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Front cover image: A mural outside of a prison in northern Iraq, where some detainees accused of joining or collaborating with the Islamic State are being held (Mara Revkin, February 2017).

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Reintegrating Rebel Collaborators After Conflict in Iraq

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Abstract

Rebel groups that govern territory require the support of large numbers of civilians. After conflict ends, these civilians are often perceived as rebel collaborators. Yet, we know relatively little about what victimized populations think is the appropriate response to collaborators. This gap in our knowledge has serious implications for the durability of peace. Through experiments embedded in an original survey of Mosul, an Iraqi city that experienced governance by the Islamic State, we identify the effects of hypothetical collaborators' (1) identity traits and (2) type of collaboration on preferences for punishment, forgiveness, and reintegration. Contrary to the government's harsh and indiscriminate approach to prosecuting collaborators, participants prefer more lenient punishments—or no punishment—for some. We find that the nature of collaboration matters more than the identity of the collaborator. Our design helps identify the conditions under which former rebel collaborators may be successfully reintegrated into post-conflict societies.

1 Introduction

The recent rise of powerful rebel groups controlling substantial territory in countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, and Nigeria raises important questions for post-conflict stabilization and reintegration. In conflicts where rebel groups attempt to govern the territory they control, civilians often collaborate in order to ensure economic subsistence and physical survival. After such conflicts end, how do members of victimized communities want those “collaborators” to be treated?¹ How do variation in the personal characteristics of collaborators and the nature of their collaboration with the enemy affect beliefs about the severity of punishment they deserve or the likelihood of forgiveness? Furthermore, does the type of punishment imposed on collaborators affect their prospects for peaceful reintegration into severely victimized societies? In this study, we provide answers to these questions with some of the first public-opinion data collected from territory recently recaptured from the Islamic State (hereafter “IS” but also known by its Arabic acronym, Daesh).

Post-conflict transitional justice processes are more likely to lead to reconciliation between adversarial groups and sustainable peace when they take public opinion into account (Latimer, Dowden and Muise, 2005). Proponents of restorative justice (Zehr, 2015) and positive peace (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006)—approaches based on rehabilitating the perpetrators of violence—have criticized highly punitive forms of victors’ justice inspired by unproven deterrence theories based on the idea that harsher punishments discourage recidivism (de Greiff, 2014: 18). The design of post-conflict transitional justice processes is important, because failure to address the underlying grievances that led to violence—as well as the grievances resulting from the violence itself—could increase the likelihood of conflict recurrence (Loyle and Appel, 2017). For instance, it is argued that the rise of IS—which emerged from the

¹“Collaboration” is a widely used term in conflict research, but one that is highly subjective and not well defined. In this article, we use “collaborator” to mean a person who participates in behaviors that support an enemy, whether voluntarily or under coercion.

remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) after the 2003 United States invasion—was fueled by widespread discontent with the Iraqi government’s collective punishment of Sunnis through its de-Baathification policy and mass incarceration of Sunnis suspected of supporting AQI (Sly, 2015). In El Salvador and Honduras, iron-fist’ policies that were intended to eradicate organized crime ultimately backfired for similar reasons. Much like in Iraq, where U.S.-run prisons became “jihadi universities” in which extremists were able to indoctrinate and recruit ordinary criminals (Taddonio, 2016), prisons in El Salvador and Honduras served as criminal incubators where incarcerated gang members “were able to strengthen their leadership system, organize criminal operations and recruit new members” (ICG, 2017). These examples illustrate the high stakes of the debate over what to do with the millions of Iraqis who lived under IS rule and collaborated with the group to varying degrees. Poorly designed counterterrorism and transitional justice policies risk generating new grievances that could fuel future insurgencies in Iraq and other war-torn societies. Given that civil wars have become the most common type of conflict since the Cold War (Kalyvas, 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003), understanding reconciliation with collaborators is important.

To date, there is very little empirical research on individual-level preferences for reconciliation and accountability mechanisms in post-conflict societies. This is problematic because collaboration with rebel groups is widespread in civil wars. Rebel groups rely heavily on civilians to obtain sustenance, shelter, labor, and information (Wood, 2003; Kalyvas, 2006; Weinstein, 2006; Lyall, Shiraito and Imai, 2015; Staniland, 2012). Those that engage in governance—around one-third of all rebel groups active between 1945 and 2003 (Stewart, 2018)—are particularly dependent on civilians to staff a variety of service-providing, law-enforcing, and extractive institutions including courts and taxation (Mampilly, 2011; Arjona, 2016). There is an urgent need for public opinion research in post-conflict societies that have experienced rebel governance to understand what types of punishments victimized

populations will accept as legitimate and potentially ease reintegration of collaborators.

The recent collapse of IS, a Sunni jihadist group that captured 40% of Iraq’s territory in late 2014 (Schwartzstein, 2017), provides a unique opportunity to collect data on a population recently governed by a rebel group whose attitudes and experiences have been, for the most part, a black box to the outside world.² Like many other armed groups that engage in rebel governance, IS provided public goods and services financed by its taxation of civilians and exploitation of natural resources. In exchange, IS required absolute conformity with its strict rules. Given IS’s control of territory, capture of local economies, and harsh treatment of dissidents, it is unsurprising that many residents of its territories cooperated with the group—whether voluntarily or involuntarily.

There is often a widespread assumption among policymakers and civilians living outside of rebel-controlled territory that everyone who lives under rebel rule is a collaborator and therefore complicit in any crimes perpetrated by the group. Much of the existing literature relies on a false dichotomy of victim and perpetrator (Tabak, 2011). In reality, the same person can be both a victim and a perpetrator or lie somewhere on a continuum between the two. Many residents of rebel-controlled territory are victims of the group’s violence and only comply with its policies in order to stay alive. Although civilian collaborators perform a variety of nonmilitary functions, including cooking and driving (Gerges, 2011: 14), variation in types of collaboration—and the implications of this variation for the design of post-conflict transitional justice processes—is largely overlooked by scholars of conflict.

In the Iraq case, the assumption that mere residence in IS-controlled territory was an act of material support for terrorism resulted in the enforcement of overbroad counterterrorism legislation. This legislation has led to the detention of more than 19,000 individuals on IS-

²Most previous research on residents of formerly IS-controlled territory is based on interviews with those who fled the rebel-held territory rather quickly (Bazcko et al., 2016) and therefore had only limited personal exposure to the group.

related charges since 2013 (Abdul-Zahra and George, 2018). Currently, the Iraqi government is taking a heavy-handed approach that fails to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary collaboration, and between serious crimes and lesser offenses. However, our fieldwork conducted in Iraq indicates that many Iraqis perceive variation in the culpability of different types of collaborators. For example, employees of the department of municipal services in Mosul—who became civilian employees of IS after the group captured the city—are still living and working in Mosul without fear of prosecution or extrajudicial reprisals by victims of IS who are now seeking revenge. As one of the municipal employees ³ explained, “No one blames us for keeping our jobs when IS arrived because we needed to feed our families, and we continued doing the same work we had done before—just with new bosses. Besides, quitting was not an option because it would have been an act of rebellion, which would have put me and my family at risk for severe punishment.”⁴ Iraqis affiliated with IS in other ways are not being forgiven so easily. For instance, widows of IS members hope to stay in Iraq’s Hajj Ali camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) indefinitely, because they fear for their safety and that of their children in their former hometown near Hawija. One widow of an IS fighter, “Laila,” whose brother’s house was attacked with grenades as a result of his family’s ties to IS, said, “I am afraid that if I return, my neighbors would kill me in my sleep.”⁵ What explains the stark difference between the cases of these two collaborators? One (“Zyad”) is perceived as innocent, while the other (“Laila”) is facing death threats.

We assess variation in preferences for punishment, forgiveness, and reintegration of IS collaborators using two experiments embedded in an original, door-to-door survey of 1,458 residents of Mosul (Moslawis) conducted in March and April 2018, eight months after IS was expelled from the city. Extensive fieldwork in Mosul and other areas of Iraq inform

³To ensure their anonymity, all IS-affiliated interviewees are identified only by pseudonyms, age, and where relevant, their sector of employment.

⁴Interview by Mara Revkin with “Zyad” (35, municipal services) in Mosul (April 19, 2017).

⁵Interview by Mara Revkin with “Laila” (40) in the Hajj Ali camp (December 14, 2017).

the design of these experiments. The first experiment employs conjoint analysis to evaluate the effect of randomly varied identity attributes of hypothetical collaborators (e.g., gender, age, and co-tribal identity) and types of collaboration (e.g., someone who paid taxes to IS, someone who was married to an IS fighter, a cook who prepared food for IS fighters, a janitor who worked in IS's department of municipal services, or an IS fighter). We ask respondents to choose the type of punishment from a list of five options (no punishment, six months of mandatory community service, imprisonment for three or 15 years, or capital punishment) that they consider to be most appropriate for each collaborator. The second experiment presents randomly selected punishments imposed upon different types of collaborators, asking respondents to indicate whether they would allow this person to become their neighbor—as a measure of their preferences for reintegration. We find that the actions of collaborators matter much more than their ascriptive identity characteristics in determining respondents' preferences for punishment, forgiveness, and reintegration.

Our experimental design offers a model for analyzing popular perceptions of and preferences for different justice mechanisms, as well as the understudied link between justice and forgiveness. Our research shows that, contrary to the Iraqi government's one-punishment-fits-all approach to IS collaborators, Moslawis perceive some acts of collaboration as more condemnable and voluntary than others. Our findings also demonstrate that many Moslawis are willing to allow the reintegration of certain IS collaborators back into their neighborhoods; these IS collaborators are subjected to more lenient and restorative punishments than the current legal framework allows—such as community service or no punishment at all. Furthermore, we identify which types of collaborators are perceived as most forgivable: those who merely paid taxes to IS or were employed in civilian jobs where they did not work directly with or for fighters. Overall, our findings—which reveal an imbalance between the harsh and retributive punishments that are currently being imposed by the Iraqi government and the

preferences of ordinary Iraqis—suggest the need for legislative reforms and an inclusive national conversation about how best to balance demands for accountability with the need for reconciliation.

2 Why Public Perceptions of Former ‘Collaborators’ Matter

Building upon lessons learned from other post-conflict settings, our study offers important policy implications and theoretical insights that are relevant for Iraq and other war-torn societies. It seeks to advance our understanding of the formation of preferences and attitudes toward rebel collaborators in wartime settings by integrating three bodies of literature. First, our research contributes to a literature on the post-conflict legacies of rebel governance. Most of this work focuses on the long-term effects of civil-war dynamics on outcomes such as democratization, yet there is a need for more research on the social and political consequences of civilian collaboration with rebel groups in the *immediate* aftermath of conflict. Second, a large body of research on transitional justice finds that when the state’s punishment of a perpetrator falls short of what the victim believes is commensurate to the crime committed, the resulting perception of an injustice gap (Worthington, 2013) may increase the likelihood that victims will seek revenge through extrajudicial violence. Consideration of public opinion toward rebel collaborators is essential for the restoration of rule of law, state legitimacy, and sustainable peace after conflict. Finally, previous research on the psychology of forgiveness provides empirical support for the conventional wisdom that the more severe the transgression, the more difficult it is to forgive. Other work finds that restorative punishments, meaning those that focus on rehabilitation of perpetrators, are more likely to lead to forgiveness than retributive, eye-for-an-eye punishments. In bringing together these

three areas of research, which are not often in dialogue with one another, our study offers new insights into the determinants of successful reintegration of societies that have endured an insurgency.

