Abstracts
Second Annual GLD Conference, May 31st-June 1st, 2018

Panel 1: Traditional Authorities
Chair: Marcia Grimes

Christian Missions, Traditional Authorities and Social Insurance Networks in Malawi
Kate Baldwin, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science, Yale University
Ellen Lust, Professor, Director of GLD, Dept. of Political Science, Gothenburg University

This paper studies the long-term effects of Christian missionaries on social structures and social insurance networks. The activities of Western missionaries implicitly and explicitly challenged the position of traditional authorities, and therefore we hypothesize that they made them weaker sources of assistance in the long-run. We also examine whether the churches and organizations established by missionaries were able to provide alternative sources of assistance. We draw on evidence from Malawi, a country in which late 19th century missionary expansion -- inspired by David Livingstone -- occurred quickly and in advance of British colonial power. We pair information on the location of missions and missionaries prior to World War I with data from the Malawi GLB survey. In communities with early access to missionaries, we find that traditional leaders are weakened and citizens are unlikely to turn to them for assistance; however, we do not find that citizens can turn to church leaders or church organizations in their place. This suggests a weakening of social insurance networks in these communities.

Legacy Institutions and Political Order in Weak States: Evidence from Chad
Paul Thissen, Ph.D. Candidate, University of California, Berkeley

This paper investigates variation in the ability of non-state institutions to produce political order in weak states, presenting evidence from interviews and a survey experiment in Chad. In some places, chieftaincies, clans, sultanates, or kingdoms perform many of the functions of a state: enforcing legal codes, collecting taxes, guaranteeing property rights, and ensuring security. The leaders of some such institutions demonstrate an impressive command over their followers. Yet in other places, residents feel free to disobey their leaders with impunity. Why are leaders of some non-state institutions able to command compliance from their followers while others are not? To address this question, this paper presents data from in-depth interviews and a survey conducted in several peripheral regions of Chad between 2015 and 2017. These interviews reveal how centuries-old institutions can command greater compliance. People grow up believing in the institution's legitimacy, and they believe they will be punished if they disobey its leader. In
contrast, people do not consider newer institutions -- such as those created during the colonial area or later -- to hold as much legitimacy. And they are not sure whether such newer institutions are capable of enforcing their decisions. Original data from a survey of 2,300 Chadian villagers supports the argument that people comply more with older institutions.

**The Developmental Consequences of the de jure State Traditional Relationship**
Daniela Behr, Postdoctoral Research fellow, Dept. Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz

In many states around the world, besides a state-sanctioned, formal sphere of governance, there exists another, second dimension of governance: traditional governance. Within this second sphere of governance, traditional leaders which can be perceived of as heads of ethnic groups typically holding a hereditary position which they obtain according to the customs of their ethnic communities, take on key functions within the society at large. In this paper, I investigate how states deal with this situation of so-called dualism. Drawing on a novel, cross-sectional dataset on the constitutional provisions for ethnic groups, their leaders, rules and norms, I estimate the developmental consequences of the de jure state-traditional relationship. Applying OLS regression, I find that the constitutional recognition of group rights is positively associated with a country’s socio-economic development, while the constitutional recognition of traditional leaders/bodies as well as customary rules and norms is negatively associated with development.

**Traditional Governance, Political Dualism and Intra-State Conflict**
Katharina Holzinger, Professor, University of Konstanz

Across the world, many ethnic groups still practice their own, traditional forms of political organization. These traditional forms of governance co-exist with state institutions at the local or regional level in about two-thirds of the UN member states. This co-existence implies a legal and political pluralism that has the potential to cause severe conflicts over authority between the groups and the state. This poses the question to which degree and under which conditions the political pluralism of indigenous and state governance leads to violent intra-state conflict.

Thus far, the role of the groups’ traditional governance and its role within state polities has largely been ignored. Previous research has shown that politically relevant ethnic groups that are excluded from government have a higher risk of engaging in violent action. In respect to traditional governance, research has shown that more centralized traditional institutions are better at bargaining with the state, which leads to a decrease of the risk of intra-state conflict. However, these institutions also have a stronger basis to mobilize against the state, which is likely to increase conflicts with the state. Finally, it has been claimed that power-sharing institutions may serve as a remedy to peacefully negotiate conflicts.
We argue that the way traditional governance of indigenous groups affects violent outcomes depends on their political relevance and mobilization potential, but that it is moderated by the way indigenous groups and their forms of governance are legally acknowledged and integrated with the state. In order to explore how the mobilization potential and the legal integration of indigenous groups relates to the risk of internal conflict, this paper draws (1) on a new dataset which codes the political integration of indigenous groups and traditional governance in the constitutions of all 193 UN member states and (2) on survey data on more than 1,000 indigenous groups worldwide. Employing logistic regression, we find support for our argument.

