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Front Cover Image: Campaign posters in Amman, Jordan (Source: Jamal Nasrallah)

**The Importance of Intersectionality:
Gender, Islamism, and Tribalism in Elections**

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Abstract

Many studies of electoral behavior and women's electability in the developing world focus on single traits—e.g., religion, gender, and ethnicity. Yet, candidate identities affect electability intersectionally—i.e., identities are mutually constituted by social hierarchies, leading to complex, interactive effects—in ways that are underexplored in this existing literature. Using an original survey experiment conducted among 1,499 Jordanians, we examine the effects of multiple, intersecting candidate identities (i.e., gender, tribe, and Islamist party identification) on voter preferences. Respondents at random received statements about male or female candidates who were Islamists or co-tribalists and rated their likelihood of voting for each. We argue and show empirically that existing theories of electoral behavior cannot account for women's electability without an approach that considers how social hierarchies intersectionally shape electability. We find that although less electable overall, female candidates fare as well as comparable males once intersectional identities are accounted for. Among some voters, women do better than men from similar groups. Our findings underscore the need to apply intersectionality to theories of electoral behavior in the developing world and lay the groundwork for a larger research agenda explaining women's electability.

Keywords: Gender and politics, Tribal politics, Religion and politics, Middle East and North Africa, Electoral politics, Jordan, Survey experiment

1. Introduction

How do voters evaluate female candidates with multiple, intersecting identities? Can women leverage other social identities to gain votes at the ballot box? Given the rise in women running for office due to electoral quota diffusion, such questions are timely. Yet, we know little about why certain women are more likely to be successful across different social contexts. There is much existing literature on voting behavior focusing on single identities, including gender,¹ race and ethnicity,² religion,³ and party;⁴ this literature shows how these traits, often in isolation, shape electability in Western democracies.⁵ Rarely does electoral politics literature empirically consider how intersections between gender and other social identities shape candidates' chances at the polls, especially in the developing world.⁶

Voters weigh multiple factors when selecting candidates and sometimes must make difficult choices between the identities they desire and others they find less appealing or outright oppose. This is particularly true in low information settings, where voters rely on informational shortcuts to evaluate candidates.⁷ In Jordan, a semi-competitive electoral context like many other developing countries, several politically salient candidate identities send signals to voters. When multiple candidate identities are simultaneously at play however, vote choice may not be simple. For instance, voters may dislike female candidates, but believe that a woman would better represent them than male candidates from a different tribe or ideological background. Or, voters may support opposition candidates, but see a member of their tribe as better placed to provide them services.

Applied to electoral politics, intersectionality considers how multiple candidate identities as well as a society's social hierarchies influence voter behavior. While it has been central to women and politics research,⁸ particularly in the West, and though it figures centrally in identity politics literature, intersectionality has yet to enter mainstream electoral behavior theory. For instance,

although some work on voting for Islamists has focused on female candidates and voters,⁹ work on how Islamist female candidates are perceived is rare.¹⁰ Even work that considers multiple identities¹¹ does not fully engage an intersectional approach, which sees identities as mutually constituted by social hierarchies, leading to complex and often unexpected effects.¹²

To fill this gap, we argue and empirically demonstrate that existing theories of electoral behavior—e.g., gender role congruity, power relations, and social identification theories—cannot fully account for women’s electoral marginalization and, in some cases, women’s relative advantage vis-à-vis men from their same identity groups. We find that an intersectional framework, which considers how social hierarchies create complex effects on electability, is needed in non-democratic settings, as much as it is for explaining electability in democracies. Gender identity is the avenue through which we make our case, but we believe that intersectionality should be more broadly employed as an approach in empirical studies of candidate electability across political contexts.

Intersectional theory posits that when an individual belongs to two or more identity groups, each elemental identity is inextricably linked to the other in complex ways that are not easily reducible to single identity categories such as gender, ethnicity, or ideology.¹³ For instance, women from an ethnic minority encounter a different social environment than other women, and also experience being an ethnic minority differently than males of their minority group.¹⁴ In Jordan, this means that social identities like gender, tribe, or religious ideology, “operate not as unitary, mutually exclusive entities, but as reciprocally constructing phenomena that in turn shape complex social inequalities.”¹⁵ With few exceptions,¹⁶ intersectionality has remained a theoretical framework lacking empirical testing within the realm of electoral studies, particularly when considering voting behavior in non-western contexts.

We explore the interactive effects of multiple candidate identities (i.e., gender, co-tribal identity, and Islamism) on voter preferences, bringing intersectionality theory into conversation with other theories that have been employed to explain voter behavior. We evaluate the usefulness of theories of in-group bias such as social identity theory (SIT) and cross-cutting cleavages (CCC), as well as theories of gender and social hierarchy, including gender role congruity (GRCT) and power relations theory (PRT).¹⁷ We use an original survey experiment conducted among 1,499 Jordanians in 2014 in which respondents were randomly assigned to hear statements about a male or a female candidate who was: (1) a member of the Muslim Brotherhood's political arm and the country's dominant Islamist group, the Islamic Action Front (IAF); (2) a member of the respondent's tribe;¹⁸ or, (3) lacking other identifying information in order to highlight gender. Respondents heard the interviewer read a total of two statements at random and evaluated how likely they would be to vote for each candidate. This allows us to examine the impact of candidate gender alone and interacted with shared tribal identity or candidate Islamist ideology on electability across different voter groups.

We show how existing theories inform our understanding of women's electability across multiple identities but are inadequate without an intersectional approach to explain our empirical findings. Gender role congruity theory (GRCT) posits that women will be less electable than men, overall, because they lack the stereotyped qualities associated with leaders,¹⁹ while power relations theory (PRT) argues that women and members of other marginalized groups like the political opposition will be stereotyped as having less power²⁰ and thus will be less electable because they will be seen as less able to access resources for service provision.²¹ Social identity theory (SIT) postulates that voters prefer members of their social in-groups, such as co-tribalists and co-religionists;²² cross-cutting cleavages (CCC) builds on in-group bias theory by suggesting that in-group favoritism along one identity cleavage will be dampened by that of an opposing identity cleavage.

Yet, women's electability cannot fully be explained by these theories across all voter groups. Consistent with GRCT and PRT, we find that candidates who are generally stereotyped as having the psychological traits and competencies desired in a political leader—i.e., male candidates—are more electable than candidates from groups who are marginalized from power—i.e., female and Islamist. As predicted by SIT, co-tribalists and Islamists are more likely to support members of their in-groups.