More research is needed on the dynamics of civilian collaboration with rebel groups *during conflict* as well as the immediate *post-conflict* consequences of collaboration for peacebuilding and the potential for conflict recurrence. A nascent but growing body of literature focuses on the long-term consequences of rebel governance for social and political order but is less attentive to the challenges of reconciliation in the immediate aftermath of conflict, despite the fact that the period just after the cessation of violence is crucial for re-establishment of peace and stability (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Huyse, 1995). Recent work examines how rebel-civilian dynamics during civil wars explain long-term variation in postwar democratization (Huang, 2016). Other researchers track the trajectories of former rebel collaborators in the years after conflict (Annan et al., 2011; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007), finding that they are more likely to vote and assume leadership roles in their communities (Blattman, 2009), and that the inclusion and participation of former rebel parties in national governments increases the likelihood of durable peace (Marshall and Ishiyama, 2016). Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii (2014) and Voors et al. (2012) employ lab-in-the-field experiments to measure the effects of civil war-related violence on pro-social behaviors. Although these studies have advanced our understanding of the long-term consequences of rebel governance for social and political order after the cessation of conflict, social psychologists highlight the importance of time as an important variable in determining willingness to forgive acts of injustice and violence (Enright, 1991; McCullough, Fincham and Tsang, 2003). More work is needed to understand processes of reconciliation in the short term, when fear of conflict recurrence is at its height.

While many scholars take a top-down approach to the study of transitional justice, focusing

on the effects of different state-imposed mechanisms including trials, lustration laws, and truth commissions (Pham and Vinck, 2007), our research takes a bottom-up approach, zeroing in on the attitudes and experiences of civilians who experienced a prolonged period of rebel governance. There have been other surveys conducted in conflict and post-conflict areas that examine civilian experiences with violence and their attitudes toward both insurgents and counterinsurgents (Blair et al., 2013; Blair, Imai and Lyall, 2014; Lyall, Shiraito and Imai, 2015) and some that examine attitudes toward transitional justice (Samii, 2013; Aguilar, Balcells and Cebolla-Boado, 2011). Our work is unique because we examine attitudes toward different *types* of rebel collaborators, as opposed to toward the rebel group as a whole. Furthermore, we collected data in the immediate aftermath of rebel governance, at a time when accountability and transitional justice mechanisms were still being debated and designed.

In communities where victims of violence blame civilian collaborators for aiding the enemy, demands for justice take many forms—some of which may undermine rule of law and hinder prospects for reconciliation. In contexts such as Iraq, where state authorities are widely perceived as corrupt, illegitimate, and incapable of administering justice, victims are more likely to resort to “wild justice,” including extrajudicial revenge killings (Jacoby, 1984), which are widespread in areas recaptured from IS (Human Rights Watch, 2017). This is not a new phenomenon. After the defeat of the Nazis, some Jews formed hit squads to kill those who had attempted to exterminate them, circumventing official legal institutions that they apparently did not trust to deliver justice (Davidson, 2015: 22). When punishment of a perpetrator falls short of what the victims believe is commensurate to the crime committed, the resulting perceived injustice gap increases the likelihood of victims being dissatisfied with the decisions of state institutions (Worthington Jr, 2006; Kelsen, 2009). Transitional justice processes that do not match public preferences have the potential to fuel extrajudicial

violence, undermining rule of law.

Exploring the determinants of forgiveness and reconciliation in post-conflict societies is a necessary first step toward preempting cycles of revenge, encouraging benevolence toward former rebel collaborators, and building trust in state institutions. An important contribution of this research is its assessment of whether societal preferences for punishment of IS collaborators match—or mismatch—those prescribed by Iraq’s Anti-Terrorism Law. A United Nations report cautions that “one-sided prosecutions” amounting to “victors’ justice” may delegitimize transitional justice efforts (de Greiff, 2014: 18). Tyler (2002) finds that sensitivity to public concerns about the fairness of legal institutions is necessary to ensure trust in the police and courts, warning that failure to consider public opinion may increase the likelihood of noncompliance with laws and state authorities. When citizens do not see their governing institutions as fair and just, the tendency to protest, rebel, or turn to violence increases (Gurr, 2015). Political scientists and legal scholars alike underscore the importance of including the voices of victims in “restorative justice” (Zehr, 2015: 37) and “positive peace” processes (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006), which view public participation as necessary for long-term, sustainable peace in contrast with “negative peace,” which refers simply to the cessation of violence. Latimer, Dowden and Muise (2005) and Tyler (2003) find that victims of transgressions who participated in restorative processes that focus on reconciliation with and rehabilitation of perpetrators were significantly more satisfied than those who participated in more punitive processes. In an experiment, van Oyen-Witvliet et al. (2008) find that restorative justice mechanisms are more likely to lead to forgiveness than retributive ones that focus on punishing the offender.

This study is, to our knowledge, the first use of a conjoint experiment to study preferences for punishment, forgiveness, and reintegration of individuals who collaborated with a rebel group during conflict. The design allows us to test numerous hypotheses concerning the

relative importance of ascriptive characteristics of those accused of collaboration, as well as different types of rebel collaboration. A rich body of observational research on the dynamics of civilian collaboration with authoritarian regimes, including Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic, exists (Finkel, 2017; Bruce, 2010), and legal scholars have discussed the normative difficulties of balancing the conflicting objectives of punishment and reconciliation with civilian “collaborators” and “bystanders” perceived as complicit in genocides (Minnow, 1998; Mamdani, 2017), yet experimental research that causally identifies the conditions under which these people can be forgiven and reintegrated into post-conflict societies remains rare.

3 A Theory of Wartime Attitude Formation

Unlike previous studies of civilian support for rebel groups, we distinguish between different types of collaboration, as well as variation in the identity traits of collaborators. In this section, we present a theory of wartime attitude formation in which both of these factors contribute to the formation of attitudes concerning the culpability of collaboration and the severity of wrongdoing. These attitudes in turn shape preferences for punishment, forgiveness, and reintegration.

Once an act of wrongdoing is committed, determinations of punishment, willingness to forgive, and openness to the perpetrator’s reintegration into society require cognitive assessments of culpability or blameworthiness. Assessments of culpability are shaped by perceptions of the perpetrator’s volitional control over her actions, her ability to understand the consequences of her actions, and her desire to achieve those consequences (Alicke, 2000). Social psychologists argue that cognitive interpretations of *the agency of the transgressor* and *the severity of the transgression* (Bradfield and Aquino, 1999; Girard and Mullet, 1997) are important in determining the appropriate punishment for a transgressor, as well as whether

to forgive her and allow her reintegration back into society. Assessing levels of volition and intention behind acts of transgression, while difficult, is a key component of most psychological models of blame and responsibility (Alicke, 2000: 57). Experimental research offers empirical evidence that more severe and more intentional transgressions are more difficult to forgive than lesser or unintentional offenses (Boon and Sulsky, 1997; Girard and Mullet, 1997; Shapiro, 1991). McCullough, Fincham and Tsang (2003) demonstrate that while the severity of the transgression tends to increase the desire for vengeance, empathy with the transgressor reduces the desire for revenge and increases benevolence.

These social-psychology studies tend to focus on disputes between individuals in intimate relationships, but we believe that many of their findings are more broadly applicable to post-conflict settings. In particular, these studies give insight into the aftermath of civil wars, which tend to be characterized by high levels of “intimate violence”—violence between neighbors and members of the same community who know one other—as opposed to anonymous violence between strangers (Kalyvas, 2006: 351). For example, Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) find that fighters from more abusive units are less likely to be reintegrated into society, suggesting that the severity of transgressions plays an important role in reconciliation after conflict. When acts of transgression are perceived as more intentional, transgressors receive harsher punishments (Darley and Huff, 1990; Folger and Cropanzano, 1998). These social norms have also been incorporated into modern legal systems. By design, criminal law systems assign culpability based on the extent to which an individual had the ability to control his or her behavior when willingly committing a wrongful act (Hollander-Blumoff, 2011). In line with this research, culpability, severity of the transgression, and empathy with the transgressor should lead to varying levels of punishment, forgiveness, and reconciliation.⁶

⁶We specified testable hypotheses in our pre-analysis plan. See Mara Revkin and Kristen Kao, “Pre-Analysis Plan: ‘Reintegration of Rebel Collaborators: Survey Experiments in Mosul,’” Evidence in Governance and Politics (March 29, 2018), <https://egap.org/registration/4395>.

3.1 Culpability Based on Identity Attributes

We assume that certain identity traits cue differing perceptions of agency or may trigger empathy among those who share identities with the offenders. Juveniles are generally assumed to be less agentic than adults, because they are easily influenced by those around them, particularly authority figures, and they may not be able to distinguish between right and wrong (Slobogin, Fondacaro and Woolard, 1999; Maio et al., 2008). Other scholarship suggests that women are often perceived as being less blameworthy than men *ceteris paribus* (Honey, 2017). Research on in-group favoritism and social-identity theory demonstrates that members of the same group tend to favor one another (Turner, Brown and Tajfel, 1979; Brewer, 1999). Shared social identity may also encourage empathy with a transgressor (McCullough, Fincham and Tsang, 2003).

Attitudes toward culpability are also shaped by social context. Iraqi law requires reduced punishments for children, taking into consideration their age and the stage of their mental development at the time of the offense.⁷ Given that Iraq is a patriarchal society with strong Islamic and tribal traditions, which tend to regard women as the weaker sex (Al-Abbadi, 2006; Hudson, Bowen and Nielsen, 2015), women are likely to be seen as having less agency than men. Our fieldwork in Iraq supports this expectation. “Fadila” from Shirqat explained that when her husband decided to join IS and she expressed misgivings about the group’s extreme ideology, he replied, “You can leave and I will keep the kids.”⁸ Anecdotal evidence suggests that female collaborators should be perceived as less culpable than men, because, as Fadila put it, “We did not have a choice.” We should expect respondents to prefer more lenient punishments for younger transgressors than for older ones and for females than for men. Additionally, in the context of Iraq, social-identity theory suggests that members of

⁷Iraq’s Penal Code (Act No. 111 of 1969), Articles 6778.

⁸Interview by Mara Revkin with “Fadila” (35, wife of an IS fighter) in an IDP camp in Ninewa, Iraq (December 14, 2017).

the same tribe should be more likely to forgive and prefer more lenient punishments for one another than for members of other tribes. Since an important aspect of tribal identity in Iraq and other tribal societies is the principle of defending one's kinsmen against outsiders (Hudson, Bowen and Nielsen, 2015; Weir, 2007; Carroll, 2011), we expect that shared tribal identity encourages empathy with transgressors.

3.2 Culpability Based on Type of Act

We posit that information about the type of act a person commits also shapes perceptions concerning the severity of a transgression as well as the agency behind it. Some offenses are almost universally condemnable—for example killing another human being. The immorality of lesser transgressions is often debatable and depends on context, as well as on the presence of mitigating circumstances, such as duress. Therefore, different individuals may have varying perceptions of the reprehensibility of the same act—such as aiding an enemy. Agency cannot be determined by type of act alone (a person could be holding a gun to the actor's head), but people often subconsciously associate worse transgressions with more culpability (Hoffman and Hardyman, 1986).

We use post-treatment questions to assess whether Moslawis associate different types of collaboration and different levels of volition with varying degrees of moral condemnation.⁹ Respondents ranked five types of collaboration from least to most condemnable. They see being an IS fighters as the most egregious transgression (98% of the sample), followed by civilians directly involved with them, such as cooks for fighters and women married to fighters. Those who were not directly involved with fighters but still working for IS in civilian roles, such as janitors at the IS municipality and taxpayers, are least condemnable (Appendix

⁹Since these ranking questions are cognitively burdensome, we randomly asked approximately 50% of the sample only one of each of these questions.

Table A5). As shown in table 1, 97% of the sample agree that fighting is a voluntary act, whereas 92% perceive paying taxes to IS to be an involuntary act.

