

# GOVERNANCE UNCOVERED EPISODE 61 TRANSCRIPT

## *Bonus Episode on Social Norms and State Engagement in East Jerusalem*

Welcome to a special episode of Governance Uncovered. This episode is shorter than usual but just as filled with fascinating insights on local governance research.

Our guest today is Hannah Early Bagdanov, a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. She is also a Doctoral Student Affiliate of the Kellogg Institute for International Studies and the Klau Center for Civil & Human Rights.

In this episode, we will be discussing Hannah's GLD working paper, "Social Norms and Sector-Level Engagement with the State: Evidence from East Jerusalem."

Hannah's research highlights how historical events have shaped the unique status and social norms of East Jerusalemites, influencing their interactions with the Israeli state.

We'll also explore how Palestinians in East Jerusalem navigate their engagement with various state services, driven by community social norms, and discuss the contemporary implications in light of ongoing conflicts in Gaza and the West Bank.

So, keep listening to learn more about the relationship between Palestinians and the Israeli state in East Jerusalem.

So, Hannah, thank you for joining us to talk about your working paper, social norms and sector level engagement with the state, which has evidence from East Jerusalem. So it was a great pleasure to read it. But also, it gives us an opportunity to talk about what you learned from your work there as well as what might be taking place now. So I just wanted to start by giving. Do a chance to let us have a better understanding of what the conditions are like and the situation is for Palestinians in East Jerusalem.

Yeah. Thank you so much, Ellen. It's great to be here. In order to think about the situation for Palestinians in East Jerusalem, you do have to step back at least to the creation of the State of Israel or Al Nakba, as it is called by Palestinians in order to think about the ways that the geopolitical status of Jerusalem has shifted. Because Palestinians relationship to the State of Israel in particular and to governance activities and claim making has shifted along with the various changes in the geopolitical status of. The city, and so in, in order to do that, you can think about at least 4 eras of

governance in East Jerusalem since 1948, the first being 1948 to 1967. At this point, following the War of Independence or Nakba, Jerusalem was divided into two: the eastern portion, which is contemporary East Jerusalem, was at that point governed by the Jordanians, sometimes called the Jordanian occupation of Jerusalem, and the western portion was governed by the Israelis. The Palestinians living in the western portion of Jerusalem were either displaced to other parts of the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, or remained. Those that remained were granted citizenship within the Israeli state, and those that were displaced, and particularly those displaced into East Jerusalem, were granted a limited Jordanian citizenship. Really, a passport without citizenship. Whites and Jordan, and so this structure held until 1967, which was the next relevant juncture in the Six Day War, at which point the Israeli state annexed East Jerusalem and reassumed control of the eastern portion of the city. The Palestinians living in East Jerusalem at that point, who had been granted this limited Jordanian citizenship, were not granted citizenship status within the Israeli State, but instead granted a permanent resident status. And that status remains today. The majority of Palestinians in East Jerusalem are not citizens of the Israeli State, but have this Jerusalem Blue ID distinct from the West Bank Green ID, which grants them the ability to reside in Jerusalem. Under certain strict conditions, but that does not grant full and equal citizenship rights. The next relevant juncture would be the Oslo Accords, at which point, with the kind of burgeoning creation of a parallel Palestinian Authority, and you see that being built up in Ramallah, Palestinians in East Jerusalem. For the first time in this period, really had the opportunity to begin looking eastward for limited governance provision from the Palestinian Authority. They were also able to vote in Palestinian Authority elections and for the first time then therefore were able to kind of look east and West and have their center of life between these two poles of Western Israeli control, Eastern Palestinian Authority control that was just beginning to be set up and very limited. So you had this fluidity for a period. Of about a little less than 10 years until the 2nd Intifada and the erection of the wall. That would be the 4th juncture when the wall was erected in East Jerusalem, cutting East Jerusalem in two. At that point you saw Palestinians in East Jerusalem being forced to look westward. The Israeli side, any affiliations or activities with the Palestinian Authority were criminalized. There were crackdowns. Those continue today. And so any kind of limited governance that the Palestinian Authority was providing at that point was cut off and then in subsequent years was curtailed even further. And so Palestinians in East Jerusalem, for the first time were cut off from the rest of the West Bank. And those blue ID's, the Jerusalem unique status of permanent residency. Meant something entirely different in this post wall era, where now Palestinians. Beholden to these real estate in a new way and in the wake of that also became somewhat of a new political community, again distinct from the West Bank, where you had an entirely different government structure, an entirely different relationship to the Israeli state. And so then in the contemporary period that has really shaped the dynamics for East Jerusalemites. Who are again separated from their other