In contrast, consistent with an intersectional framework,²³ we find that overall, female candidates are disadvantaged relative to males, but they can improve their chances relative to men from their group by leveraging an intersecting trait, such as co-tribalism or Islamism. Islamists are least electable overall, but female Islamists are as likely to be elected as male Islamists. Likewise, female tribal members are as likely as male tribal members to be preferred. Thus, our findings show that intersecting identities shape electability in ways that are not expected by existing theories. Moreover, our findings challenge the conventional wisdom that Islamists (or more religious citizens) and tribalists (or more conservative citizens) shun women in politics.²⁴ According to CCC, Islamists and tribalist voters should experience “contradictory and opposing influences”²⁵ when faced with female Islamist and co-tribalist candidates (i.e., someone from their tribe), depressing support for these candidates. We find no such effect, which highlights the limitations of CCC theory in some settings. This offers insights for activists working to promote women's equality in non-western settings and speaks globally to concerns about why women from different groups face disadvantages.

2. Explaining Women's Electability: The Need for an Intersectional Approach

Several theories explain electoral discrimination faced by women and other groups. We argue that while each contributes to explaining electoral politics writ large, intersectionality is needed to

understand electability in competitive authoritarian regimes like Jordan, where social and electoral institutions are designed to privilege some groups, as well as in other societies where structural inequality tilts the playing field.

2.1 Explaining Electability of Marginalized Groups: Gender Role Congruity and Power Relations Theory

Gender Role Congruity Theory (GRCT) and Power Relations Theory (PRT) emphasize a single identity (i.e., gender) and predict that women will be less popular than men. GRCT argues that women lack the psychological traits associated with past leaders, who are often men. While women are seen as extremely capable in domestic arenas, and in fact, are often viewed as superior to men with regard to honesty and kindness, they are not seen as having psychological traits associated with effective leadership.²⁶ Men are seen as more ambitious, forceful, and independent—qualities that are also associated with good leaders.²⁷ Women candidates are less electable because they struggle to both project a domestic image, playing to strengths as a wife and mother, while also accumulating experiences that make them qualified and competent political leaders, leading to a “double bind” that men do not experience.²⁸ Empirical evidence supports GRCT, but does not fully consider heterogeneity across women, even though women from some groups are more likely to have been leaders than others.

Like GRCT, PRT posits that women will be less electable than men, but argues that men are more successful because they are stereotyped as having more status than women, due to their structurally dominant position in the workforce and politics. These perceptions stem from—and are reinforced by—gender-based behavioral differences arising from socialization; men may control topics and interrupt to exert their status, while women build consensus and adapt to interlocutors.²⁹

PRT has been applied to gender, but it can also be used to consider how other marginalized identities fare. Applied to electoral politics, PRT predicts that socio-economically advantaged groups are more likely to be seen as able to attract resources to provide services in clientelistic settings, like Jordan. This affects how women and opposition candidates are perceived since fewer women and opposition members are in positions of power and therefore are less connected to the regime's resources. In most Arab countries, like Jordan, Islamists are marginalized by electoral laws designed to favor regime incumbents over opposition parties. This targeting by the regime affects Islamists' perceived ability to provide services and may hinder their electability.

Moreover, throughout the developing world, female candidates are excluded from clientelistic networks, which affects their service provision.³⁰ In the Middle East, *wasta* (i.e., personal connections or use of connections to achieve something an individual wants) is often necessary to access government services. These structural cues may not be explicitly recognized by voters, but they likely shape voter perceptions. For instance, according to our survey in Jordan,³¹ 38% see male parliamentarians as more capable of providing services, compared to 11% seeing females as better. Although the 'no difference' response was the most popular option (at 48%), a significant proportion see men as more capable. Additionally, the expectation that a candidate from a powerful tribe is best able to provide *wasta* is pertinent. Most of Jordan's successful parliamentary candidates since 1993 have been male members of powerful tribes. Although individual turnover is high, the same tribes often win seats election after election.³² Thus, GRCT and PRT have been applied to explaining gender-based biases, but can be extended to develop expectations about how tribal and Islamist candidates might fare.

2.2 Explaining Voting for In-Group Members: Social Identification Theory and Cross-Cutting Cleavages

Moreover, two theories of electoral and identity politics stemming from in-group biases are pertinent. Developed to explain group dynamics and later applied in electoral politics, social identity theory (SIT) provides insight into why voters choose candidates with different religious, ethnic, or other identities. Research on SIT shows that participants in a variety of experimental situations place themselves and others into in-groups and out-groups and tend to hold more positive stereotypes about and prefer members of their social in-group.³³ Applied to electoral politics, SIT suggests that voters favor in-group candidates.

Studies show that SIT has explanatory power across numerous identities. Studies find that respondents hold negative attitudes towards members of their religious out-group, believing that they will violate the participant's own values.³⁴ An experiment on municipal elections³⁵ argues that in-group preference for Latino candidates arises from belief in ethnically-linked fate. And, black state legislators are more likely to respond to black constituents' letters, even those from outside their district, suggesting an intrinsic motivation to serve one's own group.³⁶ Likewise, women parliamentarians tend to advocate more for women's interests³⁷ and are more likely to provide constituency services to women than are male legislators.³⁸

In-group preferences are strong in Middle Eastern societies with tribal cleavages.³⁹ Yet, while SIT and ethnic voting theories argue that voters prefer co-ethnics,⁴⁰ they fail to fully examine preferences when identities intersect in more complex and realistic ways, or how voter perceptions of candidates are shaped by social hierarchies. A related theory of Cross Cutting Cleavages (CCC) argues that when citizens must choose between candidates with different identities, the resulting contradictory pressures have been linked to voter confusion, lowered turnout, and indifference.⁴¹ SIT and CCC have been applied largely to explaining voter preferences for candidates with single

and multiple identities, but they do not consider how social hierarchies affect these preferences. In formulating SIT, Tajfel and Turner⁴² highlighted that the status of different groups in society may play a role in determining how social identities are perceived, in line with PRT, but they do not explicitly test this notion.