Table 1: Perceptions of Collaboration as Voluntary (Percentage of Respondents)

Type of Collaboration	Voluntary	Involuntary
An IS fighter	97%	3%
A cook for IS fighters	88%	12%
Married to an IS fighter	84%	16%
A janitor who worked for the IS municipality	71%	29%
A resident of Mosul who paid taxes to IS	8%	92%

3.3 Linking Punishment, Forgiveness, and Reintegration

In our study, we measure three interrelated outcomes: punishment, forgiveness, and reintegration. Once culpability for a transgression is assessed, the primary reaction is determination of the appropriate punishment, if any (Darley and Huff, 1990). Although the relationship between justice and forgiveness is understudied (Exline et al., 2003; Karremans and Van Lange, 2005), Worthington and Scherer (2004) posit that decreasing the perception of an “injustice gap” promotes benevolence toward transgressors and (Enright, 1991: 128) argue that forgiveness is conditional upon the belief that justice has been served. Many contemporary justice systems are based on the principle of punishment as a means for facilitating the reintegration and rehabilitation of transgressors by requiring them to repay their “debt” to society (Zehr, 2015; Darley and Pittman, 2003). As a result, one might expect greater willingness to forgive and reintegrate transgressors who have received harsher punishments.

Forgiveness is understood as the lessening of negative feelings, thoughts, and behaviors toward transgressors within a single person (McCullough, Fincham and Tsang, 2003). Reintegration and reconciliation, on the other hand, require bringing two or more people back

together within the same social space and rebuilding relationships between them (Enright, 1991). Punishment may facilitate forgiveness and reintegration, but it may not always be necessary. Forgiveness is directly related to reconciliation, as it is “one of the most important processes in the restoration of interpersonal relationships after conflict” (Hill, 2001). Reintegration and reconciliation are the most difficult outcomes to achieve after conflict, because one might be willing to punish or forgive a transgressor, yet still not be comfortable living alongside or working with that person.

4 Conducting Multi-Method Research in Mosul, Iraq

In addition to the quantitative data set, this article also draws on qualitative evidence from fieldwork conducted over the course of three research trips to Mosul and other areas of northern Iraq in 2017 (Appendix D). This fieldwork enabled us to test the survey questions to ensure their appropriateness for the context and to validate the experimental design. The fieldwork in Mosul included visits to public institutions—a hospital, several schools, and a municipal services office—that were previously administered by IS, as well as observations of trials of alleged IS members. (See Appendix D.2.) We conducted interviews with 61 individuals from areas previously controlled by IS (including Mosul), as well as 17 lawyers and judges involved in prosecuting and defending suspected IS collaborators, and other experts (Appendix Tables A10-A11). In this section we argue that Mosul, Iraq, provides a case for which understanding popular perceptions of former rebels is both theoretically and substantively important, and we further elaborate on the details of our data-collection process, as well as concerns about the ethics surrounding this process.

4.1 Case Selection

Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city and IS’s de facto capital during its three-year rule, is an ideal site in which to study preferences for punishment, forgiveness, and reintegration of rebel collaborators, because it is a site where collaboration with a rebel group (IS) was common. Moslawis witnessed a broad spectrum of collaboration, including: (1) compliance with mandatory policies such as paying taxes and follow a strict dress code, (2) social integration with the group through marriage to its members and the enrollment of children in IS-controlled schools, (3) employment in IS’s civilian workforce (e.g., as teachers, engineers, doctors, or cooks), and, finally, (4) recruitment as fighters. In addition to variation in *types* of collaboration, there was also variation in the *voluntariness* of collaboration. Since Moslawis confronted these different types of collaboration on a daily basis, they can recognize and imagine the scenarios described in our experiments. Furthermore, now that Mosul is free from the control of IS, the question of whether perceived former IS collaborators will be accepted back into the community peacefully—and if so, under what conditions—is particularly relevant. The delivery of “night letters” to the houses of perceived collaborators in Mosul—warning them that they will be forcibly evicted if they do not leave the city by a certain date (Colville, 2017)—is an indicator of the extreme importance of this question for this case.

IS claimed to be building a new caliphate, based on the earliest model of Islamic governance (March and Revkin, 2015), and not only recruited fighters but also operated a variety of institutions that provided protection, public goods, and basic services. These institutions necessitated a civilian bureaucracy, staffed by employees who faced pressure to swear allegiance to IS but generally did not carry weapons or otherwise perform military functions. In addition to IS’s civilian employees, civilian residents of IS-controlled territory and relatives of IS members often had no choice but to cooperate with the group, because opposition equaled apostasy and was punishable by death (Revkin, 2018: 3).

At the height of its expansion in late 2014, IS controlled and governed 20 Iraqi cities, including Mosul, with an estimated total population greater than five million (Robinson et al., 2017). When IS retreated from Mosul and other Iraqi cities in 2017, it left behind a population that Iraqi authorities now regard as complicit in terrorism. The government is currently facing the monumental challenge of reintegrating this population into Iraqi society, but in doing so, authorities have taken an extremely heavy-handed approach that fails to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary collaboration, and between serious crimes and lesser offenses. This approach, which is widely perceived as collective punishment of Sunnis, appears to be generating new grievances that could fuel the emergence of what many analysts predict will be an “IS 2.0” (O’Hanlon and Allawi, 2017).

Iraq’s Anti-Terrorism Law (2005) criminalizes membership in any terrorist group, including IS, without requiring proof of a specific criminal act,¹⁰ meaning that anyone with a plausible connection to the group—including unarmed civilian employees and family members of fighters—can easily be sentenced to life in prison, the minimum punishment allowed by the law. As a result of this one-punishment-fits-all approach,¹¹ the Iraqi government has detained more than 19,000 people on terrorism charges—mostly related to IS—since 2013 (Abdul-Zahra and George, 2018). Of these 19,000, more than 8,000 have been convicted in rapid-fire trials that are often decided in under 30 minutes and sometimes as quickly as 10 minutes, with a conviction rate of around 98%.¹² More than 3,000 have been sentenced to death (Abdul-

¹⁰Iraq’s Anti-Terrorism Law (No. 13, 2005) requires the death penalty for anyone who commits a terrorist act or assists in such acts. The penalty for those who cover up terrorist acts or harbor terrorists is life in prison, which Iraqi judges generally interpret as 15 or 20 years. See: Agence France-Presse, “German ‘IS’ jihadi spared death sentence in Iraq,” (April 24, 2018), <http://www.dw.com/en/german-is-jihadi-spared-death-sentence-in-iraq/a-43515263>.)

¹¹The “one-punishment-fits-all approach” refers to Iraq’s prosecution of accused members of IS: fighters, civilian employees of the group, and family members. To our knowledge, Iraqis who paid taxes to IS are not being prosecuted on that ground alone.

¹²Mara Revkin’s observations of two trials of alleged IS members in Tel Kaif, Iraq (December 13, 2017). See also Coker and Hassan (2018) and Ash Gallagher, “For captured ISIS fighters in Iraq, justice is swift and conviction certain.” *Yahoo News* (December 13, 2017), <https://www.yahoo.com/news/captured-isis-fighters-iraq-justice-swift-conviction-certain-174952840.html>.

Zahra and George, 2018), and Iraq’s prime minister indicated that some juveniles may be eligible for capital punishment (this is a violation of international law) (Roberts, 2017).

Judges and prosecutors interviewed for this study expressed an unwillingness to differentiate between different types of collaboration—some of which may have been involuntary—and between more serious crimes and lesser offenses. One prosecutor said that pressure to be perceived as “tough on terrorism”¹³—combined with an anti-terrorism law that allows very little flexibility in sentencing—results in severe punishments that are often disproportionate to the crime committed. A judge admitted that “judges can be very harsh, sometimes as harsh as IS, because there is pressure to show no mercy.”¹⁴ A judge in Mosul justified the harsh punishment of civilian IS collaborators as follows: “IS’s ideology is so dangerous that we cannot afford to show any leniency, even for those who were only believers and did not commit specific crimes.”¹⁵ Another judge expressed a similar view: “I had a case yesterday of an [IS] cook, and I have recommended giving him the death penalty. How could the [IS] fighter have executed someone if he had not been fed a good meal the night before?” (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

4.2 Survey Administration and Sampling Strategy

We ran an original survey of 1,458 residents of Mosul from March 3 to April 20, 2018, by an experienced Iraqi research firm, the Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies. A team of Iraqi enumerators recruited from Mosul conducted the face-to-face survey with tablets. The two experiments featured in this article were embedded in a larger survey that compares and contrasts “stayers” (people who stayed in Mosul for an extended

¹³Interview by Mara Revkin with “Dara” (Iraqi prosecutor) in Tel Kaif, Iraq (December 13, 2017).

¹⁴Interview by Mara Revkin with “Fawzi” (senior Kurdistan Regional Government judge) in Erbil, Iraq (December 11, 2017).

¹⁵Interview by Mara Revkin with “Farouk” (Iraqi judge) in Mosul, Iraq (December 13, 2017).

period of time after IS captured the city) with “leavers” (people who left relatively soon after IS’s arrival).¹⁶ For the purpose of testing hypotheses concerning these two subgroups, stayers were defined as people who were still living in Mosul on March 10, 2015, and leavers were defined as people who left Mosul before March 10, 2015. This date is significant, because it is the day on which an IS official in Mosul gave a speech broadcast over loudspeakers warning that anyone who left Mosul would be considered an apostate.

Since stayers currently outnumber leavers in Mosul by a significant margin, some oversampling of the latter was necessary to enable statistically significant comparisons between these two groups. Therefore, the survey was conducted in two phases: (1) an initial random sample of 1,055 stayers and leavers, followed by (2) a booster sample of an additional 403 leavers.¹⁷ We drew the initial random sample of stayers from 47 primary sampling units (PSUs) based on census blocks that were randomly selected from a list of all 209 census blocks in Mosul. (See Appendix A.1 for a map of the sampling frame.) Within each PSU, enumerators conducted 30 interviews.¹⁸ Within each PSU, the sampling team randomly selected streets, within which enumerators selected households using a random-walk procedure (Appendix A.1).

The sample is intentionally restricted to Sunni Arab Iraqis living in Mosul in June 2014—when IS arrived—and therefore had some exposure to IS.¹⁹ Therefore, a scope condition of

¹⁶Mara Revkin, “Pre-Analysis Plan: ‘To Stay or to Leave? Explaining Migration Decisions in Islamic State-Controlled Mosul,’” EGAP (February 28, 2018), <http://egap.org/registration/3200>.

¹⁷All analyses were run with and without these additional 403 respondents, to ensure that findings were not affected by differential sampling patterns (Appendix B.2). In another working paper, we explore heterogeneous effects between stayers and leavers. We find that stayers prefer more lenient punishments for the collaborator-types most closely associated with IS: fighters, wives of fighters, and cooks for fighters. We explore this finding in another paper.

¹⁸It was unfeasible to implement truly random sampling based on probability proportional to size due to conflict-related changes in demography that make accurate estimates of the true populations of the PSUs impossible. For this reason, we assigned a consistent number of interviews to each PSU.

¹⁹Given massive out-migration from Mosul by non-Sunnis and non-Arabs due to their persecution by IS, the numbers of respondents belonging to these groups would have been too small to draw any conclusions about the larger populations to which they belong.

this work is its limitation to Sunni Arabs. We do not expect that our findings will generalize to other religious or ethnic groups in Iraq. However, we do expect that some of the findings will generalize to other Sunni-majority cities governed by IS in Iraq and Syria and to other post-conflict cases more broadly. Some of the specific scenarios tested in this experiment (such as a taxpayers) are applicable only to rebel groups that attempt to govern civilians, whereas others (fighters) apply to a broader set of rebel groups.