Palestinian communities. They have a different ID status. They have a unique relationship to the Israeli state where they receive the majority of kind of social. Benefits provided by the Israeli state, but they do not. The majority do not have citizenship and they still view that relationship as a contested 1 because the majority perceive the Israeli state to be continually illegally occupying the city and that Jerusalem is the would be should be future capital of a Palestinian state and. Should be under the control of of an eventual Palestinian. The government, and so this sets up a relationship of contention, but also one where Palestinians in East Jerusalem are receiving and interacting with the Israeli state to a much higher and greater degree than Palestinians in Gaza, Palestinians and the West Bank. And so it is a unique kind of status. That has shifted. In accordance with these junctures to arrive at camp, how Palestinians relate to the Israeli state today.

And then within this, you're looking at the question of what kinds of claims they make on the state, right. So you're drawing from Gabby Crooks weisner's work on claims making. And and we'll actually be talking to her in the fall as well on this on exactly this topic in terms of claims making. Which, you know, she sees as efforts to navigate the state social welfare apparatus that is then engaging the actors, agencies and institutions that directly and indirectly shape the provision of such goods. So. Really interesting about what you're doing, I think is making an argument that it's not about different individuals necessarily sort of having different relations with the States and different sort of claim. Is making but really thinking about how this varies across sectors. Can you tell us a little bit more about what you find there?

Yeah. So I think that is one of the most fascinating pieces of the decisions that Palestinian E Jerusalem mites are making is that the same individual is making choices between the different available Israeli sectors, deciding which ones to boycott and which ones to accept and engage with. And what I find is going on here and this is really the variation that I'm trying to explain is what is driving the same individual to be comfortable accepting healthcare, be comfortable attending certain events at a Community Center, but will not ride the light rail and will not call the police, will not attend. Other events at the same Community Center. So what is driving this variation within kind of the decision making process for the same? Well, and what I find is that there are robust and developed community social norms which kind of dictate which of these sectors are acceptable to engage with and which are unacceptable to engage with. And what this comes back to is the again, the contention that the Israeli state is illegally occupying E Jerusalem. And as a result, any engagement with the Israeli state as the governing body is a explicit or tacit, depending on the action and acceptance of the Israeli states claim to. Aunty and so Palestinians are moderating and adjusting their behaviors with respect to the state in order to boycott that reality in certain sectors, and then accept and acknowledge that at the same time life must go on. And the Israeli state does have. Certain responsibilities to us as those that are under its governance

scheme. And so these social norms that have grown up in this context are really heuristic devices that help Palestinians in East Jerusalem to understand what those boundaries are. Understanding within this community, these sets of actions are widely perceived as controversial as normalizing. Relations with the Israeli state in an unacceptable way and on the other hand, these sets of activities are widely accepted as OK to engage with. There's widespread understanding that the majority of Palestinians. Engage with the state in this way and so that the same individual will be making choices across sectors.

And so the interesting thing is you're arguing it's not just about individuals choices all coming out to be the same thing, but it is. It actually is a social norm, and it's kind of community held. And Brad, is there a sense of sanctioning if people go against the norms?

Yes, that definitely came through in the interviews that depending on the severity of the offense, there is people do fear sanctioning. And so for one example, maybe that would be helpful to illustrate that I was speaking with employee of a Community Center located in one of the East Jerusalem neighborhoods for one of my interviews and. She mentioned that she has to often either call individuals or call residents or meet with them in locations other than the Community Center because people are fearful of being seen entering the Community Center. Not fearful of these really state paying attention, but fearful of their neighbor. And so she will go to their houses. She will meet with them elsewhere, but they do not want to be seen by their within their community entering the center. And that varies somewhat by neighborhood, depending on the particular makeup of the neighborhood. And that's kind of another paper, the subject of another topic, but. There are issues concerning sanctioning that affect how Palestinian E Jerusalem might engage and how they make their decisions of. What they are willing to seek out and what they will avoid.

And that brought my thinking as I was reading this to the question of how much this is also changing over time. Right. And of course, I want to ask you what your understanding is of what the sort of current conflict in Gaza and Gaza, Israel, and it's also of course, existing in the West Bank as well at the moment. So how do we understand the extent to which these kinds of? Clashes and conflicts are affecting both the norms and also the engagement between Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the state.