2.3 The Need for Intersectionality

None of these existing theories recognize how candidates' multiple identities are shaped by unequal power relations. We argue that a theory of intersectionality, which does that, is needed to fully account for voter preferences. Intersectionality was developed by Kimberlé Crenshaw to provide an analytical tool for understanding the marginalization of African American women. It highlights social justice movements' tendency to focus on African American men as the prototypical target of racism or White women as the main victims of sexism, marginalizing the differential experiences of African American women.⁴³ Crenshaw calls for an analysis that not only considers race and gender as separate categories, but also examines how differences within the categories of race and gender create distinct power dynamics and experiences that may put minority women either within or between both categories depending on the context.⁴⁴ Applied to electoral politics, how candidates fare is not simply an additive function of their group memberships leading to double discrimination in the case of two minority identities, but is intersectional, due to the impact of power structures.⁴⁵

Unlike unitary and multiple approaches,⁴⁶ intersectionality examines simultaneous and interacting effects of gender and other categories, not as unitary, mutually exclusive entities, but rather as reciprocally constructing phenomena.⁴⁷ Intersectionality treats groups as diverse, with members who often differ in politically significant ways, and engages both an individual as well as an institutional lens. Only an intersectional approach sees each of the multiple identities as mutually constitutive with existing institutional structures and power hierarchies.

GRCT/PRT and SIT/CCC need to be extended in order to explain the impact of multiple identities on women's electability. We develop a theory of intersectional electoral politics more fully than previous work⁴⁸ which allows the impact of candidate sex, opposition/incumbent group, and co-tribalism to be theorized and explained without preconceived notions about how interactions between these identities affect outcomes.

3. Tribalism, Islamism, and Gender in Jordanian Elections

Tribalism, Islamism, and gender are politically salient identities in Jordan which send voters signals about candidates. Jordan is a monarchy with a bicameral legislature, the lower house of which is popularly elected.⁴⁹ Like many competitive authoritarian and democratizing states cross-regionally, the parliament has limited policy-making power.⁵⁰ Parliamentary candidates compete largely over access to state resources to distribute to their networks, not to shape policy.⁵¹ Thus, voters expect personal benefits from parliamentarians, making candidates' perceived proximity to the regime and tribal identity an important factor in their electability.⁵²

3.1 Tribe

Tribalism is deeply embedded in Jordan's founding as a nation-state. The British provided funds to the Hashemites to payoff local tribal leaders in exchange for loyalty. State policies and patronage reinforced tribalism after independence in 1946.⁵³ Today, 76% of Jordanians identify with tribes, according to our survey. These social divisions⁵⁴ are reinforced not only through patronage but also through electoral institutions and increase the King's importance as the final arbitrator between competing groups.⁵⁵ Observers of Jordan's electoral system claim that it is designed to force voters to choose between a candidate they know—e.g., a co-tribalist—and a member of the Islamist opposition, whom they may support on ideological grounds or see as a good service

provider in their community.⁵⁶ The electoral and patronage system thus reinforces tribal affiliation, the backbone of support for the monarchy, and dampens support for the political opposition such as the IAF.

3.2 Islamist Opposition

Jordan's main Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the IAF, seeks to reassert Islamic values. First registered as a charity in 1957, the Brotherhood burgeoned by the mid-1990s into a multi-million dollar enterprise with hospitals, schools, and community centers.⁵⁷ In the past, it has proven itself to be an effective political power, threatening the regime's agenda in the parliament.⁵⁸ While its goal is not to overthrow the monarchy, the Brotherhood remains one of its staunchest critics.

Due to its success as an oppositional force, the regime has sought to marginalize the Brotherhood. Country experts explain how the electoral laws put Islamist strongholds at a disadvantage, prompting the IAF to boycott the 2010 and 2013 elections.⁵⁹ It suspended many of the Muslim Brotherhood's charity activities after refusing to renew its license in 2014 and closing down the movement's headquarters in 2016.

Despite being marginalized from power—or perhaps because of it—Islamist candidates are still favored by many voters. In the latest elections in 2016, the Brotherhood and its allies secured 12% of the seats and, with other Islamists⁶⁰ taking another 7%.⁶¹ Moreover, the IAF currently leads one of the strongest parliamentary blocs. Accordingly, Brotherhood candidates may be favored by those who support their ideology, who could be seen as their social in-group. But, respondents might, overall, be unwilling to vote for Islamist candidates if they believe that Islamists cannot access patronage.

3.3 Gender

Candidate gender also shapes electability. In Arab cultures, politics is a male domain, with women expected to remain in private spaces.⁶² Jordanian women have a labor force participation of 16%⁶³ and lack financial independence, limiting their ability to run for office. Yet, small, but significant, steps toward reducing women's political marginalization in Jordan have taken place in recent years, beginning with the implementation of a women's parliamentary quota of six seats in 2003. This quota increased to fifteen seats in 2013—about 10% of seats. In 2013, three women also won seats outside the quota, while five did so in 2016, bringing the percentage of women in parliament to the highest level (15%) in Jordanian history.

At the same time, Jordanians do not widely associate women with political leadership. In the most recent wave of the World Values Survey,⁶⁴ 81% of Jordanians agreed or strongly agreed that men make better political leaders.

4. Expectations

Jordanian voters are often faced with candidates with different intersecting features. For instance, in 2016, the coalition associated with the IAF ran twenty female candidates.⁶⁵ Tribes were reticent to nominate women in the early years of the quota as it is against societal norms to promote female leaders. But eventually smaller tribes realized how women's quota seats could benefit them since they had difficulty electing a member of their tribe to non-quota seats.⁶⁶ Tribal candidates are the most common in Jordanian elections, given that with the exception of the IAF, political parties are weak. When they do not boycott the elections, Islamists also make up a significant proportion of parliamentary candidates.

Gender Role Congruity (GRCT) and Power Relations Theory (PRT) expect females to be less electable than males. PRT also predicts that Islamists will do worse than non-Islamists, and Social Identity Theory (SIT) expects in-group members to favor in-group members (i.e., feminists will favor female candidates, Islamists will prefer Islamists, and tribalists will favor co-tribalists). Yet, these unitary theories do not offer insights about how electable candidates with more than one of these identities will be relative to others. A multiple approach like Cross Cutting Cleavages (CCC) expects female tribalists to do worse at the polls than male tribalists, and female Islamists to do more poorly than male Islamists.

Additionally, PRT and GRCT suggest that overall, females and Islamist candidates will fare worse than males and tribal candidates. GRCT theory predicts that female candidates will be less electable than male candidates, due to women's underrepresentation in political life, which results in females being stereotyped as lacking the traits associated with effective leadership. Like GRCT, PRT expects that women will be less electable than men. But this disadvantage is due to structural inequalities that lead voters to see women as less able to deliver services. PRT is thus also useful for thinking about how voters will see Islamist candidates, whom they may also stereotype as less likely than pro-regime candidates to be able to provide services.