The sample is evenly balanced between men and women. Reflecting the youth bulge of Iraq, the sample is also relatively young (38% are between 18 and 34 years old). More than 50% have only an elementary-school education or less, 31% were unemployed at the time of the survey (nearly three times the national unemployment rate of 11%),²⁰ and 70% reported facing significant difficulties in meeting their household's needs with their current income. Additionally, 85% of the sample have lived in Mosul since birth (Appendix A1, tables A1A3 and Figure 1).

4.3 Research Ethics

Research in conflict areas raises unique ethical challenges (Wood, 2006), as well as security concerns for researchers and their subjects (Sluka, Nordstrom and Robben, 1995). Presenting respondents with scenarios describing hypothetical IS collaborators runs the risk of re-traumatizing those who were victimized by the group. However, fieldwork in Mosul and other areas of Iraq reveals that discussions about collaborators and the extent of their culpability are commonplace. Many interviewees expressed concerns about the presence of collaborators in their communities and are actively debating both formal and informal justice mechanisms. One resident of Mosul complained, "Family members of IS fighters, who were beneficiaries

²⁰United Nations Development Programme, "About Iraq" (2014), <http://www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/countryinfo.html>.

of IS and its crimes, are living among us, and no one is holding them accountable.”²¹ In the Salah ad-Din Governorate, several tribes published a list of the names of 113 individuals who are accused of collaboration with IS and decreed their permanent banishment from the community.²² Given the extent to which collaboration is already being publicly debated by Iraqis, as well as an informed-consent procedure that allowed all respondents to opt out of specific questions or the entire survey, we do not believe that the survey exposed respondents to a significant risk of re-traumatization. The appendix discusses other potential risks to survey respondents and the steps taken (including data-security procedures) to minimize those risks.²³

A common concern in post-conflict settings is that social-desirability bias suppresses the true level of support for a rebel group, due to respondents’ fears of punishment or stigmatization (Blair, Imai and Lyall, 2014). To address this concern, we designed a list experiment to assess whether a higher percentage of respondents might answer “yes” to sensitive questions if asked indirectly (Appendix B.4). The direct sensitive question was: “During the first six months of IS rule, did you believe that IS was doing a better job governing Mosul than the Iraq government did previously?” to which 16% of respondents answered “yes,” suggesting that a significant minority of the Mosul population viewed IS’s system of governance favorably in comparison with that of the Iraqi state. Our list experiment, in which the wording of the sensitive item mirrored that of the direct sensitive question, indicated that 11% of the sample agreed with the sensitive item when asked indirectly. The difference between these two samples was not statistically significant according to a Welch’s two-sample t-test; in addition, only six respondents declined to answer or did not know when asked the direct

²¹Interview by Mara Revkin with “Walid” (33, store clerk) in Mosul (April 20, 2017).

²²Photograph of list published on Twitter by Hisham al-Hashimi, Twitter, (January 12, 2018), <https://twitter.com/hushamalhashimi/status/951763690784743424>.

²³Appendix D. Yale University’s Institutional Review Board approved the survey (Protocol #2000022022), observations of trials of IS members (Protocol #2000021840), and interviews with Iraqis from IS-controlled areas (Protocol #1506016040).

question, suggesting that social-desirability bias did not significantly affect our results.

5 Experimental Design

To assess the preferences of Moslawis concerning reconciliation with and reintegration of former IS collaborators, we conducted two experiments. The first experiment employs ratings-based conjoint analysis to understand what Moslawis believe to be the most appropriate form of justice for different hypothetical IS collaborators. The conjoint experiment design allows us to examine the relative effects of numerous factors that shape how residents of a conflict-affected area think about former rebel collaborators and what should be done with them. This experiment includes a follow-up question on forgiveness after selection of punishment, which we use as a preliminary step to understanding prospects for reconciliation. The second experiment displays a vignette of a former collaborator and randomizes the *punishment* they have received rather than their ascriptive identity traits. Although this experiment does not enable us to directly measure the strength of relationships between people, we do indirectly assess willingness to coexist peacefully with former collaborators by evaluating respondents' willingness to become their neighbors. This allows us to assess preferences for reintegration of hypothetical IS collaborators based on the randomized punishment they have received.

5.1 Experiment 1: 'Seeking Justice'

The first experiment uses conjoint analysis to evaluate respondents' beliefs about the type of justice deserved by former collaborators, as measured by preferences for punishment. The goal of this experiment is to understand how rebel collaborators' identities and the nature of their collaboration with IS affect respondents' preferences for the application of different justice mechanisms, as well as the propensity for forgiveness of them. For identity

traits, we randomize gender,²⁴ age, and whether or not the collaborator is a member of the respondent’s tribe to serve as identity markers.²⁵ We also randomize acts of collaboration. The five collaboration-types selected for inclusion in the experiment are: (1) fighting for IS, (2) working as a cook for IS fighters, (3) being married to an IS fighter, (4) working as a janitor for the IS municipality, and (5) paying taxes to IS. These collaboration scenarios are based on interviews with actual IS collaborators.²⁶

Table 2 specifies the types of rebel collaboration and collaborator identity characteristics randomized in this experiment. To be clear, we chose these characteristics and acts based on our knowledge of the case of IS and the broader literature on rebel governance, but we acknowledge that these factors do not constitute an exhaustive list of characteristics that are relevant for understanding rebel reintegration. Every respondent evaluated a series of three separate profiles that were generated by randomizing the attributes listed in Table 3. The total sample of evaluated profiles was 4,275.

Before the enumerator reads the descriptions of the hypothetical collaborators, the respondent is told: “I am going to read you some hypothetical scenarios about people from Mosul who are being prosecuted for their past cooperation with Daesh [IS]. These people now want to move back into your neighborhood. I would like you to choose the type of punishment that you view as appropriate for this person.”²⁷ The person is a [insert profile].”²⁸

²⁴Although IS had a relatively small number of female combatants, the group deployed female suicide bombers and snipers in Mosul (Hall, 2017).

²⁵Though sectarian identity is important in Iraq, the survey sample purposely excludes non-Sunnis, who would not feasibly be former IS members. Almost all Moslawis identify with a tribal group (99% of our respondents). Independent estimates of the percentage of Iraqis who identify with one of the country’s approximately 150 tribes range from 75% (Hassan, 2008) to 100% (Hamoudi, al Sharaa and al Dahhan, 2015).

²⁶For interview locations, see Appendix D.

²⁷For clarity, the list of punishment options was read twice—once here and again after the experiment was shown.

²⁸For examples of candidate profiles as respondents saw them, see Appendix B.1.

Table 2: Experiment 1 Randomized Dimensions and Attributes (Conjoint)

Dimension	Attributes
Gender	Man
	Woman
Age	15
	35
Tribal Member	Respondent's tribal group
	Other Tribe
Type of Collaboration	A Daesh [IS] fighter*
	A cook for Daesh fighters
	Married to a Daesh [IS] fighter (limited to female candidates)
	A janitor at the municipality employed by Daesh's [IS's] government
	A resident of Mosul who paid taxes to Daesh [IS]

After the respondent is read a collaborator profile, she is told: “A thorough investigation concluded that this is the only act of collaboration that the person committed.”²⁹ I have ordered the following punishments from least harsh to most harsh. I would like you to choose the type of punishment you deem as appropriate for this former Daesh collaborator, who now wants to move back into your neighborhood.” The responses to this question make up our dependent variables and include the following options: no punishment necessary (least harsh), mandatory community service (e.g., picking up trash, rebuilding homes) for six months,³⁰ imprisonment for three years, imprisonment for 15 years, and capital punishment (most harsh).

²⁹To help address the concern that respondents might impute other types of collaboration to the profile, the prompt specifies that the designated type of collaboration is the only act of collaboration that the person committed.

³⁰Several grassroots community-service programs have been launched in Mosul since the city's recapture by Iraqi forces. See, for example, A.C. Robinson, “University of Mosul students volunteer to restore library,” *Rudaw* (August 29, 2017), <http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/29082017>.

5.2 Experiment 2: ‘Former Collaborators as Neighbors’

In the “Seeking Justice” experiment, we tested whether different collaborator characteristics affect the severity of punishment that Moslawis believe is appropriate. Then we attempted to measure how different punishments affect respondents’ willingness to forgive hypothetical collaborators, but we are limited in this analysis by the nonrandom and uneven distribution of punishments across the five collaborator types. In this experiment, “Former Collaborators as Neighbors,” we randomize the punishment that a given rebel collaborator receives and then ask if the respondent would be willing to allow this person to become their neighbor—a measure of reintegration. Since the respondent has no control over the assigned punishment, we can better assess the full range of conditions under which the respondent would allow a former collaborator back into his or her community. This allows us to determine, for example, whether a respondent who expressed a preference for capital punishment of a given collaborator in the previous experiment might—if presented with a scenario in which the same collaborator receives a lesser punishment—nonetheless be willing to accept that person as a neighbor.³¹ Although this experiment does not allow us to directly identify the determinants of forgiveness, it sheds light on this outcome indirectly by exploring the related variable of reintegration.

The “Former Collaborators as Neighbors” experiment displays three collaborator profiles in a random order and randomizes the type of punishment that each collaborator receives. To minimize the cognitive burden on respondents, we chose to display only the three collaborator profiles that yielded considerable variation in key outcomes in the pilot of this experiment:

³¹One potential concern with this design is that the severity of the randomized punishment may be interpreted as a signal of the collaborator’s culpability. However, given widespread recognition of the arbitrary nature of the sentences meted out to IS collaborators by Iraqi courts—for example, a cook may just as easily be sentenced to death as a fighter (Human Rights Watch, 2017)—we have reason to believe that respondents’ preferences for reintegration of hypothetical collaborators are not conditioned by the severity of their punishments.

the cook for IS fighters, the woman married to an IS fighter, and the janitor who worked for the municipality under IS rule. Each respondent saw all three profiles in a random order.³²

The experimental prompt is: “Now I am going to read you some more hypothetical scenarios of Mosul residents who cooperated with Daesh. I would like to know if, given the punishment they have received, you would accept these former Daesh collaborators back into your community.” Figure 1 shows an example of how candidate descriptions were displayed.

Figure 1: Profile Presentation in Experiment 2: “Former Collaborators as Neighbors”

Respondents got each of the three profiles in the parentheses in random order. Punishments [in brackets] were randomized. Each respondent got all three candidate types in random order.

The candidate for reacceptance into your community is a 35-year-old man who was (a cook for Daesh fighters/woman who was married to a Daesh fighter/janitor for the municipality under Daesh rule) and [will be sentenced to 15 years in prison/three years in prison/six months of mandatory community service (e.g., picking up trash, rebuilding homes)/will not receive any punishment].

³²We find order effects are not a significant predictor of our outcomes.

We follow other survey-based studies that attempt to measure prejudice against outsiders in terms of whether or not a respondent will accept people of differing backgrounds as their neighbors (Schuman and Bobo, 1988; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008). After seeing each candidate, respondents are asked: “Given this [punishment/outcome], would you allow this former Daesh collaborator to become your neighbor?” Given high levels of migration out of and back into Mosul since IS’s expulsion from the city, the composition of the city’s neighborhoods was in a state of flux at the time of the survey. We believe that preferences about neighbors are a particularly salient and realistic measure of the potential for former IS collaborators’ reintegration into and reconciliation with the community of Mosul. Respondents could answer either yes or no, forming our dependent variable. We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, running separate analyses for each of the three profiles, as well as a pooled analysis for all three.³³

6 Analysis and Results

6.1 Experiment 1: ‘Seeking Justice’

The design of the “Seeking Justice” experiment relies on an assumption that respondents agree with our ranking of the severity of the five punishments. To validate this assumption, we first ran a pilot study in which we asked 100 Moslawis to rank the punishments from least harsh to most harsh. We also ran a post-experiment validation check of this same question among half of the respondents on the full survey. We find that 94% of respondents rank capital punishment as the harshest punishment, 90% saw 15 years imprisonment as the second, 91% saw three years imprisonment as the third, 94% saw six months of community service as the fourth harshest punishment respectively, and 96% replied that no punishment

³³As a robustness check, binary logistical analysis was also performed, and its results did not differ significantly from the OLS results.

is the least harsh punishment of the five options offered. On average, over 90% of the sample agreed with our ranking; the 10% that do not simply add noise to our findings.