Jerusalem has been surprisingly quiet. And I think if you ask people who follow E Jerusalem and ask experts on the topic or those that live there, most people would be surprised because this is not the same pattern that we've seen with E Jerusalem across other conflicts. Typically E Jerusalem is one of the first areas to. Kind of ignite in the wake of conflicts elsewhere in Israel and Palestine, but in the very early stages of the war, E Jerusalem functionally shut down. Anecdotally, I had a friend, a colleague, my

research assistant from my interviews described her experience in the early stages of the war as akin to the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic that everything was moved online. She rarely left her house. Nobody was out. At some point. That did shift, and things began to open up again, but I think there was an understanding amongst E Jerusalemites that there was tight surveillance, particularly of social media posting online content that was posting in relation to the war. And so you see kind of a quieting on social media. You see the same thing happening within. Palestinian citizens of Israel and Arab Israeli communities in Israel, that certain high profile individuals were arrested or detained or questioned because of their online posting, and so the online sphere in East Jerusalem. Quieted down fairly early on, so that's one of the markers that you saw of this kind of. General. Quiet and then at the same time you saw a crackdown by police and by the Housing Authority in terms of home demolitions in East Jerusalem. So are at so the Israeli newspaper quotes a 60% increase in home demolitions. Since the start of the war and this is a different tactic taken by the Israeli Government and the Jerusalem Municipality as compared to previous conflicts. Which in previous conflicts, the municipality and the state decided to reduce home demolitions to reduce the risk of escalation and escalating tensions, and instead mostly led by the far right National Security Minister, it's Mar Ben Javier. You see an increase in home demolitions and so Palestinians. In East Jerusalem are seeing OK, there's online surveillance happening with real implications for arrest Tainment and questioning. And then there's crackdown by the state in significant and tangible ways, such as an increase in the demolition of homes. And as well as kind of increase in general surveillance police presence, the deployment of police to East Jerusalem, and with that you see a general retreat. But the second factor that I would say is that you also have a lack of media attention on East Jerusalem in a way that is new because there is so much media attention. Being diverted to other parts of Israel and Palestine for good reason. You see just a quieting in terms of what is reported on the kind of day-to-day happenings in East Jerusalem, more as before, you might be seeing. Kind of more of a play by play within the Israeli media within the Palestinian media, within international news outlets, on some of these major events and especially things like an increase in home demolitions. Each one might have been covered in a pre war situation, but here you see just a sparse kind of attention to East Jerusalem. In general and then the last thing I will say is that it is likely that in addition to a crackdown in security, in addition to surveillance, in addition to this media quiet. Palestinians in East Jerusalem are remaining quieter because they're positioned with their respect to Israel is more complicated than those in Gaza and those in the West Bank. Their lives are intertwined with the Israeli state in a way that is different than West Bank Palestinians. And then Palestinians in Gaza and. For that reason, they do have more to lose should they protest in a way that would threaten arrest or detention or home demolition or other types of punishments by the state. And that's not to say that the Palestinian E, Jerusalem, any relationship to Israeli state is rosy or equitable. Or absolutely marked by discrimination, dispossession and all the rest. However, it is

different because there is an exchange of goods. There is a reciprocal relationship of goods for taxes. In a way that just does not exist in the West Bank and Gaza, and so I would say that would be the last factor in terms of what is explaining this relative quiet that nobody would have expected necessarily within E Jerusalem.

That's fascinating. And in some ways, right. I mean, what you're pointing to is the interdependence or the dependence, I should say on the Israeli state, right. And so your earlier discussion is really pointing to the fact. The people, at least to some extent, can make choices as to how much they're willing to be dependent on it and how much they're willing to engage in the state, right? And in this case, even that of more limited dependence and discrimination and the things that you're pointing to still mean that we're seeing a quieting of, or at least appear to see as a quieting was taking place in east Jerusalem. Thank you. Thanks for sharing this again. Thank you for your work. I think it's really interesting and of course the implications of it extend far beyond E Jerusalem and important theoretical ways. But I think it's also great to learn from you what's taking place in East Jerusalem and how we might think about the relationship between Palestinians there and the Israeli state visa vis some of the other parts of Palestine. Thank you so much.

Yeah, thank you. It's really been great to be here.