SIT suggests that voters will prefer candidates from their in-group. Thus, we expect Islamists and non-Islamists will prefer candidates with similar ideologies, tribalists will prefer their tribal members, and feminist voters will prefer female candidates. CCC proposes that candidates with identities that cut across one another will lead to weaker support.⁶⁷ Since females are marginalized by conservative traditions like Islamism and tribalism within the society, overall female Islamists and co-tribalists should fare worse than their male counterparts according to CCC. Within subgroup analyses, by similar logic, CCC suggests that Islamist and tribalist voters should prefer female

candidates of their in-groups to a lesser extent than male candidates who share these identities. Likewise, feminist voters will be less enthusiastic about female Islamists and co-tribalists.

Existing theories carry expectations about how candidate identities affect their popularity in pre-determined ways. By contrast, an intersectional approach posits that the relationship between intersectional identities and electability must be empirically verified since unique identity combinations can play out in unexpected ways at the polls, shaped by structural inequality.

5. Survey Experiment

To explore these expectations, we employ an original low information survey experiment embedded in a household survey of 1,499 Jordanians conducted in 2014.⁶⁸ (See Appendix C). This allows us to explore electability while minimizing social desirability bias. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of six conditions, each one comprising of a different statement about a hypothetical candidate and asked how likely they would be to vote for the candidate. They saw two candidates, presented in random order to eliminate bias from priming, contamination, or attrition and yielding 2,850 profile ratings.⁶⁹ For instance, respondents might be asked how likely they would be to vote for “an educated woman” and “an educated man who is a member of their tribe”⁷⁰ or vice versa. Or, they may be asked how likely they would be to vote for “an educated woman who is a member of their tribe” and “an educated man who is a member of the IAF.” (See Appendix A, Table A1 for the full experimental design).

We included the term, “educated” in all of the statements to avoid floor effects, which we expected for candidates with traits such as gender or Islamism that might make them undesirable to some voters.⁷¹ By doing this and by separating the two candidates received by participants with four unrelated questions, we hoped to reduce the extent to which the study’s purpose would be obvious to respondents. To streamline the discussion of results, we drop out the description of being

“educated” below since all candidate profiles carried this descriptor.⁷² As discussed above, the experimental treatments simulate experiences that could actually occur in the real world, which is necessary for a survey experiment to have merit.

5.1 Respondent Characteristics

Due to resource constraints, we do not use a fully factorialized experimental design. Thus, we are unable to test all identity combinations. We chose to focus on the interactive effects of gender with tribal or Islamist identities. As such, we are not able to fully tease out what drives our results in this study, but our design lays the groundwork for a larger research agenda seeking to understand female electability in the Arab world and the global south more broadly. We hope to demonstrate the limitations of extant theories in accounting for electability and the need to extend these theories by engaging an intersectional approach.

We use three measures to identify respondent in-groups by their degree of attachment to feminism, Islamism, and tribalism. Feminist identification is a dichotomous measure of whether the respondent supports an increase in the women’s quota in parliament or not.⁷³ About one-third of the sample supports an increased quota. Although most respondents claim a tribal identity, this does not mean that all adhere to tribalism—i.e., the tendency to favor one’s tribal members over others—to the same degree. We operationalize tribalist identity as favoring one’s own putative kinship group over others among those who claim tribal membership, measured by the statement: “On a scale of one to ten, how important is it that your tribe elects a parliamentary representative, where a one is not at all important and a ten is very important?” We dichotomized the measure so that five and below indicates non-tribalist tendencies and six and above indicates tribalist tendencies. Among those claiming tribal membership, about one-third say that electing a tribal representative is not important; two-thirds say it is important.

To tap into respondent Islamism, we use responses to the following question: “On a scale of one to ten, please state your preference, where one means you prefer a candidate or list without any Islamist tendency and ten means you prefer a candidate or list with an Islamist tendency.” Among the sample, the split was about even between those who preferred no Islamist tendency (i.e., non-Islamists) and those who preferred an Islamist tendency (Islamists).⁷⁴

Importantly, respondent identities interact with one another in unexpected ways. About 65% of feminists are also tribalists and 49% are Islamists; 72% of non-feminists are tribalists and 56% are Islamists. Islamists make up 40% of non-tribalists and 56% of tribalists. This suggests that these identities are not cross-cutting in that they are not orthogonal to one another.

6. Results and Discussion

We first present average treatment effects, which allow us to evaluate our expectations about the electability within the overall population. We use ordered logit regression with a dependent variable that ranges from one to ten and a binary logistic regression with a dependent variable of one for the desire to vote for the candidate (coded 6-10 on the 10-point scale) and zero for not desiring to vote for the candidate (1-5 on the 10-point scale).⁷⁵ We present the binary logit analysis because displaying the predicted probabilities for a ten-point scale is unwieldy and the substantive results of the two models are similar. (For ordered logit results and robustness checks including analysis by OLS see Appendices A and D). We also run models with and without standard demographic controls, including respondent gender, age, and self-identified socio-economic status (Appendix A, Table A2 and A3) and find similar results.

6.1 Average Treatments Effects: Evaluating GRCT and PRT

Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities based on a logistic model of being likely to vote for the candidate. (Regression tables appear in Appendix A, Table A2). On average, the predicted probability of being a likely-voter for the candidate (i.e., answering 6-10 on the 10-point scale) holding other factors constant is highest for the male candidate lacking an intersectional identity (71% probability of tendency to vote for candidate), followed by the male co-tribalist (67%), female member of one’s tribe (63%), and the female lacking an intersectional identity (59%). The least electable candidates are the female Islamist (51%) and male Islamist (46%).

Figure 1 Marginal Effects of Being a Likely-Voter for the Candidate




Figure 1 shows predicted probabilities based on a logistic model of the respondent being likely to vote for the candidate (95% confidence intervals).

Consistently with gender-based theories, GRCT and PRT, the male candidate lacking an intersecting identity is significantly more desired than all other minority candidates—including the female candidate without another identity ($p < 0.000$), female tribe member ($p < 0.05$), female Islamist ($p < 0.000$), and male Islamist ($p < 0.000$). The only candidate that fares equally well as the male without an intersecting identity is the male co-tribalist. On average, the probability of being a likely-voter for the male candidate is thirteen percentage points higher than for a female candidate

without other identity information. When voters are presented with male candidates, because the candidates are not noticeably different from the typical parliamentarian, they are able to pull support widely from different types of voters, as expected by GRCT and PRT.