To assess whether the scale of five punishments included in the experiment was sufficiently comprehensive to capture what a majority of Moslawis believe to be appropriate justice mechanisms for former IS collaborators, we asked respondents: “Would you have preferred a different punishment for this person and if so, what?” Of the 4,296 profiles shown, only 175 (4% of) respondents said that they would have preferred a different type of punishment (Appendix C.1). Overall, the outcome of this validation question suggests that the scale of punishment we offered to respondents was well aligned with their actual preferences.

Examining the distribution of the dependent variable (the five-point scale of punishment), the two most frequently selected options were no punishment (28%) and capital punishment (33%), indicating that there is considerable variation in the preferences of Moslawis concerning justice. Six months of community service and 15 years of prison were selected around 14% of the time, while three years of prison was selected 12% of the time. In general, preferences for punishment appear to be highly dependent on the type of collaboration in question, as suggested by Table 3, with IS fighters and those who were most closely associated with fighters (cooks for and wives of fighters) receiving consistently harsher punishments than those less closely associated with fighters (janitors who worked for the IS municipality and taxpayers).³⁴

We use OLS regression to assess the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of each of the profile attributes, pooling across all respondents and tasks.³⁵ This allows us to estimate

³⁴Each profile type was shown between 19% and 21% of time. Balance tests confirm that the randomization of collaborator acts does not significantly vary by respondent gender, age, education level, or whether the respondent was a stayer or a leave, according to χ^2 tests.

³⁵We also employed ordinal logistical analysis as a robustness check on the use of OLS for analysis of the results and we did not find substantive differences. Following (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2013), we expect OLS to be a consistent estimator of the AMCE.

Table 3: Punishments Preferred for Types of Collaboration (% of Cases)

Act	No Punishment	Community Service	Three Years Prison	15 Years Prison	Capital Punishment
IS Fighter	2%	2%	5%	13%	78%
Cook	3%	14%	22%	26%	36%
Married Fighter	17%	17%	16%	18%	31%
Janitor	41%	27%	11%	6%	15%
Paid Taxes	74%	8%	5%	4%	9%
Total	28%	14%	12%	14%	33%

the effects of profile attributes on degree of punishment through the following equation:

$$Punishment_{ijk} = \theta_0 + \theta_1 Gender_{ijk} + \theta_2 Age_{ijk} + \theta_3 Tribe_{ijk} + \theta_4 Collaboration_{ijk} + \varepsilon_{ijk}$$

where i denotes the respondent, j indicates the number of alternative profiles (which in this case is 1), and k denotes which round of three rounds each respondent completes. $Punishment_{ijk}$ is the outcome on the scale of least to most severe punishment. The analysis is run with robust standard errors clustered at the level of the respondent to account for within-respondent correlation across the rounds. The outcomes from the OLS regression are displayed below in Figure 2 in which the IS fighter is the base category of comparison for other types of collaborators. For female collaborators, male is the base comparison. For tribal members, non-tribal members are the base comparison category. Finally, for the youth, the older collaborator is the base comparison. The dependent variable is the five-point scale of punishment, in which 1 is no punishment, 2 is six months of community service, 3 is three years in prison, 4 is fifteen years in prison, and 5 is the death penalty.


Figure 2 shows that former IS fighters receive punishments that are higher than all other acts of collaboration to a statistically significant level. We find that, on average, taxpayers

receive significantly less harsh punishments than former collaborators who worked as cooks or janitors for IS or were married to IS fighters. As noted previously, IS required all Moslawis—except for the very poor—to pay taxes and service fees, and punished non-compliers. In the survey, 91% of Moslawis considered the payment of taxes to be involuntary. Therefore, it is likely that this particular form of collaboration was viewed as less blameworthy than acts perceived as voluntary. On average, former IS taxpayers receive punishments that are 2.97 points lower than IS fighters, accounting for approximately 59% of the entire five-point scale, with a standard error (SE) of 0.06. This means that punishments for taxpayers were nearly three levels less harsh than for fighters, which on our five-point scale is the difference between six months of community service and capital punishment.³⁶ We also find that civilian collaborators who were directly involved with fighters (e.g., women married to fighters and cooks for fighters) receive harsher punishments than those who did not work directly with fighters (e.g., janitors working for the IS municipality). On average, cooks receive punishments that are 0.87 points (SE = 0.05) lower than fighters—a difference of 17% of the five-point scale. Women married to fighters and janitors receive, respectively, punishments that are on average 1.36 (SE = 0.07, 27% of the scale) and 2.37 (SE = 0.07, 47% of the scale) less harsh than former IS fighters.

Contrary to expectations, respondents prefer significantly harsher rather than more lenient punishments for members of their own tribe (0.09 points higher equivalent to 2% of the scale, SE=0.04). This finding suggests that respondents may hold members of their own tribe to a higher moral standard than members of other tribes. Such a dynamic would be consistent with a theory of “in-group policing,” predicting that members of one ethnic group will tend to “ignore transgressions by members of the other group, correctly expecting that the culprits

³⁶We recognize, however, that a linear model may not be appropriate for estimating differences between levels of a scale. Employing ordered logistical regression, we find that taxpayers are 75 percentage points less likely to receive the death penalty than IS fighters and 69 percentage points more likely to be given no punishment than IS fighters.

Figure 2: Effects of Collaborator Identity and Type of Act on Punishment



Note: Figure depicts point estimates with 95% confidence intervals.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

will be identified and sanctioned by their own ethnic brethren” (Fearon and Laitin, 1996). Admittedly, this effect is substantively rather small. More lenient punishments are selected for younger collaborators (15 years old) than for older ones (35 years old) by 0.07 points (SE=0.04), although this finding is only significant at the $p < 0.10$ level. We lack support for the expectation that female collaborators would receive more lenient punishments than male collaborators.

Overall, these results indicate that Moslawis assign different levels of culpability to different types of collaborators in ways that have important implications for post-conflict transitional justice and accountability processes. Contrary to expectations, identity characteristics of collaborators do not seem to have a substantial effect on perceptions of culpability. These results underscore our main finding that the *type* of collaboration is a more important determinant of preferences for justice than the *identity* characteristics of the collaborator (i.e., gender, age, and tribal identity).³⁷

³⁷We did not find significant differences among respondents of different ages, genders, and tribal identities.

6.1.1 Forgiveness

We ask a post-treatment question for each former collaborator profile to better understand the implications of punishment for forgiveness: “Given the punishment you have selected, would you forgive this person?” This question sheds light on whether punishments selected by respondents actually encourage forgiveness and are therefore conducive to reconciliation and reintegration.

Overall, 59% of respondents who did not choose the death penalty reported that they would forgive the collaborator (those who chose the death penalty, who make up 34% of the sample, were not asked this question). Surprisingly, 29% of respondents who were presented with profiles of IS fighters were willing to forgive them, about a third of those who were presented with profiles of cooks were willing to forgive them, while 42%, 72%, and 85% of those who saw women married to fighters, janitors for the IS municipality, and taxpayers respectively were willing to forgive them. The *type* of collaboration is an important determinant of willingness to forgive a former rebel collaborator. In the analysis below, we code those who chose the death penalty as not being willing to forgive collaborators.³⁸

We employ OLS regression to analyze the outcome of this experiment.³⁹ Compared to fighters, cooks for fighters are 15 percentage points more likely to be forgiven on a 0-1 scale (SE=0.17). Likewise, respondents are more likely to forgive women married to fighters (by 24 percentage points, SE=0.02) and janitors working for the IS municipality (by 55


We also estimate the average conditional marginal effects separately for each of the three rounds of the experiment. Our main finding, that acts of collaboration determine preferences for punishment, remains the same across rounds (Appendix B.3).

³⁸We also ran the analysis excluding those who chose the death penalty. The substantive results are the same, except that cooks are no longer distinguishable from fighters, but this is likely because many fighters received the death penalty.

³⁹We also ran logit regression but we present only the OLS results here, as the substantive results are the same.

percentage points, $SE=0.02$) than they are to forgive fighters. Taxpayers are 71 percentage points ($SE=0.02$) more likely to be forgiven than fighters. These results almost mirror those in the “Seeking Justice” experiment, suggesting that there is a correlation between views of punishment and forgiveness. Among the ascriptive attributes of former collaborators, females are less likely to be forgiven, by about 4 percentage points. Although the finding is statistically significant, the effect is relatively small in magnitude. Age and shared tribal membership are insignificant. (Figure 3) highlights once more that the actions of former collaborators matter more than their identities for reconciliation.

Figure 3: Effects of Identity and Act on Forgiveness of Former Rebel Collaborators



Note: Figure depicts point estimates with 95% confidence intervals. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

6.1.2 Examining Correlations Between Voluntariness of Action, Justice, and Forgiveness

We also conducted exploratory analyses of heterogeneous treatment effects to probe whether there is a relationship between perceptions of different types of collaboration as voluntary or involuntary and preferences for punishment and forgiveness.⁴⁰ Employing pairwise comparisons to assess the difference in predicted marginal means on the punishment scale for those who perceived an act as voluntary versus involuntary, we find that, on average, those who viewed paying taxes to IS as involuntary chose a punishment that is 1.4 points lower than those who saw it as voluntary ($SE=0.20$, 28% of the scale). We also find that respondents who perceived other types of collaboration as involuntary preferred more lenient punishments: 0.63 points lower on the five-point scale for women married to IS fighters ($SE=0.16$); 0.45 points lower for cooks for fighters ($SE=0.15$), and 0.47 points lower for fighters ($SE=0.24$). These differences are statistically significant, ranging in magnitude from 9% and 13% of the full 15 scale. For janitors, perceptions of voluntariness do not seem to correlate with severity of punishment. As our anecdotal evidence in the introduction suggests, this could be because respondents see the need for a living wage as a necessary and therefore permissible form of collaboration. However, perceptions of voluntariness of the act are also positively and significantly correlated with forgiveness for all acts. Thus, for certain acts, believing whether it was done intentionally or not has a significant correlation with perceptions of justice and willingness to forgive.


⁴⁰We recognize that randomization of whether or not the act was voluntary would have been a superior design for understanding whether there is a causal relationship between these variables. Unfortunately, we are limited to making only correlational claims with the analysis of this follow-up question to the experiments.

6.2 Experiment 2: 'Former Collaborators as Neighbors'

The expectation that respondents will be more likely to accept former IS collaborators who have “paid their debt” by receiving harsher punishments is analyzed through independent analyses for each of the three collaborator types. The primary independent variable in the individual analysis is the type of punishment. This enables us to determine whether harsher punishments are more likely to lead to reintegration of former collaborators, holding type of collaborator constant. We rely on a pooled OLS analysis of the data across all three types of collaborators to assess whether acceptance as a neighbor depends on the type of collaboration with IS. The pooled analysis allows for the inclusion of a second independent variable: harshness of punishment. We can also examine the interactive effects of these two variables on acceptance of former IS collaborators.