Panel 2: Shifting Modes of Non-State Rule
Chair: Josephine G. Gatua

Does the State Crowd Out Non-State Institutions? A field experiment on community policing and gender inequality in Papua New Guinea
Jasper Cooper, Ph.D. Candidate, Columbia University

Why do traditional authorities coexist alongside state institutions in some contexts, while in others state services appear to have crowded out non-state competitors? In answer to this question, this study takes advantage of a unique opportunity to examine an exogenous shock to the capacity and availability of state policing services in formerly stateless areas. In late 2015, remote villages in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, were assigned at random to have or not have a uniformed community police officer permanently present in the village. In a household-level survey carried out over eight months after the community police have been working in the selected communities, I find no evidence that the expansion of state services crowds out non-state institutions. Rather, the presence of community police widens an already existing gender gap in appraisals of police, with men shifting toward customary authorities and women towards the state. Demand for both services increases as a result of the state’s expansion. There is some evidence that this complementarity improves order: respondents are less likely to perceive theft, alcoholism or domestic violence as prevalent in their community.

Tribes without Sheikhs? Technological Change, Media Liberalization, and Authority in Networked Jordan
Geoffrey Hughes, Fellow, Dept. of Anthropology, London School of Economics

This paper examines how Jordan’s rapidly evolving media sector is transforming the nature of authority in Jordan. An older generation of leaders, known as sheikhs, confronts technologies they often don’t understand and a new generation that has little respect for their elders’
genealogical claims. Amidst a proliferation of social media tools that allow young people to use the idiom of the tribe to act quickly and decisively—even violently—in the political field without regard for their elders, the Jordanian government seeks to reassert control over a media sector that is increasingly international, for-profit, and privately held. Yet a new generation of would-be tribal leaders is rushing into the breach. Drawing on case studies of those who would seek to control the tribes, this paper argues that the future of authority in Jordan will depend on the continued ability of leaders to use media to move between various scales, representing themselves individually while also convincingly standing in for lineages of various sizes and, indeed, the nation itself.

“You must only drink one cup” Revisiting the Tension Between “Kikombe cha Babu” and biomedicine in Tanzania
Alexander Makulilo, Professor, Dept. of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Dar es Salaam

In 2011 tens of thousands of people from all over East Africa flocked to Loliondo in Tanzania seeking a cure for several diseases, including diabetes, tuberculosis and HIV. Ambilikile Mwasapile, a former Lutheran pastor, administered a miracle dose popularly known as “kikombe” charging about $0.33 for his concoction per patient. The Tanzania’s National Institute for Medical Research concluded that while the dose in Babu’s “cup” was safe, it did not endorse such drink as a "cure." In this paper, I revisit the Traditional and Alternative Medicine Act of 2002 in order to understand the tension that exists between traditional health practice and biomedicine in providing health services in Tanzania. I argue that although there is a tendency by the government to regulate and set standards for traditional health remedies and practices, that trend is a contradiction since it compels traditional health practice to work like biomedicine. Yet, despite the existence of the law, several traditional health practitioners are not registered thereby posing a serious challenge for the government to exert effective control over them.
Panel 3: Conflict and Criminality

Chair: Nora Stel, Associate Professor, Governance and Human Rights, Maastricht School of Management

Configurations of Wartime Governance and their Legacies on Political Behavior
Ana Arjona, Assistant Professor, Northwestern University

Non-state armed groups such as insurgencies, militias, and criminal organizations often take on governance functions in the localities they seek to control. Even though these groups often monopolize the use of violence, they seldom monopolize political power and authority: other actors—including religious, ethnic, and civic leaders as well as state agents—continue to play important roles. There is great variation in the roles that these different influential actors play in local governance in conflict zones and the ways in which they interact with each other. This paper investigates the legacies of different configurations of local governance during wartime on citizens’ political behavior in the post-war period. I rely on original data on Colombia, where different types of armed groups transformed local governance in radical ways for decades within the context of a civil war. Using detailed data on governance by guerrillas, paramilitaries, ethnic leaders, civic authorities, and state agencies during the war, I trace the effects on political behavior by relying on an individual-level survey conducted in the same communities after both guerrillas and paramilitaries demobilized.