Moreover, as predicted by PRT, Islamists of both genders do worse than all other candidates. Islamist candidates are likely seen as less proximate to the regime and are therefore less capable of helping constituents. The male Islamist is twenty-six percentage points behind the male candidate ($p < 0.000$) and twenty-one percentage points behind the male co-tribalist ($p < 0.000$); the female Islamist is eight percentage points behind the female candidate ($p < 0.05$) and twelve percentage points behind the female co-tribalist candidate ($p < 0.05$). Across both models, and using the male Islamist candidate (the weakest candidate) as the baseline comparison, all other candidates are significantly more likely to receive support ($p < 0.001$), except the female Islamist.

At the same time, we also find complex and intersectional effects that are not anticipated by existing theories, including those that expect women to always face discrimination relative to men. Females can improve their electability by leveraging an intersecting identity—co-tribalism or Islamism—in order to be equally electable as male candidates from the same group, inconsistently with the expectations of PRT, GRCT, and CCC theories. Even though the female tribal member is eight percentage points less likely to receive support than the male candidate lacking another identity, she is not significantly less electable than a male tribal member. Similarly, female Islamists are not significantly less electable than male Islamists.

6.2 Heterogeneous Effects: Evaluating GRCT and SIT

To further examine the usefulness of the three theories and our intersectional approach, we test for heterogeneous effects by respondent gender, tribalism, and Islamism. The results show that, as predicted by SIT, being an Islamist sympathizer significantly increases the probability of support

for the Islamist candidates (See Figure 2). An Islamist respondent is twenty-two and twenty-four percentage points more likely to prefer an Islamist candidate (male and female, respectively) compared to non-Islamist respondents. As PRT/GRCT would expect, Islamist respondents maintain a strong preference for male candidates when other identity information is lacking. The difference between an Islamist and non-Islamist here is seventeen percentage points. Interestingly, Islamist voters are also significantly more likely to support both a female candidate who is lacking an intersectional identity as well as female co-tribal candidates, compared to non-Islamists. Thus, female co-tribal candidates are likely to notice a different reception among Islamist voters versus non-Islamist ones, demonstrating how the intersectional identities of being female and co-tribalist are linked in this case and combine to produce differential experiences than those for a male co-tribalist candidate, who is favored among Islamist and non-Islamists.

These findings defy conventional wisdom about Islamist ideology with regard to women in politics. While Islamists overall do worse than other candidates, we find that there is no difference in the electability of male and female Islamist candidates in Figure 1 (among the entire sample) or Figure 2 (among Islamist voters). This is surprising given the discourse of this group that relegates women to the home.⁷⁶ This finding, in addition to the fact that other types of female candidates (i.e., female tribal candidates and female candidates lacking another identity) do better among Islamists compared to non-Islamists (Figure 2), also does not support conventional explanations of gender bias in the Arab world, which see the Islamic religion as a driver of bias against women.

Figure 2 Marginal Effects of Islamist Tendency Interacted with Candidate Statement




Figure 2 shows the change in the predicted probability of being a likely voter for a candidate among Islamist respondents compared to the baseline of non-Islamist respondents at 0 (95% confidence intervals).

The analyses also reveal that being a tribalist is significantly related to support for all candidates except for male Islamists when compared to non-tribalists (See Figure 3). SIT predicts that tribalists will support co-tribalists more than non-tribalists, and they do so by twenty-nine percentage points for both males and females. Contradicting GRCT and PRT, tribalists are also just as likely to support male and female candidates lacking other identities.

That tribalists wish to vote for every candidate—with the exception of the male Islamist—more than non-tribalists, demonstrates that SIT fails to fully account for voting patterns in this case. Tribalists are twenty-five percentage points more likely to be a likely-supporter of a male candidate lacking an intersectional identity and twenty-three percentage points more likely to be a likely voter of a female candidate lacking an intersectional identity. Tribalists are also eighteen percentage points more likely to prefer a female Islamist than non-tribalists. This finding emphasizes the need to consider intersectionality when approaching electoral politics as the interaction between being both a male and an Islamist is a disfavored combination among tribalist voters. This also defies CCC theory's expectation that female Islamists should fare worse than male Islamists. That

tribalists on average are just as likely to vote for male tribal as female tribal members is consistent with Bush and Gao,⁷⁷ who suggest that even if tribes are patriarchal and not particularly supportive of women’s leadership, they can benefit from running women candidates for quota seats.

Figure 3 Marginal Effects of Tribalist Tendency Interacted with Candidate Statement




Figure 3 shows the change in the predicted probability of being a likely voter for a candidate for tribalist respondents compared to the baseline of non-tribalist respondents at 0 (95% confidence intervals).

To gauge support for female candidates among feminists,⁷⁸ who should be most likely to support female candidates, we analyzed the experimental results by respondents who support an increase in the women’s quota versus those who prefer the same or fewer seats (See Figure 4). As expected by SIT, feminists are significantly more likely by fifteen percentage points ($p < 0.01$) to prefer female candidates who lack an intersectional identity compared to non-feminists. PRT helps to explain why female co-tribal members are sixteen percentage points ($p < 0.01$) more likely to be preferred by feminists compared to non-feminists. Yet, female Islamists are not statistically significantly more preferred by feminists than non-feminists, a finding that is explained by an intersectional framework. The female Islamist does worse among feminists than other female candidates, likely due to her perceived rejection of secular feminism, although this finding may also be due to CCC.

Figure 4 Testing Preferences for Female Candidates among Supporters of Raising the Women’s Quota




Figure 4 shows the change in the predicted probability of being a likely voter for a candidate for feminist respondents compared to the baseline of non-feminist respondents at 0 (95% confidence intervals).

7. Conclusion and Implications

Our results have implications for electoral politics theories worldwide, and speak to debates in the gender, tribal, and Islamist politics in the Middle East and beyond. First, our results do not invalidate existing studies but show the need for an intersectional theory that accounts for complex combinations of advantage and disadvantage within different social and institutional contexts.⁷⁹ Women occupy a whole new social space when they are also members of an intersecting identity group. Their electability is shaped by the complex interaction of different identities, such that women may leverage an intersecting tribal or ideological tie with voters to improve their electability and achieve parity with minority men. While our findings do not invalidate existing theories, they demonstrate their limitations; to better comprehend voter behavior, an intersectional framework must be part of electoral behavior theory, particularly in the developing world.