As expected, Moslawis are more willing to allow the reintegration of collaborators who committed less condemnable acts than more condemnable ones. They are 12 percentage points more likely to accept women married to IS fighters and 47 percentage points more likely to accept janitors working for the IS municipality when compared to the base of a cook for fighters (Figure 4). Notice that the coefficients for the various punishments, as well as the interactions between types of acts and punishments, all cross zero, suggesting insignificant results. The pattern that emerges from these results is consistent with the findings of the “Seeking Justice” experiment: the *type of act committed* by former rebel collaborators appears to determine the likelihood of their reintegration into and reconciliation with the community of Mosul. Preferences for reintegration do not appear to be dependent on the type of punishment received.

Figure 4: Effects of Type of Act and Punishment on Probability of Reintegration of Former IS Collaborators



Note: Figure depicts point estimates with 95% confidence intervals. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

7 Conclusion

This study makes important and original contributions to research on rebel governance, transitional justice, and the psychology of forgiveness and reconciliation by illuminating public opinion in an Iraqi city, Mosul, that experienced three years of governance by a powerful rebel group. First, this study investigates questions that have not been answered by previous work: (1) How does variation in the identity of collaborators and in the type of collaboration affect preferences for punishment? and (2) How does variation in the punishments imposed on collaborators affect the prospects for their reintegration into a post-conflict society? We find that the actions of collaborators matter more than their ascriptive identity characteristics—age, gender, and tribal affiliation—in determining preferences for justice and reintegration. We use these two dimensions of variation to generate hypotheses about public opinion toward different types of collaborators and test them employing an experimental design that is of immediate relevance to researchers and policymakers who are working to identify the conditions under which former collaborators can be successfully reintegrated into post-conflict societies.

Second, the design of our study is innovative in using two experiments—the second of which takes the dependent variable of the first (punishment) and turns it into an independent variable—to explore causal mechanisms. Third, our research has important policy implications. A UN report on best practices for post-conflict transitional justice finds that failure to prioritize the prosecution of more serious crimes over lesser offenses can increase the likelihood that innocent people are convicted, while those who are actually guilty escape justice (de Greiff, 2014). The reintegration and rehabilitation of combatants is usually the highest policy priority in post-conflict peace processes, but most of the people who support and enable insurgencies are civilians, not fighters (Weinstein, 2006). By demonstrating that

Moslawis differentiate between the culpability of different types of collaborators and prefer more lenient punishments for some of them, the findings of these experiments suggest that the Iraqi government’s heavy-handed approach to collaborators is both inconsistent with public opinion and with important principles of transitional justice, including proportionality, prosecutorial prioritization, and truth-seeking. Examples from other historical and regional contexts suggest that failure to implement evidence-based transitional justice mechanisms that distinguish between different types of collaboration and variation in their voluntariness could generate new grievances—and therefore, the potential for conflict recurrence—in formerly rebel-governed territories.

Some may question the broader applicability of a study of a single case of rebel governance. However, we contend that our findings make an important contribution to understanding the micro-dynamics of rebel collaboration and the effects of variation in different types of collaboration on propensity for reconciliation and reintegration in post-conflict settings writ large. It is not unusual for rebel groups to establish governance institutions and rule territories for multiple years (Stewart, 2018), or to demand that populations conform to strict rules Arjona (2016), as IS did. We expect that some of the findings will generalize to other Sunni-majority cities governed by IS in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, this research has implications not only for civil wars but for other types of conflicts where civilian collaboration is widespread—such as foreign interventions, occupations, and coups. The disconnect between public opinion and justice mechanisms is likely in all of these types of post-conflict settings.

This research raises a number of questions for future research. Given the intentional limitation of our sample to Sunni Arabs, we do not expect that our findings will generalize to other religious or ethnic groups in Iraq, such as Shia, Christians, and Yazidis, whom IS victimized to a much greater extent than Sunnis and are therefore likely to have different preferences for punishment, forgiveness, and reintegration of former IS collaborators. Under

what conditions, if any, would these other ethnic and religious groups be willing to allow the reintegration of former collaborators? Moreover, how might populations that did not experience rebel governance view former collaborators in ways that differ from those of victimized populations? Given our finding that the *type* of collaboration matters more than the *identity* of the collaborator, what policy interventions might help to reduce the stigmas associated with different collaborator-types? Finally, further research should use causal inference to examine whether the voluntariness or culpability of collaboration affects preferences for forgiveness.

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
Appendix

Appendix A: Survey Administration

A.1 Map of the Sampling Frame

Figure A1 shows the sampling frame of 209 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) in light green and the 47 randomly selected PSUs in dark green. Eight PSUs in West Mosul were excluded from the sampling frame because these areas experienced severe collateral damage during the recent military operation and remain largely uninhabited. These excluded PSUs are marked in red.¹ Within each PSU, streets were randomly selected, and from these streets, enumerators selected households using a random-walk procedure. Enumerators counted the number of houses on each street and divided by seven to determine the interval of houses skipped between interviews. The tablets were programmed with a Kish grid (Kish, 1949) that randomly selected a respondent from the pool of adult household members.

Figure A1: Map of the Sampling Frame



¹This map was generated with CARTO using shapefiles provided by provided by Ivan Thung, Program Manager of the Recovery and Resilience Platform at the United Nations Human Settlements Programme in Iraq.

A.2 Enumerators

A team of 10 Iraqi enumerators (male and female Sunni Arabs from Mosul) hired by the Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS) conducted the survey. With all survey research, there is a possibility that the observed effects are being driven by human error or the characteristics and biases of individual enumerators. Previous research indicates that the perceived religiosity of an enumerator—based on visible indicators of religious identity—impacts respondents’ expressions of personal piety and adherence to Islamic cultural norms (Blaydes and Gillum, 2013). However, the female enumerators recruited for this project all wear the hijab and so we do not test for differences along these lines. Another concern is that religiously conservative men and women may not be comfortable speaking with an enumerator of the opposite gender, so we developed a protocol for such situations. Although enumerators work individually, if a female or male respondent requested to be interviewed by an enumerator of the same gender (an option offered during the informed consent process), the opposite-gender enumerator called a colleague to conduct the interview. A pilot test of 100 respondents was conducted in January 2018 followed by revisions to the questionnaire and retraining of the enumerators. Mara Revkin conducted training with the project manager and two field managers who then trained the enumerators. The training script and other training materials were developed with guidance provided by Ellen Lust, Kristen Kao, and other researchers with the Governance and Local Development Program at the University of Gothenburg. For security reasons, IIACSS does not allow direct contact between local enumerators and foreign clients; however, we maintained frequent contact with the project manager during the administration of the survey and monitored the incoming data and enumerator movements on a daily basis.

A.3 Attrition

As noted in the article, Mosul’s current population is almost entirely Sunni Arab due to massive out-migration by other religious and ethnic groups who were persecuted by IS. Through the filter questions that were designed to limit the sample to Sunni Arab Iraqis who were living in Mosul in June 2014, only 4 people were excluded for not being Iraqi, 4 were excluded for not being Sunni Arab, and 9 were excluded because they were not living in Mosul in June 2014. The refusal rate was 14.9%. After piloting the survey, the research team agreed that the survey should take at least 25 minutes to complete, to ensure that all questions were read thoroughly and slowly. Six surveys were dropped from the final dataset because they were completed in less than 25 minutes.

A.4 Demographics and Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: Demographics

	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Gender		
Male	734	50%
Female	724	50%
Age		
18-24	326	22%
25-34	435	30%
35-44	283	19%
45-54	204	14%
55-65	154	11%
65 and older	56	4%
Education		
Illiterate/No formal education	202	14%
Elementary	552	38%
Primary/Basic	261	18%
Secondary	238	16%
Professional or technical diploma	73	5%
BA	125	9%
MA and above	6	<1%
Current Employment Status		
Unemployed	456	31%
Housewife	592	41%
Student	134	9%
Retired	84	6%
Part-time (<20 hours/week)	71	5%
Full-time (> 20 hours/week)	121	8%
Current Income / Household's Needs		
Significant difficulties meeting needs	967	66%
Some difficulties meeting needs	303	21%
Expenses covered without notable difficulties	165	11%
Expenses covered and able to save	21	1%

Table A2: Identity and History

	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Years Lived in Mosul Before June 2014		
Less than 2	46	3%
2-5	19	1%
6-10	19	1%
More than 10	127	9%
Since birth	1,246	85%
Primary Identity		
Iraqi national	713	49%
Muslim	560	38%
Resident of Mosul	106	7%
Member of my tribe	57	4%
Female/Male	24	2%
Tribal Identity		
Identifies with a tribe	1,452	99%
Does not identify with a tribe	5	<1%
Leaver/Stayer (March 10, 2015 Cut-Point)		
Leavers	403	28%
Stayers	1,055	72%

Table A3: Exposure to Violence

	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Violence During IS Rule		
Arrested by IS	247	17%
House seriously damaged	411	28%
House confiscated by IS	294	20%
Member of household injured	156	11%
Member of household killed	122	8%
Violence During Battle for Mosul		
House seriously damaged during the battle	739	51%
Member of household injured	316	22%
Member of household killed	190	13%

Table A4: Payment of Taxes and Fees to IS

	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Type of Tax Collected from Household		
Electricity Fees	557	38%
Water Fees	654	45%
Zakat	507	35%

Table A5: Five-Point Ranking of Collaborators from Least (1) to Most Condemnable (5)

Ranking	Type of Collaboration	% of Respondents
(1) Not condemnable at all	An IS fighter Married to an IS fighter A cook for IS fighters A janitor at the IS municipality A taxpayer to IS	1% 1% 0.4% 16% 81%
(2)	An IS fighter Married to an IS fighter A cook for IS fighters A janitor at the IS municipality A taxpayer to IS	0% 4% 3% 77% 15%
(3)	An IS fighter Married to an IS fighter A cook for IS fighters A janitor at the IS municipality A taxpayer to IS	0.3% 37% 57% 4% 1%
(4)	An IS fighter Married to an IS fighter A cook for IS fighters A janitor at the IS municipality A taxpayer to IS	1% 57% 39% 2% 1%
(5) Completely condemnable	An IS fighter Married to an IS fighter A cook for IS fighters A janitor at the IS municipality A taxpayer to IS	98% 1% 0% 0% 1%

Appendix B: Experimental Design and Robustness Checks

B.1 Example of Collaborator Profile in “Seeking Justice” Experiment

Each respondent was presented with a randomized profile of a hypothetical IS collaborators and was asked to evaluate it. Respondents evaluated three separate profiles in total. The total sample of evaluated profiles was 4,275 evaluated profiles. Standard errors correct for within-respondent clustering.

Profile 1 is a:

Gender: [Female]

Age: [15]

Tribal affiliation: Member of [the respondent’s tribe].

Type of collaboration with IS: [married to a Daesh fighter]

Profile 2 is a:

Gender: [Male]

Age: [35]

Tribal affiliation: Member of [a tribe other than the respondent’s tribe].

Type of collaboration with IS: [a Daesh fighter]

Profile 3:

Gender: [Male]

Age: [35]

Tribal affiliation: Member of [the respondent’s tribe].


Type of collaboration with IS: [a resident of Mosul who paid taxes to Daesh]

B.2 “Booster Sample” of “Leavers”

Figure B1 displays differences between the 376 respondents who were part of a “booster sample” of Moslawis who left the city after March 10, 2015. This sample was purposively selected. The outcomes of the experiment based on this sample alone overlap with those of random sample and the “booster sample” outcomes on their own do not contradict our findings presented in the main body of the paper, except for the findings concerning the youth and tribal members where it seems the random sample is driving the findings that the youth are more likely to be receive lighter punishments and tribal members are more harshly punished for collaboration with IS.


The only other finding where we found differences between the booster sample and the random sample was the finding that cooks for fighters are more likely to be accepted back as neighbors only after having been sentenced to the harshest punishment. However, the samples do not affect the results for the woman married to a fighter or for the janitor at the municipality. Moreover, in the pooled results the two samples do not significantly differ in

Figure B2: Effects of Collaborator Characteristics on Punishment by Sample Type, Base of Taxpayer



terms of outcomes.