Laws in Conflict: Legacies of War and Legal Pluralism in Chechnya
Egor Lazarev, Ph.D. Candidate, Columbia University

How does exposure to conflict affect choices between state and non-state legal orders? This paper studies this question in post-war Chechnya, where state law coexists with Sharia and customary law. I focus on the effect of conflict-induced disruption of gender hierarchies, because non-state legal orders are explicitly discriminatory against women. The study leverages variation within Chechnya and compares Chechnya with its neighbor, Ingushetia, which has similar constellations of legal orders but was not affected by war. The analysis relies on semi-structured interviews, original population surveys, and data on court cases. I find that women in Chechnya are more likely to rely on state law than men and that this gender gap in legal preferences and behavior is especially large in more victimized communities. In Ingushetia this gap is absent. I infer from this that the conflict empowered women in Chechnya to pursue their interests through state law – albeit not without resistance. Female legal mobilization has generated a backlash from the Chechen government, which has attempted to reinstate a patriarchal order. I conclude that that conflict may induce legal mobilization among the weak, and that gender might become a central cleavage during state-building processes in post-conflict environments.
Reintegrating Rebel Collaborators: Experimental Evidence from Mosul, Iraq
Mara Revkin, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, Yale University
Kristen Kao, Postdoctoral Fellow, GLD, Dept. of Political Science, Gothenburg University

What are the conditions under which civilians will accept those who collaborated with a rebel group back into their community after conflict? How does variation in the identity of a rebel “collaborator” (e.g. gender, age, or tribal identity) and the type of collaboration (e.g. marriage, combat, payment of taxes, or employment in a civilian job) affect preferences for punishment? Moreover, how does the type of punishment imposed on a former collaborator affect the prospects for his or her reintegration into a post-conflict society? Mosul, an Iraqi city that experienced more than three years of control and governance by the Islamic State (IS) until 2017, is an ideal site in which to seek answers to these questions, which are crucial to the stabilization and reconstruction of war-torn societies. Through two embedded experiments in an original survey of 1,409 residents of Mosul, we identify the effects of hypothetical collaborators’ identity and the type of collaboration on respondents’ preferences for punishment, forgiveness, and reintegration. We find that, contrary to the Iraqi government’s one-punishment-fits-all approach to IS collaborators, Mosul residents assign different levels of culpability to different types of collaborators in ways that have important implications for post-conflict transitional justice and accountability processes in Iraq and beyond.

Social Resistance to Victimization under Criminal Rule
Eduardo Moncada, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science, Barnard College

Criminal violence is a growing concern for citizens and policymakers. While the nature of this violence varies both across and within countries, armed non-state actors – ranging from street gangs to drug trafficking organizations – are major drivers of violence in Latin America. These armed non-state actors often exert some form of territorial control through which they regulate varied aspects of everyday life while simultaneously victimizing populations located within those territories. Existing research on the political consequences of crime finds that victims of crime withdraw from political life or, alternatively, become more politically engaged. But the focus on whether victims retreat from or pursue engagement with the state overlook victims' political behavior vis-à-vis their criminal victimizers. In this paper I analyze striking variation in one such form of political behavior: social resistance to criminal victimization under criminal rule. I find that resistance by victims of protection rackets – one of the most common forms of territorially-organized crime in the developing world – can range from quiet everyday negotiations with criminal actors to armed insurrection. To account for this striking variation I develop a framework which shows how distinct configurations of economic and political resources influence the type of resistance available to victims of crime. I illustrate the
framework’s analytic utility with comparative case studies of social resistance to criminal protection rackets in Latin America.

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**Panel 4: Decentralization and Local Governance**

**Chair:** Kristen Kao, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, GLD, Dept. of Political Science, University of Gothenburg

**Precolonial Legacies and Institutional Congruence in Decentralized West Africa: Assessing the Roles of Elected and Traditional Actors on Local Public Goods Delivery**

Martha Wilfahrt, Postdoctoral Fellow, Dept. of Political Science, Northwestern University

Scholars have long identified political bias in how African politicians distribute state resources. Much of this literature has focused on the motivations of the central state or on the role of group identities, such as ethnicity, to explain varying distributional outcomes. This paper shifts focus to local governments, increasingly important players in basic social service provision, to argue that public goods allocation under democratic decentralization is shaped by the presence or absence of informal social institutions, which embed local state and non-state elites in dense social networks and shared behavioral norms. I suggest that this is explained by varying degrees of congruence between formal and informal institutions within local governments. It is the relative overlap of formal institutional space of the local state, created and reformed from above, that determines the nature of local redistribution under decentralization: broad and equalizing in cases of high congruence or contentious and targeted in areas where it is low. Because social institutions are inherited from the past and are uniquely robust across villages in areas that were home to precolonial states, local government performance is spatially and historically structured. Looking to the West African state of Senegal, I draw on case studies of three local governments to illustrate the historically induced political dynamics of institutional congruence. The findings underscore how state and non-state actors interact at the grassroots and, in turn, how the structure of their relationships to each other drive emerging sub-national variation in local government performance following decentralization.