Our research challenges the assumption that, when it comes to Islamist identity, women are doubly disadvantaged as an additive identity theory suggests.⁸⁰ Like Benstead, Jamal, and Lust⁸¹ find in Tunisia, we show in Jordan that Islamist males are less electable than Islamist females. This is

striking, given the patriarchal nature of Islamist ideology and the fact that transitional Tunisia is a more secular society where the Islamist Ennahda party held a plurality, while Jordan is a conservative society where Islamists are marginalized. Yet, Islamist females are as able to draw at least as much support as male Islamists in both. Further research is needed to test why this is the case.

These findings complement the burgeoning literature on gender and tribal politics within comparative electoral and identity politics literature. While female candidates are disadvantaged relative to males, they can improve their chances relative to similar men by drawing on an intersecting trait associated with their advantage, such as co-tribalism. That co-tribalism closes the gender gap among tribalists is again a surprising finding given tribal patriarchy. This finding illustrates just how important it is to conceptualize identity as intersectional and expect identities to play in complex and unexpected ways given institutional structures.

Our work also clarifies the relationship between GRCT and SIT theories, which were viewed in the past as competing.⁸² We argue instead that GRCT and SIT are complementary, but must be extended to take into account intersecting identities and power structures (i.e., intersectionality). The extent to which respondents desire to vote for candidates depends on those candidates' gender, tribalism, and ideology, with the male candidates from dominant tribes doing best, followed by females from dominant tribes. Candidates who look most like those of the past can draw support equally from all social groups—consistently with GRCT—while minority candidates activate stereotypes about their traits, competencies, and policy positions that lead them to lose support among some voter groups. This argument has not been articulated in the existing literature on identity politics but is critical to our understanding of electoral politics and identity in leadership in Jordan and elsewhere. At the same time, further research is needed to understand the mechanisms behind why one intersectional identity versus another is attracting voters.

In this study, we were unable to directly test the extent to which the candidate's identity is seen as having the stereotyped psychological traits (i.e., GRCT) and competencies (i.e., PRT) associated with effective leadership, or how likely he or she is to deliver based on shared identity with the voter (i.e., SIT). Thus, this work is a starting point for a research agenda on the role of intersectionality theory in electoral politics in non-western contexts. Future research should, for instance, test whether female candidates are less electable because they are seen as lacking competencies, such as providing *wasta*, or personality traits, such as decisiveness. Disentangling the role of different stereotypes will also help us test whether ideology or service provision drives voters' preferences Islamist candidates.⁸³

Our theoretical framework is sufficiently general to explain candidate electability across a broad range of intersecting identities—such as religiosity and race—in western and non-western contexts, though more research is needed to build a comparative framework. In this vein, Kuwait presents a case that is most similar to Jordan although numerous other Middle Eastern states also present opportunities to test Islamist versus tribalist voting tendencies including Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, as well as cases across Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Sudan, Nigeria) and South Asia (e.g., Afghanistan, Pakistan). While the extent to which political institutions marginalize the political opposition or favor some groups over others also varies, our intersectional theory and the insights of GRCT, PRT, and SIT theories travel beyond any one region.

Due to resource constraints and the need for a much larger number of observations, we were unable to theorize how candidates are perceived by voters with different intersecting traits—how a female Islamist voter perceived a female non-Islamist candidate, for instance. Through a more comprehensive study designed to test questions like these and other extensions of our research,

we will be better placed to understand the complex dynamics and controversies underlying voter behavior in Jordan and elsewhere.

Our work also has implications for policymakers seeking to empower women and minorities by suggesting the need for programs that are tailored to women from different backgrounds that may advantage or disadvantage candidates depending on the voter pool. At the same time, while these results offer input for women to improve their electability, these candidates will still be disadvantaged relative to males from the privileged groups. And, women from some groups (e.g., tribes) will have advantages that other women, such as non-members of a tribe or Islamists, will not have. These insights underscore the growing realization that women's chances at the polls depend not simply on their gender, but also on their intersecting identities and highlight the need to engage intersectionality in theories of electoral behavior and policy-making.

Notes

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68. Replication files will be made available. Random assignment of respondents to conditions was effective. (See Appendix B).
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70. We use "*asheera*" (tribe in Arabic). This term is common and not considered pejorative.
71. Our experiment, like other profile-based research designs, may be viewed as violating the exclusion restriction. When the respondent hears, 'an educated woman/man,' there are many things that change in the respondent's understanding of the candidates. We cannot manipulate gender *ceteris paribus*, due to the same social and structural mechanisms we believe explain our outcome (i.e., electability). We are interested in the effect of gender variation and all the concomitant variation, which are randomized across our respondents and therefore should not bias our findings.
72. We refer to this candidate as being just male or female and as a candidate lacking an intersectional or other identity.
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75. All results are run using Stata's svyset command to account for sample stratification at the district level and clustering at the neighborhood level.
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Online Appendix A: Experimental Design and Outcomes

Table A1 shows the experimental design.

Table A1 Experimental Conditions and Question Wording for the Dependent Variable

Question stem	On a scale from 1 to 10, how likely would you be to vote in the future for [insert randomized statement here] where 1 means you would definitely not vote for and 10 means that you would definitely vote for this candidate: An educated:
Female	...woman.
Male tribal member	...man who is a member of your tribe.
Female tribal member	...woman who is a member of your tribe.
Male Islamist	...man who is a member of the IAF.
Female Islamist	...woman who is a member of the IAF.
Male	...man.

Table A2 shows the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) binary logit, as well as the ordinal logistic regression models. Collapsing the ten-point scale into a dichotomous measure of preference for candidates yields similar results to the both the OLS and ordinal logit regression analysis, thus, we interpret the results of the more streamlined binary model in the paper, but all results are robust to both models. (See Appendix D for robustness checks).

Table A2 Determinants of Preference for Candidate Characteristics

	OLS¹	Binary Logit¹	Ordinal Logit¹
	1	2	3
Male Tribal Member	0.637*** (0.165)	0.364** (0.115)	0.389** (0.116)
Female Tribal Member	0.101 (0.197)	0.184 (0.141)	0.0522 (0.148)
Male Islamist	-0.909*** (0.218)	-0.511*** (0.151)	-0.538*** (0.108)
Female Islamist	-0.573* (0.245)	-0.309* (0.151)	-0.346** (0.096)
Male	0.795*** (0.200)	0.549*** (0.140)	0.464** (0.126)
Gender of Respondent	-0.601*** (0.142)	-0.428*** (0.105)	-0.323** (0.093)
Age	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
Socio-Economic Status 2	0.207 (0.151)	0.156 (0.094)	0.119 (0.091)
Socio-Economic Status 3	-0.032 (0.228)	0.104 (0.151)	-0.008 (0.105)
Constant	6.669***	0.531**	
Cut 1			-2.122***
Cut 2			-1.072***
Cut 3			-1.324***
Cut 4			-0.921***
Cut 5			-0.400**
Cut 6			-0.085
Cut 7			0.289
Cut 8			0.777***
Cut 9			1.216***
Observations	2,850	2,850	2,850

¹Female candidate is the base outcome. Standard errors in parentheses; †p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.²

Appendix B: Randomization

1,499 Jordanian respondents provided 3,376 candidate evaluations for this study. Table B1 shows that the six experimental conditions were randomly distributed across the districts (the primary sampling units, PSUs).