Figure B2: Effects of Punishment on Acceptance of Neighbor for a Cook for Fighters, Base of No Punishment



B.3 Checking Carry-Over Effects Between Experimental Rounds

Analysis of the Average Marginal Conditional Effects (AMCEs) by order in which the respondents saw the experiment reveals slight effects for youth and tribal members. Youths were significantly more likely to receive lighter punishments in the second round and tribal members were more likely to be punished harsher than non tribal members. It is possible that respondents were beginning to fatigue by the third round and/or focus more on collaborator acts rather than identity characteristics. However, the effect sizes of these findings are small and they further cast doubt on the ability of identity attributes to explain differential preferences for justice when it comes to former rebel collaborators. Our main finding that acts of collaboration determine preferences for punishment is not affected by round effects. (See Figure B3.)

Figure B3: Effects of Collaborator Characteristics on Punishment, Base of Taxpayer



B.4 List Experiment

On the survey, 16% of respondents answered “yes” to the following direct sensitive question: “During the first six months of Daesh rule, did you believe that Daesh was doing a better job of governing Mosul than the Iraqi government did previously?” To assess whether an even higher percentage of respondents might answer “yes” to this question if asked indirectly, we designed a list experiment in which the wording of the sensitive item mirrors that of the question above.

List Experiment to Measure Support for IS

“Please tell me how many of the following statements were true during the first six months of Daesh rule. We are not interested in which statements you think are true, only how many of them:

— During this period, the Iraqi government stopped paying the salaries of government employees in Mosul [FALSE]²

— During this period, Daesh started collecting zakat from the people of Mosul³ [TRUE]

— During this period, Daesh opened a religious police department (known as the “hisba”) in Mosul [TRUE]⁴

— During this period, Daesh was doing a better job of governing Mosul than the Iraqi government did previously” [TREATMENT: displayed for 50% of respondents]

The non-sensitive items in this list experiment are objectively true or false statements based on facts that should have been widely known to Mosul residents during the first six months of IS rule, so we expected that most respondents would be able to correctly identify them as true or false. However, given individual-level differences in exposure to IS governance and information, it is possible that some respondents would not know whether these statements are true/false or will have incorrect beliefs. Nonetheless, the distribution of uninformed or misinformed respondents should have been unbiased across control and treatment groups.

If survey respondents had perfect information, we would expect the mean of the control group to be approximately 2, since 2 out of the 3 items on the list are objectively true and the third is objectively false. The difference between the mean of the control group (1.34) and the expected mean under conditions of perfect information (2) suggests that some survey respondents had factually incorrect beliefs about the items that were objectively true or false. One possible explanation for misinformation is that some residents of Mosul avoided leaving their homes as much as possible during the three years that IS was in control of the city to minimize contact with the group.⁵

Using the Welch’s Two Sample t-test in R, we find a difference in means of 11% between the treatment and control groups (Table A5), which represents an estimate of the percentage of respondents in the treatment group who agreed with the sensitive item (that “IS was doing a better job of governing Mosul than the Iraqi government did previously.”) The similarity between the response rate for the sensitive item on the list experiment (11%) and on the direct question (16%), together with the fact that only 6 respondents declined to answer or did not know when asked the direct question, suggests that social desirability bias did not significantly affect our results.

⁵Florian Neuhofer, “Meet the woman who picked up the pen under ISIL’s sword,” *The National* (Apr. 5, 2018), <https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/meet-the-woman-who-picked-up-the-pen-under-isil-s-sword-1.718978>.

Table A6: Analysis of List Experiment

Mean of Control Group (3 Items)	1.34
Mean of Treatment Group (4 Items)	1.45
P-value	.037
Difference in Means	0.11

Appendix C: Additional Analyses

C.1 Experiment 1: Validation of the 5-Point Scale of Punishments

The survey asked a post-treatment question to assess the extent to which respondents’ preferences matched the 5-point scale of punishments included in the experiment: “Would you have preferred a different punishment for this person and if so, what?” Of the 4,296 profiles shown, only 175 (approximately 4 percent) of respondents said that they would have preferred a different type of punishment—and many of these were simply a more specific form of a punishment that was included on the five-point scale. For example, 41 of these 175 respondents (23 percent) said that they would have preferred a specific type of capital punishment including “torture until death,” “death by firing squad,” “starvation,” and “stoning.” The most commonly preferred form of capital punishment was death by burning, although this is not a punishment found in Iraqi state law. IS routinely burned defectors and dissidents to death in Mosul,⁶ suggesting—anecdotally—that some respondents have a preference for retributive forms of punishment (“an eye for an eye”), or that years of exposure to IS’s violent rule may have led some to internalize the group’s norms. Another common response to this question was “banishment” from the community (31 responses), which is a punishment sometimes prescribed by tribal law for serious crimes such as murder.⁷ In designing the experiment, we intentionally limited the menu of punishments to those that could plausibly be imposed by Iraqi state courts. Including tribal law punishments such as “banishment” in the menu of options would have introduced a second implicit question into the experiment—Which of these two legal systems, state or tribal, does the respondent prefer?—which is a question that we explore in other experimental work.⁸

Tables C1 and C2 show that both type of collaboration and severity of punishment seem to affect respondents’ willingness to forgive former collaborators. However, severity of punishment does not seem to affect forgiveness in the direction one might expect: lesser punishments result in higher likelihood of forgiveness. We suspect that the types of collaborators who receive more lenient punishments are inherently more forgivable because punishment is correlated with blameworthiness.

⁶Nefal Mostafa, “IS burns 10 militants to death over fleeing attempt, west of Mosul,” (Jul. 25, 2017), <https://www.iraqinews.com/iraq-war/burns-10-militants-death-fleeing-attempt-west-mosul/>.

⁷UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq,” (Jan. 15, 2018), <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5a66f84f4.html>.

⁸For more research on “legal pluralism” in post-IS Mosul, see: Kristen Kao and Mara Revkin, “Legal Pluralism and Fragmented Sovereignty After Conflict: A Survey Experiment in Mosul.” Working Paper (2018).

Table C1: Forgiveness for Types of Collaboration (# and % of Respondents)

Act	No Forgiveness	Forgiveness	Total
IS Fighter	127 71%	52 29%	179 100%
Cook	373 67%	187 33%	560 100%
Married Fighter	351 58%	253 42%	604 100%
Janitor	201 28%	512 72%	713 100%
Paid Taxes	114 15%	656 85%	770 100%
Total	1,166 41%	1,660 59%	2,826 100%

Table C2: Forgiveness by Type of Punishment (# and % of Respondents)

Punishment	No Forgiveness	Forgiveness	Total
No Punishment	119 10%	1,041 90%	1,160 100%
Community Service	234 40%	346 60%	580 100%
3 Years Imprisonment	319 63%	189 37%	508 100%
15 Years Imprisonment	506 85%	89 15%	595 100%
Total	1,178 41%	1,665 59%	2,843 100%

We also ran a robustness check since we did not include death penalty givers in the analysis for forgiveness of former collaborators. We assumed that these respondents would not forgive collaborators. When we coded them this way the results changed slightly such that the cook for fighters is now distinguishable from the fighters in receiving more forgiveness, but otherwise the results are the same as those presented in the body of the article. (See Figure C1.)

Figure C1: Forgiveness of Former Rebel Collaborators with Capital Punishment Coded as Not Forgiving, Base is IS Fighter



Appendix D: Research Ethics, Data Security, and Funding

The following sections discuss the potential risks to survey respondents and the steps taken to minimize those risks.

D.1 Minimizing Risks to Respondents

The sample (Sunni Iraqi civilians who were living in Mosul when IS arrived in June 2014) may be vulnerable to different types of harm as a result of their participation in this survey. First, they may be experiencing emotional distress or trauma as a result of their recent exposure to violence. Second, they may be vulnerable to reprisals by any IS “sleeper cells” or other IS sympathizers who have managed to remain underground in Mosul. Third, they may be vulnerable to interrogation or detention by Iraqi authorities on charges of association with IS. Several steps were taken to minimize these risks.

First, neighborhoods most severely affected by the battle for Mosul will be excluded from the sampling frame in order to reduce the likelihood of re-traumatizing respondents. Enumerators were instructed to monitor respondents for signs of serious emotional distress and to remind them that participation is voluntary, and he/she is free to take a break, skip a question, or terminate the survey entirely. These precautions reduced the potential for causing emotional distress to vulnerable subjects.

Second, in the immediate aftermath of the liberation of Mosul, sleeper cells occasionally perpetrated suicide bombings and other attacks. However, the last such attack occurred seven months prior to the start of the survey in July 2017, when the Iraqi government officially claimed victory over IS in Mosul.⁹ These attacks were generally aimed at inflicting

⁹Simona Foltyn, “Exclusive: Iraqi forces hunt for IS group sleeper cells in Mosul,” *France 24* (Jul. 19, 2017), <http://www.france24.com/en/>

indiscriminate violence, rather than targeted at particular individuals, suggesting that even if such cells are still active in Mosul (however unlikely), respondents are unlikely to be singled out as a result of their participation in this study. Nonetheless, to guard against the possibility that covert IS affiliates in Mosul might observe respondents participating in the survey and retaliate against them, enumerators were instructed to offer to conduct the surveys inside of respondents homes to ensure their privacy (unless respondents preferred to take the survey outside).¹⁰

Third, there is a possibility that inadvertent disclosure of the survey data—as a result of theft or confiscation by government authorities—could expose respondents to counterterrorism measures if they express support for IS on the survey. Since the survey did not collect names or addresses, it is highly unlikely that the data—if inadvertently disclosed—could be linked back to any particular individual.

The data security procedures discussed below further reduce the risks to human subjects.

D.2 Data Security Procedures

The 10 enumerators, working under the supervision of two field managers, administered the survey with Android tablets that were programmed with a mobile software application, SurveyToGo. The GPS-equipped tablets collected locational data on the movements of the enumerators and length of each survey in order to identify irregularities including deviations from the random sampling procedure or data fabrication. Surveys that contained any such irregularities were discarded (for example, surveys completed in less than 25 minutes, which was determined to be the minimum acceptable length after field testing). Complete GPS coordinate data was only retained for as long as was necessary to verify the quality of the enumerators work. Less granular locational data (neighborhood level) was retained to generate maps of the sampled areas. Throughout the administration of the survey, we monitored the incoming data on a daily basis through a SurveyToGo administrator account, where the survey data was uploaded as it was collected without being cleaned or otherwise handled by IIACSS.

C.3 Funding Disclosure

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20170719-exclusive-iraq-mosul-sleeper-cells-islamic-state-group.

¹⁰The survey recorded variation in the interview setting. The vast majority of surveys (1,052) were conducted inside of the respondents' homes. 82 were conducted outside but hidden from passersby and 176 were conducted outside and visible to passersby.

Appendix D: Interview Data and Qualitative Evidence

The Human Subjects Committee of Yale University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved interviews with individuals from IS-controlled areas on June 24, 2015 (Protocol #1506016040) and interviews with lawyers, judges, and other experts as well as observations of trials on September 22, 2017 (Protocol #2000021840). Interviewees from IS-controlled areas were identified through snowball sampling. Interviews with judges were formally requested through Iraq’s Higher Judicial Council.

D.1. Interview Data

For ethical and security reasons, all interviewees associated with IS are identified by pseudonyms to protect their anonymity.¹¹ Judges, prosecutors, and some lawyers are also identified by pseudonyms at their request. Pseudonyms are noted with quotation marks in the tables below, which summarize the key demographic attributes of the interviewees and the nature of their contact with IS or role in IS-related prosecutions. Consistent with the survey data, we classify interviewees as “stayers” if they were still living in IS-controlled territory on March 10, 2015 and as “leavers” if they left before that date. (See Tables D1 and D2.)

