior should travel outside settings where territory is contested, and civilians are ideologically at odds with the state, as social norms have been shown to influence formal political participation elsewhere (Anoll, 2022; Byambaa and Yamada, 2023; Panagopoulos, 2010). Furthermore, in this article, I have not attempted to provide exhaustive evidence that social norms are the only variable influencing engagement, but instead acknowledge the possibility of equifinality and the influence of other factors on individuals’ decision-making.

These findings are significant for scholarship concerning citizen claim-making, political behavior in conflict contexts, and distributive politics. Most importantly, renewed attention should be given to the sector level, as this article provides evidence that individuals’ choices vary by sector. It is possible that cross-case trends emerge in the types of sectors typically engaged with, or it is instead possible that trends in sector-by-sector variation are unique to each case. Additionally, certain groups may be more likely to engage with or avoid specific sectors. These empirical questions emerge from this article and deserve their own analyses.

Further, sector-level attention is relevant for understanding both civilians’ actions in seeking out the state in pursuit of rights and resources and their attitudes towards those doing the same. In addition to individuals’ choices varying by sector, the experimental evidence in this article suggests East Jerusalemites evaluate their peers more positively if they engage with select sectors and more negatively if they engage in others. Importantly, the composite likeability measure comprises four questions that are at once a seemingly benign assessment of cordiality amongst neighbors and also indicators of potential stability and safety, jeopardizing resentment, distrust, and the othering of those who behave differently on these axes. As such, this article suggests the need to theorize the intercommunal consequences of social norm deviation, assuming these consequences vary by sector.

In the Palestinian case, ideological commitments manifest in social norms, which affect Palestinian East Jerusalemites’ everyday political behavior and attitudes. Importantly, this article

primarily focuses on the second step of the causal chain, whereby social norms affect behavior and attitudes, with limited attention to how ideological commitments shape social norms within a given political community. This, too, could be the subject of future theorizing.

Kramon and Posner's (2013) piece began the important work of pioneering the study of sector-level variation in the distributive politics field, as their article focuses on the differential effects of top-down state distributive policies concerning different goods and services. As such, a major contribution of this article is to shift the focus to the individual level, highlighting how individuals form attitudes towards different government-provided goods and services and how these attitudes influence individuals' behavior concerning the state. In a similar vein, while the conflict literature has considered civilian-rebel and rebel-state dynamics, less attention has been given to how conflict dynamics influence the civilian-state dyad. This article suggests civilians may alter their behavior with the state due to their conflict-related ideological commitments and the influence of their peers. Future research could examine differences in the behavior of pro-state and anti-state civilian contingents.

Understanding what drives Palestinian choice-making regarding state-provided goods, services, and institutions is important for improving access to goods and services in East Jerusalem. These findings suggest that Palestinian communities in East Jerusalem will be most receptive to Israeli state efforts that liaise directly with local community members. However, the decimation of local Palestinian leadership following the erection of the Separation Barrier, Israel's ousting of the PLO and PA from East Jerusalem, and crackdowns on collective organizing have narrowed the pool of genuine, representative community liaisons (Regular, 2005). Thus, Israel's easing of these restrictions would be a first step towards the development of community leaders with whom to liaise.

Furthermore, this article suggests municipal funding should focus on improving technical services, as these are widely accessed and desired by East Jerusalemites. The municipality should also allow for increased Palestinian autonomy in "political" areas where possible. For example, the incorporation of Palestinian history lessons into the existing Israeli Baghrut curriculum or increased funding (without curriculum stipulations) to non-Baghrut schools would likely be seen as a measure of goodwill by the state in a contentious sector, currently viewed with much suspicion. These autonomy-increasing measures would not only increase goodwill but would also serve to improve East Jerusalem's living conditions, which have suffered decades of neglect across all service sectors compared to most West Jerusalem neighborhoods.