Table B1 Randomized Block Design: Assignment of Respondents to Experimental Conditions

	Female treatment	Male tribal member treatment	Female tribal member treatment	Male Islamist treatment	Female Islamist treatment	Male treatment	Total
Amman 1	47(8.4%)	49(8.6%)	36(6.9%)	35(6.7%)	51(8.5%)	49(8.2%)	267(7.9%)
Amman 4	51(9.1%)	53(9.3%)	52(10.0%)	52(10.0%)	49(8.2%)	49(8.2%)	306(9.0%)
Balqa 2	39(7.0%)	41(7.1%)	48(9.2%)	47(9.0%)	57(9.5%)	58(9.7%)	290(8.6%)
Zarqa 3	53(9.5%)	53(9.3%)	58(11.1%)	57(11.0%)	48(8.0%)	47(7.9%)	316(9.4%)
Irbid 1	42(7.5%)	43(7.5%)	52(10.0%)	52(10.0%)	48(8.0%)	49(8.2%)	286(8.5%)
Irbid 8	45(8.0%)	45(7.9%)	42(8.0%)	41(7.9%)	53(8.9%)	52(8.7%)	278(8.3%)
Jerash	51(9.1%)	52(9.1%)	39(7.5%)	41(7.9%)	47(7.9%)	46(7.7%)	276(8.2%)
Ajloun 2	52(9.3%)	53(9.3%)	33(6.3%)	32(6.2%)	54(9.0%)	54(9.0%)	278(8.3%)
Tafileh 1	47(8.4%)	47(8.2%)	47(9.0%)	48(9.3%)	54(9.0%)	57(9.5%)	300(8.9%)
Tafileh 2	34(6.0%)	37(6.5%)	33(6.3%)	33(6.4%)	50(8.4%)	49(8.2%)	236(7.0%)
Ma'an 2	52(9.3%)	52(9.1%)	36(6.9%)	36(6.9%)	42(7.0%)	44(7.4%)	262(7.8%)
Ma'an 3	46(8.2%)	46(8.0%)	45(8.6%)	45(8.7%)	45(7.5%)	45(7.5%)	272(8.0%)
Total	559 (100%)	571 (100%)	521 (100%)	519 (100%)	598 (100%)	599 (100%)	3,376 (100%)

Two-tailed χ^2 test show treatments are randomly distributed across groups.

Table B2 shows that the conditions were randomly distributed across the independent variables, as shown by insignificant chi-square tests.

Table B2 Randomization of Treatment and Independent Variables

	Female treatment	Male tribal member treatment	Female tribal member treatment	Male Islamist treatment	Female Islamist treatment	Male treatment	Total
Respondent sex							
Female	254 (50.9%)	260 (50.9%)	236 (50.9%)	237 (51.2%)	271 (51.2%)	272 (51.3%)	1530 (51.1%)
Male	245 (49.1%)	251 (49.1%)	228 (49.1%)	226 (48.8%)	258 (48.8%)	258 (48.7%)	1466 (48.9%)
<i>(N=2996/ Mean=.51/ Sd=.50)</i> $\chi^2(5)=.0423(p<1.000)$							
Islamist tendency ¹							
Not Islamist	182 (41.2%)	184 (40.7%)	166 (42.4%)	165 (42.4%)	187 (40.0%)	188 (40.2%)	1072 (41.1%)
Islamist	260 (58.8%)	268 (59.3%)	226 (57.6%)	224 (57.6%)	280 (60.0%)	280 (59.8%)	1538 (58.9%)
<i>(N=2610/ Mean=.51/ Sd=.50)</i> $\chi^2(5)=.9419(p<.967)$							
Tribalist ²							
Not tribalist	123 (33.9%)	127 (34.4%)	105 (29.0%)	103 (28.7%)	135 (34.0%)	135 (33.9%)	728 (32.4%)
Tribalist	240 (66.1%)	242 (65.6%)	257 (71.0%)	256 (71.3%)	262 (66.0%)	263 (66.1%)	1520 (67.6%)
<i>(N=2248/ Mean=.51/ Sd=.50)</i> $\chi^2(5)=6.0981(p<.297)$							

Two-tailed χ^2 test show treatments are randomly distributed across administrative districts ($p < .941$).

¹Tribalist: “On a scale of 1 to 10, how important is it to you that your tribe elects a representative to the parliament where a 1 is not at all important and a 10 is very important?” ²Islamist: “On a scale of 1 to 10, please state your personal preferences on the positions below...1 means you prefer a candidate or list without any Islamist tendency; 10 means you prefer a candidate or list with an Islamist tendency.”

Appendix C: Survey Design

The 2014 Jordanian Post-Election Survey followed the country's 2013 parliamentary elections. Local partnership with an experienced and highly reputable survey implementation firm, Middle East Marketing Consultants lead by Tony Sabbagh, facilitated the translation of the questionnaire into the local Arabic dialect, creation of a complex sample design suitable for the needs of the study, recruitment and training of fifty enumerators and supervisors, and the swift and careful implementation of the survey in the field. Data collection was carried out from April 21, 2014 to April 28, 2014 employing tablet computers in face-to-face household interviews. The enumerators and supervisors¹ were trained for two days prior to the implementation of the survey, after which they were sent out into the field in teams of five (four enumerators to each supervisor). Every attempt was made to have data uploaded to the main database in Amman every evening over Internet, and one of the authors analyzed the results each evening to check for errors or inconsistencies.

The purpose of the study was to assess political attitudes and behaviors following parliamentary elections in 2013 among the target population of Jordanian citizens of voting age (18 years) or older. To ensure sampling of adequate numbers of respondents eligible to vote in either multimember or single-member electoral districts as well as adequate representation of rural,² tribal populations under-counted in conventional probability-proportional-to-size sampling, a

¹ In the dataset, the first ten surveyors (variable svyr) are actually supervisors whose tablets were only employed for practice or in times of emergency should another tablet fail in the field.