D.2. Observations from the Trial of an Alleged IS Collaborator

The trial of an alleged IS collaborator observed by one of the authors in a courtroom near Mosul in December 2017 illustrate many of the flaws in the Iraqi governments efforts to bring justice and security to areas recaptured from IS.¹² “Khaled” was working for a slaughterhouse in Mosul when IS swept across northern Iraq in June 2014. Like many of the estimated five million Iraqis living and working in areas captured by IS, Khaled soon faced a terrible choice. He was told by the new IS-appointed manager of the slaughterhouse that in order to keep his job, he would need to pledge allegiance to the group. Those who refused to swear this oath of loyalty (known in Arabic as *bay’ah*) would be fired. Beyond the loss of income, quitting would have exposed Khaled and his family to the threat of retaliation. Refusing to work for the group could be interpreted as an act of opposition, and IS routinely executed civilians believed to be dissidents or spies for the Iraqi government. Faced with these threats to his economic and physical security, Khaled, like many residents of Mosul, decided to cooperate when the group took control of his workplace and salary.

Three years later, in July 2017, Iraqi forces supported by an international coalition recaptured Mosul after a bloody nine-month battle. Khaled was one of more than 19,000 people who have since been detained on suspicion of association with IS. He was arrested solely on the basis of testimony from a secret informant in a camp for internally displaced persons to which he had fled as the battle to retake Mosul intensified. During his trial, Khaled testified that his work consisted only of feeding and caring for the animals at the slaughterhouse and

¹¹Mara Revkin conducted these interviews in standard Arabic with occasional help from research assistants in interpreting the Moslawi dialect.

¹²Mara Revkin’s observations of two trials of alleged IS members in Tel Kayf, Iraq (Dec. 13, 2017).

Table D1: Interviews with Residents of Mosul and Other IS-Controlled Areas of Iraq

#	Pseudonym	Age	Gender	Profession	Contact with IS	Interview Date	Interview Location	Lived Under IS Rule In
1	"Amir"	54	Male	Teacher	"Leaver"	2/25/17	IDP camp, Hamdaniya	Bartella
2	"Yusuf"	36	Male	Farmer	"Leaver"	2/25/17	IDP camp, Hamdaniya	Mosul
3	"Talib"	24	Male	Farmer	"Leaver"	2/25/17	IDP camp, Hamdaniya	Mosul
4	"Salim"	35	Male	Farmer	"Leaver"	2/25/17	IDP camp, Hamdaniya	Mosul
5	"Sami"	42	Male	Police officer	"Leaver"	2/25/17	IDP camp, Hamdaniya	Mosul
6	"Adeel"	55	Male	Public transportation	Paid taxes to IS	2/25/17	IDP camp, Hamdaniya	Mosul
7	"Rahim"	43	Male	Prison guard	"Leaver"	2/25/17	IDP camp, Hamdaniya	Mosul
8	"Salima"	25	Female	Housewife	"Leaver"	2/25/17	IDP camp, Hamdaniya	al-Shirqaat
9	"Raniya"	50	Female	Housewife	"Leaver"	2/25/17	IDP camp, Hamdaniya	Mosul
10	"Adil"	24	Male	Day laborer	"Leaver"	2/25/17	IDP camp, Hamdaniya	Mosul
11	"Sharif"	22	Male	Street vendor	"Stayer"	2/25/17	Bashika	Bashika
12	"Fadil"	50	Male	Teacher	IS civilian employee	2/25/17	Bashika	Bashika
13	"Kalil"	62	Male	Security guard	IS civilian employee	2/25/17	Bashika	Bashika
14	"Nasim"	22	Male	Student	"Stayer"	2/25/17	Bashika	Bashika
15	"Hakim"	44	Male	Lawyer	"Leaver"	2/27/17	Erbil	Mosul
16	"Bassem"	45	Male	School administrator	IS civilian employee	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
17	"Mina"	41	Female	School administrator	IS civilian employee	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
18	"Haidar"	46	Male	School administrator	IS civilian employee	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
19	"Wissam"	52	Male	School administrator	IS civilian employee	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
20	"Saad"	33	Male	Teacher	IS civilian employee	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
21	"Ayad"	58	Male	Teacher	IS civilian employee	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
21	"Salih"	28	Male	Teacher	IS civilian employee	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
22	"Karim"	35	Male	Teacher	IS civilian employee	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
23	"Jala"	32	Male	Teacher	IS civilian employee	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
24	"Aisha"	59	Female	Teacher	IS civilian employee	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
25	"Fatima"	33	Female	Teacher	IS civilian employee	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
26	"Zainab"	45	Female	Teacher	IS civilian employee	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
27	"Hafsa"	60	Female	Teacher	IS civilian employee	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
28	"Marwa"	35	Female	Teacher	IS civilian employee	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
29	"Dalia"	41	Female	Housewife	"Stayer"	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
30	"Mohammad"	62	Male	Butcher	Paid taxes to IS	4/15/17	Mosul	Mosul
31	"Adnan"	35	Male	Factory worker	Paid taxes to IS	4/19/17	Mosul	Mosul
32	"Amira"	22	Female	Student	"Stayer"	4/19/17	Mosul	Mosul
33	"Hamid"	33	Male	Municipal worker	IS civilian employee	4/19/17	Mosul	Mosul
34	"Jawad"	67	Male	Doctor	IS civilian employee	4/19/17	Mosul	Mosul
35	"Haitham"	33	Male	Hospital administrator	IS civilian employee	4/19/17	Mosul	Mosul
36	"Fares"	43	Male	Municipal services	IS civilian employee	4/19/17	Mosul	Mosul
37	"Faisal"	48	Male	Municipal services	IS civilian employee	4/19/17	Mosul	Mosul
38	"Tarek"	44	Male	Municipal services	IS civilian employee	4/19/17	Mosul	Mosul
39	"Zyad"	35	Male	Municipal services	IS civilian employee	4/19/17	Mosul	Mosul
40	"Khaled"	38	Male	Accountant	IS civilian employee	4/19/17	Mosul	Mosul
41	"Ahmed"	42	Male	Journalist	Paid taxes to IS	4/19/17	Mosul	Mosul
42	"Lama"	20	Female	Store clerk	Paid taxes to IS	4/20/17	Mosul	Mosul
43	"Tamir"	40	Male	Butcher	Paid taxes to IS	4/20/17	Mosul	Mosul
44	"Nasir"	50	Male	Tailor	Paid taxes to IS	4/20/17	Mosul	Mosul
45	"Hamza"	35	Male	Car dealer	Paid taxes to IS	4/20/17	Mosul	Mosul
46	"Walid"	33	Male	Store clerk	Paid taxes to IS	4/20/17	Mosul	Mosul
47	"Ismail"	35	Male	Store clerk	Paid taxes to IS	4/20/17	Mosul	Mosul
48	"Latif"	38	Male	Food services	Paid taxes to IS	4/20/17	Mosul	Mosul
49	"Raed"	24	Male	Food services	Paid taxes to IS	4/20/17	Mosul	Mosul
50	"Mahmoud"	30	Male	Food services	Paid taxes to IS	4/20/17	Mosul	Mosul
51	"Amr"	22	Male	Food services	Paid taxes to IS	4/20/17	Mosul	Mosul
52	"Mohamed"	35	Male	Truck driver	Paid taxes to IS	4/20/17	Mosul	Mosul
53	"Hanan"	45	Female	Lawyer	"Leaver"	12/6/17	Baghdad	Mosul
54	"Taiba"	52	Female	Housewife	Wife of IS fighter	12/14/17	IDP camp, Makhmour	al-Shirqat
55	"Ahlam"	35	Female	Housewife	Wife of IS fighter	12/14/17	IDP camp, Makhmour	Hawija
56	"Badia"	60	Female	Housewife	Wife of IS fighter	12/14/17	IDP camp, Makhmour	Hawija
57	Laila	40	Female	Housewife	Wife of IS fighter	12/14/17	IDP camp, Makhmour	Hawija
58	Maha	46	Female	Housewife	Wife of IS fighter	12/14/17	IDP camp, Makhmour	al-Shirqat
59	Fadila	35	Female	Housewife	Wife of IS fighter	12/14/17	IDP camp, Makhmour	al-Shirqat
60	Raina	45	Female	Housewife	Wife of IS fighter	12/14/17	IDP camp, Makhmour	al-Shirqat
61	Maher	42	Male	Retired military	"Stayer"	12/14/17	IDP camp, Makhmour	Mosul

Table D2: Interviews with Judges and Lawyers Involved in Trials of IS Collaborators

#	Pseudonym	Gender	Profession	Interview Date	Interview Location
1	“Hadi”	Male	Lawyer	12/4/17	Baghdad
2	Ahlam Allami	Female	Lawyer, Iraqi Bar Association	12/6/17	Baghdad
3	Nifal al-Tai	Female	Lawyer, Iraqi Bar Association	12/6/17	Baghdad
4	Khalid Obaide	Male	Law Professor	12/7/17	Baghdad
5	“Fawzi”	Male	Senior Judge	12/11/17	Erbil
6	“Farouk”	Male	Judge	12/13/17	Mosul
7	“Saleh”	Male	Judge	12/13/17	Tel Kayf
8	“Oday”	Male	Judge	12/13/17	Tel Kayf
9	“Amjad”	Male	Judge	12/13/17	Tel Kayf
10	“Dara”	Female	Prosecutor	12/13/17	Tel Kayf
11	“Nouri”	Male	Public Defender	12/13/17	Tel Kayf
12	“Haitham”	Male	Public Defender	12/13/17	Tel Kayf
13	Zyad Zaeed	Male	Lawyer	12/16/17	Baghdad
14	“Abbas”	Male	Senior Judge	12/17/17	Baghdad
15	“Wael”	Male	Senior Judge	12/17/17	Baghdad
16	Lubna al-Waeli	Female	Lawyer	12/17/17	Baghdad
17	“Qassim”	Male	Senior Judge	12/17/17	Baghdad

that he had never carried a weapon or received any military training from IS. He admitted to receiving a small monthly salary from IS for his work in the slaughterhouse and to occasionally “hanging out” with friends from Mosul who had become fighters for the group. However, he insisted that he had never participated in combat or any acts of terrorism on behalf of the group.

However, the non-military nature of Khaled’s association with IS had little bearing on the outcome of his case because, as noted above, Iraq’s Anti-Terrorism Law criminalizes membership in a terrorist group, regardless of whether the member has engaged in violence or other criminal acts. A three-judge panel concluded that Khaled’s admission of pledging allegiance to IS—even though the pledge was coerced—was sufficient evidence of membership for him to be convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison after a trial that had lasted less than 30 minutes. The law requires the death penalty for anyone who commits a terrorist act or assists in the planning or financing of such acts.¹³ The penalty for those who intentionally cover up terrorist acts or harbor terrorists is life in prison, which Iraqi judges generally interpret as 20 years or 15 years with good behavior.¹⁴ Judges have some discretion to reduce sentences in cases with mitigating circumstances, such as Khaled’s. The judges told Khaled that he was lucky to have been sentenced to “only” 15 years, given the harsher alternatives. Nonetheless, Khaled was so distraught by the verdict that he collapsed on the courtroom floor as he begged the judges to reconsider.

¹³Anti-Terrorism Law No. 13 of 2005, Article 4. Available at: http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Iraq/IQ_Anti-Terrorism_Law.pdf.

¹⁴AFP, “German ‘IS’ jihadi spared death sentence in Iraq,” (Apr. 24, 2018), <http://www.dw.com/en/german-is-jihadi-spared-death-sentence-in-iraq/a-43515263>.

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