The events of October 7<sup>th</sup> and the subsequent 2023 Israel-Hamas war in Gaza are likely to have implications for how Palestinian East Jerusalemites engage with the Israeli state in pursuit of state

goods and services. First, during the war, Palestinian East Jerusalemites can be expected to identify more strongly with their Palestinian identity and participate in acts of civil disobedience, such as strikes and boycotts of the Israeli state and economy, all of which could result in lower levels of engagement with Israeli goods and services. However, at the same time, increased surveillance, security operations, and arrests in East Jerusalem and the West Bank could lead to (a) increases in engagement as visible shows of loyalty to the state to shield oneself from state violence, or (b) decreases in engagement to stay under the radar and avoid unnecessary attention from the state. Importantly, the durability of these changes is likely to be a function of whether there are long-term and significant changes to the political status quo or whether, instead, the pre-war status quo largely resumes following the conclusion of the horrific hostilities.



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## 8. Appendices

### 8.1 Appendix A

The following table lists the survey questions, attributes, and survey experiment levels included in this analysis. Each respondent was shown 6 randomly generated profiles. Each profile included 5 attributes and one randomly selected level from each attribute. After viewing each profile, respondents were then asked the four questions below Table 5.

**Table 5**

Question: Now we are going to look at descriptions of 6 made-up people who are hypothetically interested in moving into your neighborhood. After looking at each description, I will ask you how you feel about these people.

<b>ATTRIBUTES (5)</b>	<b>LEVELS (4 per attribute)</b>
<b>Name</b>	If respondent is Muslim, Amir/ Mohammed/ Ibrahim/ Ali OR If the respondent is Christian, Elias/ Jirius/ George/ Hana
<b>Age</b>	38 / 34 / 37 / 39
<b>Occupation</b>	Businessman / Doctor / School Principal / Engineer
<b>Neighborhood</b>	Ras Al Amoud / Beit Hanina / Sur Baher / Abu Tor
<b>Additional Information</b>	(1) Has no problem calling the Israeli police to come solve problems in his neighborhood / (2) Attends the local Clalit clinic when in need of medical care / (3) Attends the municipal community center weekly for Hebrew lessons / (4) Votes in every municipal election

On a scale of 1 to 10, rate your level of agreement with the following statements;

- (a) My overall impression of this person is positive (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10)
- (b) I think this person is responsible (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10)
- (c) I respect this person (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10)
- (d) I would feel comfortable if this person moved in next door to me as my neighbor (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10)

The composite likability dependent variable used in the experimental analysis is a sum of the respondent's answers to the above four questions. Thus, the lowest possible composite likeability score is 4, and the highest possible likability composite score is 40.

**Table 6.** Example Vignette

Name	Amir
Age	34
Occupation	Doctor
Neighborhood	Abu Tor
Additional Information	Attends the municipal community center weekly for Hebrew lessons

On a scale of 1 to 10, rate your level of agreement with the following statements;

- (e) My overall impression of this person is positive (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 **10**)
- (f) I think this person is responsible (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 **8** 9 10)
- (g) I respect this person (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 **9** 10)
- (h) I would feel comfortable if this person moved in next door to me as my neighbor (1 2 3 4 5 6 **7** 8 9 10)

Composite Likability Score: 34

## 8.2 Appendix B

Tables 7 and 8 reflect the two types of questions in the Services Census section of the survey. The first question type, shown in Table 7, records where and/or from whom the individual would seek help if dealing with a problem related to a particular GSI. Here, I use the example of dispute resolution. This question type was used to record engagement with various GSIs (such as justice and dispute resolution institutions, the sanitation and water departments, etc.). The advantage of this question type is that it captures comfortability (or lack thereof) with institutions an individual may not have yet used. Thus, it captures information about engagement tolerance that would otherwise be lost if a person had not yet needed the particular service but would feel comfortable seeking it out if they needed. When recording state engagement based upon these question types, the observation would be marked as a 1 (engagement) if the individual answered “yes” to numbers 4, 10, or 11 (in bold) and, otherwise, 0 (no engagement). Number 6, “Israeli NGO,” is not included because although these are Israeli institutions that can receive state funding, Israeli NGOs are not formally part of the state apparatus.

The second question type asks individuals whether they engage with a particular GSI and/or the frequency with which they engage. This question type is used where possible, as it provides a more direct answer to the question of usage history. An example of this question type is shown in Table 8.