**The Legacy of Development Planning: Evidence from Tanzania**

Ruth Carlitz, Research Fellow, GLD, Dept. of Political Science, Gothenburg University

Ameet Morjaria, Assistant Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

Philip Osafo-Kwaako, Economist, McKinsey & Company

This paper examines the long-term impact of a major episode of development planning in post-independence Tanzania. Specifically, we focus on the legacy of *Ujamaa* villages introduced in mainland Tanzania over the period 1974-1982. Using historical maps, we generate
finely-grained estimates of the extent of villagization, which we then combine with data from population censuses and recent national household surveys. This allows us to investigate the extent to which variation in the intensity of the government’s forced resettlement program explains subnational variation in social and economic outcomes today. We document that, in the short-run, villagization led to an increase in various educational outcomes, such as primary school completion rates, literacy rates, and total years of schooling. Today, districts which experienced a high share of developmental villages have greater availability of some public goods and citizens report higher rates of participation in community activities, but there is worse perception of corruption among government officials and greater rejection of one-party rule. Per capita household consumption is also significantly lower in districts with historically high levels of the treatment measure. To address potential endogeneity in village formation, we report instrumental variable results based on variation in ethnolinguistic fragmentation and the occurrence of droughts in the 1970s which facilitated the resettlement of peasants into villages. We conclude by providing some preliminary evidence on the lack of economic diversification as well as political alignment with the ruling party as possible channels which explain the legacy of the villagization experiment.

**The Determinants of Local and National Vote Choice: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment**

Adam Harris, Lecturer (Assistant Professor), Dept. of Political Science and School of Public Policy, University College London

Kristen Kao, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, GLD, Dept. of Political Science, Gothenburg University

Ellen Lust, Professor, Director of GLD, Dept. of Political Science, Gothenburg University

What drives vote choice? This paper presents a rst systematic theorization and empirical investigation of this question at different election levels in developing countries. The literature on elections in new democracies largely assumes that determinants of vote choice in one type of election generalize to other elections. Yet, voters view the attributes of candidates very differently when they run for local versus national elections. Using a conjoint survey experiment we empirically test for differential determinants of vote choice across Malawi's local, parliamentary, and presidential elections. We find that a candidate's party affiliation is a key driver of vote choice in local elections while ethnicity is the main determinant in national elections. We theorize that this disparity arises because voters recognize that elected positions differ in the degree of power officials hold and access to resources accorded to them. National level officials enjoy resources that they can allocate to co-ethnics, while local office holders are resource poor and thus rely on national level politicians for resources required to meet constituents' demands. Voters recognize that politicians and government officials support local politicians from their own party. Consequently, citizens vote for national level politicians who are more likely to reward them (e.g., co-ethnics), but local level politicians who are able to obtain resources from above (e.g., co-partisans with national politicians). This study provides a unique theory of elections and illustrates that we cannot necessarily export ndings from presidential or
parliamentary elections to local elections, contradicting a core assumption of much of the extant literature on vote choice.

Panel 5: Layered Authority: Complementing or Contradicting?
Chair: Ruth Carlitz, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Program on Governance and Local Development, University of Gothenburg

Institutional Layering and Political Stability
Jennifer Murtazashvili, Associate Professor and Director, The International Development Program at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh

Institutional layering refers to shared authority between informal and formal authorities. This paper uses the literature on self-governance and self-enforcing constitutions to clarity when institutional layering is stable and socially beneficial. To be stable, institutional layers must reflect the interests of all relevant participants in the system of shared governance. Specifically, there must be transparent and public limitations on the authority of government officials, the power-sharing arrangement must be in the interest of both government officials and informal powerholders, and powerful groups must have an interest in power-sharing. To be socially beneficial, informal powerholders must be constrained and accountable. I illustrate the framework by first considering the structure of customary governance in Afghanistan. I then compare the stability and effectiveness of layering in Afghanistan and extends the framework to two additional contexts: Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Traditional Institutions, Reciprocity Norms, and Interethnic Inequality: Experimental evidence from Peru
Christopher Carter, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science and Research Associate at the Center on the Politics of Development, University of California

Interethnic inequality varies greatly across Latin America. In some areas, indigenous and non-indigenous citizens have access to the same public goods and services. In others, however, the indigenous are greatly disadvantaged compared to mestizo citizens. This paper seeks to explain the reasons for this variation. I argue that where traditional institutions of communal landholding, which tend to have a mostly indigenous membership, have persisted, differences in development outcomes between indigenous and non-indigenous populations are greatly reduced. Such a reduction is largely due to the the fact that traditional communities preserve longstanding norms of reciprocity. Community membership provides an important cue for indigenous voters regarding which candidates will be most likely to provide their communities with resources. Using the case of Peru and data from a conjoint experiment, lab-in-the-field, and a natural
experiment, I provide evidence to show that 1) a candidate’s community membership is an important determinant of whether they receive the support of community members; 2) that reciprocity is a key mechanism in explaining this preference; and 3) that mayors who are from communities reward communities with more public goods than mayors who are not from communities.

**Measuring the Salience of Ethnic Institutions (SEI): When Social Institutions are Ethnically Based**

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(Abstract to be released)