² Defining the terms “rural” versus “urban” is a subjective process. Population density statistics at the electoral district level for Jordan were unobtainable, so two measures were constructed from available eligible voter data try to capture the differences between urban and rural electoral districts.

purposive multistage stratified sampling design was used with electoral district as the primary sampling unit. Jordan's 45 electoral districts served as strata. Twelve districts were selected, within which 25 households were randomly selected from blocks enumerated in the 2004 census.

Once in the field, interviewers were instructed to stratify selection of respondents to obtain approximately equal numbers of male and female respondents, and to select newer buildings in all replacement interviews in an attempt to gain representation of respondents who live in buildings constructed after the 2004 census. Kish tables were used to select one eligible individual within each household at random. Due to the sampling design, results are likely to show clustering in responses. Data analyses should take stratification variables into account and we do so by adding a `svyset` command to stratify by district and cluster responses at the neighborhood level.

Interviewers recorded detailed sampling and refusal information on coversheets completed for up to two visits to each residence. Incomplete surveys in the dataset are the result of a variety of issues. Refusals, in which either the person answering the door or the participant selected by the Kish table refused to participate, make up one type of incomplete survey in the dataset. A survey in which the participant decided to stop participating halfway through the questionnaire constitutes another example of an incomplete interview. Towards the end of fielding, it became apparent that some of the surveys took 20 minutes or less for enumerators to complete. The researchers conducting the project and the local partner concluded that these surveys were too short to be considered to be realistic, thus part of the final two days of the survey was spent replacing these surveys.³

³If the interview took less than 20 minutes, it is marked as incomplete under the variable "complete". Analyses of this dataset should be carried out keeping these issues in mind,


A response rate of 79.8% is based on a total of 1,879 residences visited and 1,499 completed interviews. Among these visits, 7.3% interviews are incomplete due to empty, closed, or non-residential units; ineligible respondents; or other reasons. Another 13.6% are incomplete because respondents refused to participate in the survey. Finally, 12% of the interviews were marked incomplete because they fell short of the 20-minute threshold established to verify that the interviewer did not rush through the interview, so as to call the validity of the interview into question.

dropping these surveys from analyses where appropriate.

Appendix D: Robustness Checks

We performed a number of robustness checks of the models presented in the paper. We find that an OLS analysis is inappropriate for this data because the likelihood of voting for each candidate is not normally distributed. (See Figure D1).

Figure D1 Likelihood of Voting for Candidate




To check for an alternative method of analyzing the data, an ordered logit was run on the data. In the sample as a whole, as shown in Table D2, according to ordinal logit analysis, the male candidate without an intersectional identity is most electable, followed by the male tribal candidate, the female tribal candidate, the female candidate lacking an intersectional identity, and finally the female Islamist candidate does slightly better than the male Islamist. This is the same outcome as we found with binary logit regression analysis.

Table D2 Predicted Probability of Preference for Candidate (Ordinal Logistic Analysis)

Candidate Type	Probability of 10 (%)	Probability of 1 (%)	Rank Ordinal Logit Analysis
Male	31	7	1
Male Tribal Member	30	8	2
Female Tribal Member	22	12	3
Female	22	10	4
Female Islamist	18	16	5
Male Islamist	15	19	6

If we use an ordinal logit regression analysis, we see in a visual presentation of the predicted probabilities of outcomes that male candidates, male tribe members, female tribe members, and female candidates all are statistically significantly more likely to receive a score of 10, the respondent would definitely vote for the candidate, than other categories (Figure D3). For the male Islamist candidate, the outcome of 1, the respondent would definitely not vote for the candidate, is most likely, whereas for the female an outcome of 1 is second likely. Substantively, these findings replicate what we find using binary logit.

Figure D3 Predicted Probability of Preference for the Candidate (Ordered Logistic Regression)




According to OLS the male candidate with no other information does best and then the male tribal member, followed by female tribal member and then female lacking other an intersectional identity, then female Islamist, and finally male Islamist, as shown in Table D4. (All candidate types included a statement of being educated).

Table D4 OLS Analysis

Candidate Type	Point Estimate	Rank OLS
Male	7.12	1
Male Tribe	6.9	2
Female Tribe	6.4	3
Female	6.31	4
Female Islamist	5.7	5
Male Islamist	5.4	6


If we use an OLS regression analysis, we see in a visual presentation of the predicted probabilities of voting for the candidate (Figure D5) that is very similar to the basic model presented in Figure 1. in the paper. Male candidates lacking an intersectional identity do statistically significantly better than all other candidates with the exception of the male co-tribal member. However, while the male tribal member does statistically significantly better than the female candidate lacking an intersectional identity ($p < 0.000$), he is not significantly more preferred than a female tribal member. Thus, the results reported in the paper are robust to the use of OLS.

Figure D5 Predicted Probability of Preference for the Candidate (Ordinary Least Squares)



In response to a concern that middling categories of preference for a tribal or Islamist candidate or list may be driving our results, we re-ran the analysis separating out this category of respondent. (Figure D6). We find that strong tribalist respondents (7-10 on a 10-point scale) are statistically significantly more likely to prefer tribal candidates than non-tribalist respondents. They are also just as likely to prefer female tribalists at about the same level they prefer male co-tribal candidates. Cutting this measure into three categories only strengthens our findings concerning intersectional identities and preferences for candidates.


Figure D6 Dividing Preference for Tribalist into Three Categories



Note: Base comparison is a non-tribalist respondent who was a 1-4 on the scale of being pro-Islamist.

We also find that strongly Islamist respondents (7-10 on the 10-point scale) are statistically significantly more likely to prefer Islamist candidates than non-Islamists (1-4 on the 10-point scale). (Figure D7). They are also significantly more likely to prefer female Islamist candidates at about the same level they prefer male Islamist candidates than non-Islamist respondents. Thus, splitting the sample into three groups does not affect our findings concerning intersectional identities.

Figure D7 Dividing Preference for Islamist into Three Categories



Note: Base comparison is a non-Islamist respondent who was a 1-4 on the scale of being pro-Islamist.

Finally, we checked the results for a gender divide and we find that female voters are significantly more likely to prefer female candidates of all backgrounds supporting SIT. (Figure D8).

Figure D8 Marginal Effects of Respondent Gender Interacted with Candidate Statement




Figure D8 shows the predicted probability of being a likely voter for a candidate for female respondents compared to the baseline of male respondents at 0 (95% confidence intervals).