**Table 7. Services Census Question Type 1**

<p>If you had a dispute about property with a family member or neighbor that you could not settle yourself, who would you turn to to help settle it? You can choose more than one. Please tell me all that apply;</p>	1. Hamula leaders (yes/no)
	2. Family (yes/no)
	3. Mukhtar (yes/no)
	<b>4. Municipal community center (yes/no)</b>
	5. Palestinian NGO or CSO (yes/no)
	6. Israeli NGO (yes/no)
	7. International NGO (yes/no)
	8. The Waqf (yes/no)
	9. Local mosque or church leaders (yes/no)
	<b>10. The Israeli Police (yes/no)</b>
	<b>11. The Israeli court system (yes/no)</b>
	12. Sharia court system (yes/no)
	13. Neighbors or friends (yes/no)

	14. A Sulha or reconciliation committee (yes/no)
	15. Factions or political parties (yes/no)
	16. UNRWA (yes/no)
	17. The PA (yes/no)
	18. Other -----

**Table 8. Services Census Question Type 2**

What type of school did you attend, if you were able to attend school?	1. Private schools (religious, charitable, international)
	2. Jerusalem Municipality schools using the Tawjihi curriculum
	3. Jerusalem Municipality schools using the Baghrut curriculum
	4. Palestinian schools/Alwaqaf schools
	5. UNRWA schools
	6. Other -----

**Table 9. Normalization Perception Survey Questions**

I am now going to ask you about your perceptions of different service sectors in Jerusalem and whether you think using the services in that sector amounts to an act of “normalization” or <i>tatbi'a</i> . Answer “yes, it is normalization” or “no, it is not normalization” to the following list.	1. Voting in Israeli municipal elections (Yes/No)
	2. Applying for Israeli citizenship (Yes/No)
	3. Going to an Israeli hospital or medical clinic (Yes/No)
	4. Contacting the Israeli police (Yes/No)
	5. Using the Israeli buses or light rail (Yes/No)



	6. Sending children to a school that uses the Israeli Baghrut curriculum (Yes/No)
	7. Sending children to the Hebrew University for college (Yes/No)
	8. Going to a municipal community center to access services provided there (Yes/No)
	9. Having the Jerusalem municipality sanitation department pick up trash in your neighborhood (Yes/No)
	10. Settling a dispute with a friend or neighbor using the Israeli court system (Yes/No)
	11. Accepting economic relief or welfare from the Jerusalem municipality or the Israeli National Insurance Institute (Yes/No)
	12. Going to and using a municipal park, soccer field, or playground (Yes/No)
	13. Going to the municipality offices on Jaffa street or contracting a municipal official to ask for help accessing government provided services (Yes/No)

### 8.3 Appendix C

Table 10 lists the regression results from which the average treatment effects were drawn for the survey experiment. Due to the experimental design, no additional control variables were added, but all attributes and levels were tested to ensure they did not interfere with the treatments.

**Table 10. Survey Experiment Regression Results**

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*Dependent variable: Composite Likability Peer Evaluation*

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Health	1.188***
	(0.214)
Police	5.042***
	(0.240)
Vote	1.431***
	(0.207)
Name-Amir	0.328
	(0.229)
Name-Elias	1.185
	(0.930)
Name-George	1.182
	(0.915)
Name-Hanna	0.121
	(0.825)
Name-Ibrahim	0.104
	(0.235)
Name-Jiries	0.572
	(0.842)
Name-Mohammad	0.123
	(0.238)
Age	0.052
	(0.042)
Occupation- Doctor	0.070
	(0.227)
Occupation- Engineer	0.242
	(0.224)
Occupation- School Principal	0.398*
	(0.238)
Neighborhood- Beit Hanina	0.313
	(0.225)
Neighborhood- Ras Al Amoud	0.203
	(0.236)

Neighborhood-Sur	0.262
Baher	(0.233)
Subject Number	0.00000
	(0.00000)
Constant	75.346*
	(44.325)

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

#### 8.4 Appendix D

**Table 11. Variable Descriptions and Computation for Logit Regressions**

<b>Dependent Variables</b>	<b>Service Census Question Type (1 or 2)</b>	<b>Computation</b>
Primary and Secondary Education- Baghrut Curriculum (respondent)	2	Binary (1/0) record of whether the respondent went to a school that taught the Baghrut curriculum
Dispute Resolution	1	Binary (0/1) record of whether the respondent reports seeking dispute resolution assistance from Israeli police, courts, or community center.
Voting	2	Binary (0/1) record of whether the respondent has ever voted in a municipal election.
Police (visiting a station)	2	Binary (0/1) record of whether the respondent has ever visited a police station to report an issue or solve a problem.
Higher Education- The Hebrew University	2	Binary (0/1) record of whether the respondent reports that the Hebrew University is the best university option for East Jerusalemites (as compared to other Palestinian higher education options).
Social Welfare/Economic Assistance	1	Binary (0/1) record of whether the respondent

		would seek social service assistance from a municipal community center, Jerusalem municipality welfare offices or other social service providers within the municipality, or Israeli state social security or welfare offices
Transportation (Respondent uses Israeli buses or Israeli light rail)	2	Binary (0/1) record of whether the respondent reports using Israeli buses or light rail
Community Center	2	Binary (0/1) record of whether the respondent reports having ever visited a municipal community center
Sanitation	1	Binary (0/1) record of whether the respondent reports willingness to contact a municipal community center, the Israeli police, Israeli court system, or the sanitation offices of the municipality if they need to solve a problem related to sanitation conditions in their neighborhood.
Health (primary care)	2	Binary (0/1) record of whether the respondent reports that they would attend an Israeli clinic should they need to seek medical attention.
Parks (parks, playgrounds, community gardens, soccer fields)	1	Binary (0/1) record of whether respondent would visit a municipal park, soccer field, community garden, or playground if it existed in their neighborhood.
<b>Explanatory Variables</b>	<b>Question</b>	<b>Computation</b>
Normalization Perception: Voting in the Israeli elections	See Table 9	Binary (Yes/No)

Normalization Perception: Going to an Israeli hospital or medical clinic	See Table 9	Binary (Yes/no)
Normalization Perception: Sending children to a school that uses the Israeli Baghrut curriculum	See Table 9	Binary (Yes/No)
Normalization Perception: Sending children to the Hebrew University for college	See Table 9	Binary (Yes/no)
Normalization Perception: Going to a municipal community center to access services provided there	See Table 9	Binary (Yes/No)
Normalization Perception: Having the Jerusalem municipality sanitation department pick up trash in your neighborhood	See Table 9	Binary (Yes/no)
Normalization Perception: Settling a dispute with a friend or neighbor using the Israeli court system	See Table 9	Binary (Yes/No)
Normalization Perception: Accepting economic relief or welfare from the Jerusalem municipality or the Israeli National Insurance Institute	See Table 9	Binary (Yes/no)
Normalization Perception: Going to and using a municipal park, soccer field, or playground	See Table 9	Binary (Yes/No)
Normalization Perception: Contacting the Israeli police	See Table 9	Binary (Yes/No)
Normalization Perception: Using the Israeli buses or light rail	See Table 9	Binary (Yes/No)
<b>Control Variables</b>	<b>Computation</b>	
Sex	A binary (0/1) record of whether a respondent presents as male or female, coded by the survey enumerator	
Age	An ordinal variable of which age bracket an individual falls into (18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-70, 70 and above)	
Neighborhood	A nominal variable of the neighborhood of residence respondents belong to	

Education level	An ordinal variable of the highest level of education of the respondent completed (No formal education; Elementary; Preparatory; Secondary; Mid-level diploma/professional or technical; BA; MA and above)
Political Apathy	An ordinal variable recording the extent to which respondents agree with the statement, “Politics is meaningless and rarely benefits people like me” (Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, Strongly Disagree).
Marital Status	A binary (0/1) record of whether the respondent reports being married
Refugee	A binary (0/1) record of whether the respondent is a registered refugee with UNRWA
Income	An ordinal variable recording the monthly take-home income range of the individual in New Israeli Shekels (Less than 2500 NIS, 2500-5000 NIS, 5000-7500 NIS, 7500-10000 NIS, 10000-12500 NIS, more than 15,000 NIS).
Prison	A binary (0/1) record of whether the respondent reports having spent time in an Israeli jail or prison
Party Affiliation	A binary (0/1) record of whether the respondent reports being affiliated with a political party
Religious Attendance	An ordinal variable recording the frequency with which individuals attend places of worship (Always, Most of the time, Sometimes, Rarely, Only on holidays, Never).